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Abstract 
With the establishment of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) one 
of the first projects that were added to its agenda was the financial instruments project. 
The controversy surrounding the standards, and their heavy Anglo-American nature, 
have led to widespread concerns regarding the IASB granting undue influence to 
certain lobbying parties in developing these standards. The thesis examines whether 
these concerns are warranted. 
The IASB standard setting is characterised by varying degrees of constituent support 
and opposition for the organisation’s proposed changes to accounting standards. A 
robust methodology, grounded in ideology theory of regulation, is therefore developed 
to identify the impact of special interest lobbying on the IASB’s decisions during the 
development of standards for financial instruments from 2001-2012. Textual analysis 
is applied to a large sample of comment letters in order to derive a continuous measure 
of negativity for the analysis of overt lobbying, as well as identifying cases of explicit 
opinion in the responses.  
The findings show that the IASB takes account of lobbying in its standard 
development. Lobbyists are found to be more likely to be successful in blocking 
proposed changes by expressing negativity in their discussion of a proposal, as 
opposed to explicitly disagreeing. Further, the results of the analysis show that, in 
general, all major constituent groups are influential in the development, but that only 
the business community is influential when it comes to disclosure requirements. 
Moreover, opposing American constituents are more likely to block proposed changes 
than are lobbyists from elsewhere.   
Abstract  iv 
In sum, the thesis investigates and finds that the IASB’s standard setting process 
allows special interest lobbying to shape the standards for financial instruments 
accounting and that the business community and American constituents are 
particularly influential in the process, thus reinforcing the Anglo-American nature of 
the standards.  
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The foundation and formation of the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) in 1973 by professional accountancy bodies was motivated by a growing 
demand for international accounting harmonisation in the late 1960s (Godfrey and 
Langfield-Smith 2005). Since this time, the appetite for uniform standards has gained 
momentum and international bodies, such as the International Securities and Exchange 
Organization (IOSCO), have promoted efforts to develop a set of international 
standards. After substantial restructuring of the IASC, and name change to the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in 2001, many countries, including 
all E.U. countries, have replaced their domestic accounting standards with the IASB’s 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, achieving consensus in 
the development of a set of international standards has proven to be a complicated and 
difficult task. Most notably, controversies surrounding financial instruments 
accounting have resulted in partial adoption of standards, projects being delayed or 
removed from the IASB’s agenda, and major economies threatening to make 
unilateral changes to the standards. Without acceptance of the standards by its 
constituents, the legitimacy of the standards, and the survival of the IASB, would be 
threatened. This raises questions concerning its operating procedures. 
The development of appropriate standards to deal with financial instruments 
accounting has been a challenge to the IASB throughout its existence. Prior to the 
adoption of IFRS by the E.U. in 2005, the standards for financial instruments, IAS 39 
Chapter 1: Introduction   2 
 
and to a lesser extent IAS 32, were sources of constant debate.
1
 Firms subject to the 
adoption cited the complexity of IAS 39 as their biggest concern about implementing 
the new accounting system (Larson and Street 2004; Jermakowicz and Gornik-
Tomaszewski 2006). Further, the fair value option (FVO), which allowed fair value 
measurement of any financial instrument, was opposed by financial markets regulators 
on the grounds that it would introduce artificial volatility (IFRS Foundation 2005). 
The IASB resolved the issue by implementing limitations to the option, but the extent 
of fair value measurements in the standard and whether this is suitable in all reporting 
environments remains controversial (e.g., Ball 2006; Nölke and Perry 2007).  
Other concerns among European constituents regarding requirements in IAS 39 were 
not resolved prior to the E.U. adoption. In particular, the financial industry disputed 
requirements preventing macro-hedging, something which banks were using to 
smooth out fluctuations in earnings. As a consequence, the European Commission (EC) 
decided to adopt the standards with a carve-out for these requirements. The notes to 
audited financial statements for European companies listed in an E.U. securities 
market therefore state “in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards as adopted by the E.U.” (E.U.R-Lex. 2002).  This sets an alarming 
precedence for future IFRS adoption (Armstrong and Jagolinzer 2005), as adopting 
only parts of standards, or own versions of standards, defeats the purpose of 
international accounting. 
                                                 
1
 “The standards developed and issued by the IASB since 2001 are referred to as International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). The organisation also inherited a set of standards from the IASC which are 
referred to as International Accounting Standards (IAS). Some of the set of IAS have since been 
changed by the IASB but until they have been replaced they are still referred to as IAS. When referring 
to standards in a context prior to the existence of the IASB and when referring to specific standards this 
distinction is made in the text. The full set of standards, as currently in use, is henceforth referred to as 
IFRS.” 
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Academic research is divided in its judgment on fair value measurements in financial 
instruments accounting. Some argue that it exacerbates contagion (e.g., American 
Bankers Association 2008; Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Khan 2010), whilst others argue 
that this criticism is not justified in the way the standards are applied (Laux and Leuz 
2010; Badertscher et al. 2012). Aside from a downward spiral of asset valuations, 
there are concerns regarding other aspects of financial instruments accounting, such as 
how to deal with credit losses. It has been argued that the failure to allow sufficient 
provisions for doubtful debt led to overstated assets that were masking the insolvency 
of banks and obscured warning signs of a pending financial crisis (e.g., LAPFF 2011). 
The importance of accounting standards in a macroeconomic context was highlighted 
in Arnold (2009, p. 803) “…solvency and survival of our major financial institutions 
now turns on how accountants value bank assets and the extent to which auditors 
require firms to consolidate off-balance sheet entities”.  
As indicated above, the financial crisis highlighted issues within financial instruments 
accounting. Regardless of how justified the criticism of IFRS is, the political pressure 
facing the standard setter has intensified as a result of the financial crisis and the IASB 
had to respond accordingly (Bengtson 2011). This was clearly seen in 2008, when the 
IASB conceded to demands from E.U. leaders and finance ministers, waiving its due 
process, and urgently amending IAS 39 and IFRS 7 to allow banks to retrospectively 
reclassify financial instruments from the fair value category to the amortised cost 
category. All of these issues raise questions as to how the standards are developed and 
come to incorporate these highly controversial characteristics. 
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1.2 Contribution of the thesis 
The accounting literature has long viewed standard setting as a political exercise as 
opposed to a purely technical process. For example, Zeff (1978) discussed the role of 
the economic consequences argument in the fall of the then U.S. standards setter, the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) and the rise of a new body that was intended to be 
better able to cope with pressures from third parties, namely the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB). Since this time, academic research has supported the view 
that outside parties, motivated by self-interest, try to influence the standard setters to 
obtain favourable regulation (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Jorissen et al. 2012). 
One avenue for influencing the IASB is through submitting comment letters in 
response to the organisations proposals. Reviewing comment letters is part of the 
formal due process of the IASB’s standard setting. However, despite numerous calls 
for research to develop greater understanding of this process (e.g., Barth 2008; Kothari 
et al. 2010), there is still a lack of objective and rigorous methods in the lobbying 
literature for analysing comment letters, and their influence on the resulting standards. 
Even members of the IASB recognise that there are many questions surrounding 
international accounting standard setting for academic research to address. The 
following quote is from Professor Mary Barth, member of the IASB from 2001-2009: 
"Most observers understand that the IASB and FASB come under political 
pressure from time to time...Open questions relating to these issues include the 
following. What is the role of politics in standard-setting? What are the 
political forces? Do political forces from different countries offset or reinforce 
each other? Does the existence of political pressure on the standard-setting 
process result in higher or lower quality standards? That is, does political 
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pressure provide a healthy tension or does it compromise the quality of the 
outcome?"  (Barth 2008, p. 1175) 
The thesis therefore seeks to address these questions by focusing on financial 
instruments accounting, one of the most contentious topics in international accounting. 
Two standards on financial instruments were inherited from the IASC, the predecessor 
to the IASB. One, IAS 39, deals with recognition and measurement, and the other, 
IAS 32, with presentation. IAS 39 is considered to be the most controversial legacy of 
the IASC (Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 362) and a project to improve the standard 
was added to the IASB’s agenda immediately after its inception. Sir David Tweedie 
described the state of the standard in an interview in March 2001, soon after assuming 
the position of chairman of the new organisation: “For example, financial instruments 
(IAS 39) is the most terrible standard. Any standard that requires 200 questions and 
answers before it has actually come into effect represents a major problem.” (Street 
2002, p. 86).  
The IASB was established in March 2001 and implemented a due process for standard 
setting. It involves a consultation period with constituents where the IASB publishes 
an Exposure Draft (ED) setting out changes that it intends to make to the standards. 
Constituents are then allowed to submit comments on the ED, which are reviewed and 
summarised by the IASB’s technical staff, and presented to the board before changes 
are finalised and implemented into the final standard. Establishing a due process like 
this had been one of the requirements from parties influencing the development of the 
IASC into the IASB, and is crucial to the public perception of the organisation, as well 
as to the legitimacy and survival of its accounting standards (Camfferman and Zeff 
2007). As part of its commitment to transparent standard setting, the IASB publishes 
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the comment letters on its website. The length of time that the financial instruments 
project has been running for, and the controversial nature of the topic, make it an ideal 
setting to analyse the opportunities for influence within the due process. Moreover, to 
date, there is no complete study of the development of international accounting 
standards for financial instruments.  
There are some concerns that the financial industry has been granted undue influence 
over international financial instruments accounting. For example, Perry and Nölke 
(2005) found through network analysis of the IASB and the European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) that actors from the financial sector have more 
opportunities for influence than other industries. Moreover, the financial industry has 
been argued to effectively have captured financial market regulators (Hardy 2006). 
The thesis, therefore, examines whether these concerns are warranted, and whether the 
organisation and accounting standard enforcement institutions around the world need 
to reconsider aspects of their due process. 
Prior research has employed manual content analysis in order to extract opinions 
within letters and examine sources of influence (e.g., Kenny and Larson 1993; 
McLeay et al. 2000; Kwok and Sharp 2005; Hansen 2011; Giner and Acre 2012). 
However, this type of methodology makes it difficult to detect significant 
relationships between lobbying and influence as it relies on small samples due to the 
costly and time-consuming nature of content analysis. In addition, it is subjective in 
nature and results are at risk of bias due to the researcher’s own view on the opinions 
in the letters. By employing a novel, yet objective and rigorous methodology, 
grounded in ideology theory of regulation, this thesis is able to analyse a large sample, 
and establish causation of the relationship between lobbying and the final version of 
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the standards, thus obtaining objective results regarding the sources of influence at this 
stage of the standard setting process. 
In sum, the thesis contributes to our understanding of the impact of comment letter 
lobbying and the extent to which the IASB takes account of external influence within 
its due process. Moreover, a methodology is developed which is employed to identify 
sources of influence in the development of financial instruments accounting. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 outlines historical developments of the IASB and the rise of its standards to 
their current status. In addition, the chapter discusses the development of standards for 
financial instruments and the debate that has centred on the implementation of the 
controversial provisions, including the fair value option and abolition of macro-
hedging. There have been several shocks to the development of these standards caused 
by the E.U. adoption and the financial crisis. The historical developments indicate that 
there are concerns that certain parties are granted undue influence. This motivates the 
empirical investigation. 
Chapter 3 reviews the prior literature examining political lobbying of accounting 
standard setters. Competing theories of regulation are discussed, as well as two 
streams of lobbying literature: one which centres on the motivations for the 
participation in the standards setting process and the characteristics of participants, 
and one which examines the impact of comment letters on the resulting regulation. 
Extant research shows that lobbying activities are undertaken in the belief that the 
benefits will outweigh costs, yet there is little consensus as regards the extent of 
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influence that is granted to lobbying parties. Moreover, due to the shortcomings of 
manual content analysis, the scope for textual analysis is discussed in the context of its 
recent applications in accounting and finance research. 
Chapter 4 describes the sample and its text characteristics as organised by interest 
groups and geographical origin of the comment letter author or author organisation. 
The sample selection and negativity analysis demonstrate the conflicts between 
different lobbyists as well as the opportunity for deriving the primary measurements 
for the empirical investigation of ideological alignment and lobbying success used in 
the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 5 empirically analyses the room for influence in the standard setting process 
at the point where the IASB has issued an exposure draft and is requesting 
constituents’ input before making the final changes to a standard. Using computerised 
textual analysis, the level of negativity and explicit opinion in each response are 
measured and logit regression analysis is used to test if these measures have an impact 
on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its proposed changes.  
Chapter 6 empirically examines the differences in ideological alignment between 
various constituent groups and the IASB by comparing the levels of opposition in 
comment letters to the IASB’s proposals. Opposition is measured as a composite 
factor based on negative tone and explicit opinion. Further, it analyses if the impact of 
opposition on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its proposed change is dependent 
on the constituent group as well as the type of accounting issue that the change 
concerns. 
Chapter 7 investigates the issues concerning international differences in financial 
reporting and uses the methodology developed in Chapters 4-6 to examine the impact 
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of national characteristics of the lobbyists. The analysis is extended by constructing a 
subsample of the most opposing responses used to examine the impact of country-
specific characteristics on the likelihood of lobbying success. 
Chapter 8 summarises the empirical findings and concludes with the original 
contribution of the thesis, as well as considerations for future research. 
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2. Historical Development of the IASB and 
International Financial Instruments 
Accounting 
 
2.1 The Formation of the IASC 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was established in 1973. 
Its creation was a response to a growing demand for international harmonisation of 
accounting standards (Godfrey and Langfield-Smith 2005). The founding members 
were a group of professional accounting bodies from Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom and the United 
States of America.
2
 These professional bodies agreed to formulate and promote 
compliance with basic international accounting standards (IAS).
3
  
In Europe, previous attempts to harmonise European accounting included the fourth 
and seventh directives, issued in 1978 and 1983, respectively. Joos and Lang (1994) 
found that these efforts had limited impact and showed that the directives failed to 
bring about convergence of financial statement ratios between the U.K. and Germany. 
The demand for international harmonisation remained, and in the 1990s in the U.S. the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) turned to the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to encourage their endorsement of IASs to reduce the barrier for foreign 
companies to list on the exchange (McGregor 1999). However, these organisations 
wanted to see a more transparent organisation and standard setting (Jones et al. 2004). 
                                                 
2
 For a full list of professional accounting bodies, see appendix 1. 
3
 For key points of the original constitution, see appendix 2. 




2.2 The Development into the IASB 
Before 1987, the standards produced by the IASC were basic principles, prohibiting 
what they deemed to be unacceptable accounting practices, while allowing several 
acceptable options. At the time, this flexibility was necessary in order to be 
compatible with the majority of practices in the founder members’ home countries 
(Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 10). Yet, in order for the standards to attain the status 
they hold today, there were three key events that reduced the flexibility and improved 
the perception of the organisation: the stock market crash in 1987, the International 
Organization of Securities and Commissions (IOSCO) agreement in 1995, and the 
IASC’s constitutional reform in 2001 (Godfrey and Langfield-Smith 2005). These 
events generated opportunities for external parties to influence both the structure of 
the organisation as well as its standards. Influential parties included the IOSCO, the 
Group of 4 (G4), the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the 
SEC.  
2.2.1 IOSCO 
In response to the anticipated critique of financial reporting in the wake of the stock 
market crash in 1987, IOSCO and the IASC agreed that the IASC should undertake a 
comparability project of international accounting standards (Godfrey and Langfield-
Smith 2005). As a result of the project, the IASC issued set of ten standards in 1993 
which had removed some of the available alternatives that had been available under 
the old standards. However, IOSCO did not consider the ten standards to be complete 
enough to be endorsed to their member countries. A particular shortcoming was the 
lack of standards to deal with financial instruments (Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 
10). 




In 1995, IOSCO and the IASC arrived at a new agreement regarding a core set of 30 
standards, which were to include a standard for financial instruments (Camfferman 
and Zeff 2007, p. 12). Recognising the increase in the flow of cross-border capital, 
IOSCO assessed and approved the 30 resulting standards and recommended them to 
its members in 2000 (OICV-IOSCO 2000). This recommendation was, however, 
declined by the U.S., U.K., and Japan who were critical of the IASC’s operating 
structure (Collett et al. 2001). Moreover, the IASC had already started a process of 
restructuring the organisation, something which presented an opportunity for 
additional parties to influence the structure of the new organisation. 
2.2.2 The G4 
The IASC was operating in close proximity to the Group of 4 (G4); a group of 
accounting standard setters from countries with strong national standards with a ‘user 
focus’.4 The G4 had formed in 1993 as a reaction of scepticism to the increasing 
influence of the IASC (Beresford 2000). The G4 standard setters had more similar 
conceptual frameworks and wanted to move ahead with convergence of their 
standards at a faster pace than could be achieved by the IASC (Nobes 2003). The 
relationship between the IASC and the G4 developed into a state of competition for 
becoming the de facto international accounting standard setter (McGregor 1999). In 
order to assert its status, the IASC created the Strategy Working Party (SWP) in 1997 
with the explicit responsibility to turn the IASC into a quality standard setter (Street 
2006).   
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(AcSB), U.K. Accounting Standards Board (ASB), U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) and from 1996 New Zealand Financial Reporting Standards Board 
(FRSB). 




The first recommendations of the SWP proposed that the organisation should retain 
geographical dispersion as the main criteria for membership on the board. It was also 
suggested that there would be a standards development committee, operating under 
supervision of the board, in charge of the technical development of the standards, but 
that the board would possess the power to veto any standard (SWP 1998, p. 12-15). In 
their capacity as standard setters from countries with relatively developed standards, 
the G4 representatives would be likely to serve on the proposed standards 
development committee. However, G4 members were sceptical about serving on the 
committee should the standards be subject to veto by the board (Street 2006).  
An article by G4 member Warren McGregor, and staff observer/technical advisor to 
the IASC, raised doubt as to whether the SWP’s (1998) proposal of a restructured 
IASC would succeed in meeting the demands of the relevant groups. Should it fail, 
McGregor (1999) proposed that a modified G4 could assume the role as the 
international accounting standard setting body.   
2.2.3 The SEC and the FASB 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would be likely set the criteria 
for IOSCO’s endorsement of IASs and the SEC was, in turn, advised by the FASB 
(McGregor, 1999). The FASB was sceptical of the structure of the IASC as it was 
primarily made up of the accounting profession, as opposed to standard setters, and 
lacked transparency of its processes (Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 15). In 1999, the 
FASB issued a report, International Accounting Standard Setting: A Vision for the 
Future, which set out the characteristics it would like to see in a restructured IASC. 
The crucial characteristics were a transparent due process and high quality staff, as 
well as independent fund raising and oversight (Street 2006). 




The G4, FASB, and SEC all recommended the assignment of board members to be 
based on technical expertise, as opposed to geographical representation (Street 2006). 
Moreover, both the FASB report and McGregor’s (1999) article brought up the 
possibility that a modified G4 or FASB could come to take over as the international 
standard setter if the IASC were to fail in achieving an acceptable structure. The future 
of the organisation was, therefore, dependent on its willingness to comply with the 
demands of the aforementioned parties. 
2.2.4 The Creation of the IASB 
In 1999, the SWP produced a final report with recommendations for the IASC’s 
restructuring. The threat of others taking their place was recognised in the report 
(SWP 1999, p. 6):  
“In the Working Party’s view, IASC should now make structural changes so 
that it can continue to meet the need for a set of high quality global accounting 
standards. If IASC fails to make those changes, other national, regional or 
international bodies are likely to emerge to fill the gap in response to market 
pressures and become de facto global or regional standard setters.”  
The proposed structure included the appointment of board delegates based on 
technical expertise as per the wishes of the G4, FASB, and SEC. Moreover, the 
suggestion of veto by an oversight committee was removed (SWP 1999). In 2001, the 
IASC was incorporated and renamed the International Accounting Standards Board 
and started operating as an independent body with trustees and a board (Brown and 
Tarca 2001). Since its restructure, incorporation, and name change, the IASB has 
gained international recognition as a quality standard setter (Camfferman and Zeff 
2007). Currently, domestic listed companies in 92 jurisdictions are required to prepare 




their financial statements in accordance with IFRS, with a further 10 jurisdiction 
requiring some listed companies to use them, and an additional 26 jurisdiction 
permitting their use (Deloitte IAS Plus 2014). The map in Figure 2.1 illustrates the use 
of IFRS for domestic listed companies around the world with grey fields indicating 





Figure 2.1 Use of IFRS around the World 
 
 
                              This figure illustrates the use of IFRS around the world. 
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2.3 Current Structure 
Undoubtedly, the G4, including the FASB, influenced the restructure of the IASC. 
Four G4 members were given seats on the IASB after the restructure (Street 2006) and 
U.S. influence was formalised through a memorandum of understanding, signed by 
the IASC and FASB in 2002. The project, known as the Norwalk Agreement, 
promised to bring about convergence between the two bodies’ standards.  
The current structure of the IASB is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The monitoring board is 
made up of public capital market authorities to whom the trustees are publicly 
accountable. The IFRS Foundation Trustees are geographically and professionally 
diverse and responsible for the governance and oversight of the IASB, whereas the 
IASB is responsible for the technical matters of standard setting and for approving 
interpretations prepared by the IFRS Interpretation Committee. The IFRS Advisory 
Council is appointed by the trustees, and serves as the formal advisory council to the 
IASB and the trustees. It is made up of representatives of constituents affected by 
accounting standards. 
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Figure 2.2 Structure of the IFRS Foundation and IASB 
 
 
This figure was reproduced from IFRS Foundation (2012) “Who we are and what we do” and illustrates the structure of the IASB. 
 
The current structure of the IASB has been developed to balance the demands of 
important economies and organisations with endorsement and enforcement powers 
over IFRS. The make-up of the organisation is no longer exclusive to the accounting 
profession but includes various interest groups, such as representatives from the 
business community, national standard setters, other regulators, academics, and the 
accounting profession, both on the board and throughout the operating structure. This 
structure is arguably the key to the currently high status of the standards, which is 
demonstrated by widespread international adoption. An understanding of its historical 
development, therefore, provides the foundation for studying the influences upon the 
organisation within its current structure. For example, with its investor focus, 
international accounting is known to be rooted in Anglo-American accounting (Nobes 
2003; Ball 2006). Moreover, the development of the IASB clearly demonstrates how 




Anglo-American accounting is likely to continue to dominate international accounting 
(Nobes 2003).  
2.4 Due Process  
The power dynamics within international standard setting remain complex as they 
include numerous constituents, from various institutional backgrounds, often with 
conflicting interests. A key feature of the process from which the IASB derives 
legitimacy, is its due process. The IASB’s due process involves several steps and 
consultations with constituents in the development of IFRS. Below is a brief summary 
of the steps as included in the preface to IFRS (IFRS Foundation 2011, A8): 
a) The IASB identifies issues that need attention and consults with the IFRS 
Advisory Council regarding adding items to the agenda. 
b) The board decides whether to conduct the project alone, or jointly with another 
standard setter. 
c) A working group may be established. 
d) A discussion paper is issued which includes an overview of the issue, the 
preliminary views of the IASB and an invitation to comment. (This step can be 
omitted). 
e) An exposure draft is published which must have been approved by at least nine 
members of the IASB. 
f) The comment letters received are reviewed along with other consultations. 
g) An IFRS is developed which must be approved by at least nine members. 
The IASB may issue further exposure drafts if an issue is not resolved before issuing 
or amending a standard. In any lobbying setting such as this, there may be 
unobservable, informal channels of influence for external parties in the early stages of 




standard development. However, when an exposure draft has been issued, there is a 
formal opportunity for external parties to comment on the proposals contained within 
the draft, and potentially affect the IASB’s decision whether or not to implement it.6 
2.5 Financial Instruments Accounting 
The project on financial instruments has been recognised as the most challenging 
project in the history of the IASC, and the resulting standards as its most controversial 
legacy (Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 361). It started as a joint project between the 
IASC and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, in 1988 (IASC 1998). The 
disclosure and presentation part was added to a new standard in 1995, IAS 32: 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, whilst the first version of IAS 39: 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement was issued in 1998 (IASC 
1998). However, the project was far from completed and has remained complicated 
and controversial, as revisions to improve, and ultimately replace, the standards have 
continued since the organisation’s restructure into the IASB. 
2.5.1 Early Developments 
Before IAS 39 was created, another standard, IAS 25: Accounting for Investments, 
addressed investments in financial instruments. Three versions of an exposure draft 
preceded the issuance of IAS 39: E40, E48, and E62. E40 Financial Instruments was 
issued in September 1991. Although the IASC had already begun developing 
proposals on using fair value as the measurement basis for all financial instruments, 
the exposure draft proposed a mixed measurement approach based on managerial 
intent (Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 364). This was later re-drafted and re-exposed 
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 The comment letters are reviewed by the IASB’s technical staff and presented in a summarised form 
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as E48, Financial Instruments, in 1994, and as E62 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement, in June 1998, immediately preceding the standard. 
Even after issuing IAS 39 in 1998, the IASC realised that resolving the remaining 
issues, would be a long and complicated project as a result of the controversy and 
disagreement amongst interested parties.
7
  
 “Those meetings and analysis of comment letters on the Discussion Paper 
confirm that IASC faces controversies and complexities in seeking a way 
forward. While some acceptance exists of the view put forward in the 
Discussion Paper – that measurement of all financial assets and liabilities at 
fair value is necessary to obtain consistency and relevance to users – 
application of that concept to some industries and to some kinds of financial 
assets and liabilities continues to present difficulty. Widespread unease is also 
evident about the prospect of including unrealised gains, particularly on long-
term debt, in income as proposed in the Discussion Paper.  Those difficulties 
will not be easily or quickly resolved. Further, while several national standard 
setters have undertaken projects to develop national standards on various 
aspects of recognition and measurement of financial instruments, no country 
has in place or proposed standards that are similar to the proposals in the 
Discussion Paper.” (IASC 1998, p. 1023) 
2.5.2 The Interim Standard 
The standard that was published in 1998 was seen as an interim standard to be 
developed further and finalised by the Joint Working Party (JWP), comprising 
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 The discussion paper referred to in the quote below is: Accounting for Financial Assets and Financial 
Liabilities, issued in 1997. 
 




national standard setters and the IASC (IASC 1998). The JWP issued a report in 2000, 
Draft Standard and Basis for Conclusions: Financial Instruments and Similar Items, 
which proposed a shift to full fair value measurement of financial assets and financial 
liabilities. However, banks and banking associations were opposed to the complete use 
of fair value and the resulting amendments to IAS 39 maintained a mixed 
measurement approach (Hodges and Woods 2004). This illustrates the role of politics 
in developing accounting standards and in 2001, Sir David Tweedie expressed 
dissatisfaction with the interim standard, IAS 39, claiming that it was a result of 
having to complete its core set of standards (Street 2002). 
2.5.3 The Fair Value Option and the E.U. Carve-Out 
Another exposure draft on proposed improvements to IAS 39 was published by the 
IASB in 2002.
8
 This ED proposed the introduction of the much debated fair value 
option (FVO). The FVO would allow entities to irrevocably designate any financial 
asset or liability to be measured at fair value through profit or loss. The IASB 
interpreted most of the comment letters as being in favour of the introduction of the 
FVO but recognised that it evoked concerns among prudential bank regulators (IFRS 
Foundation 2005). Particular concerns amongst regulators had been the potential 
misuse of fair value to inappropriately affect profit or loss, the increase in volatility if 
used on only one part of a matched position, and the gains in profit or loss for a 
decline in an institution’s own creditworthiness (IFRS Foundation 2005).  
The E.U., which was due to adopt IFRS in 2005, was reluctant to endorse this feature 
of IAS 39 and the IASB responded by suggesting some limitations to the use of the 
FVO (IFRS Foundation 2005). Whilst these limitations were sufficient for the E.U. 
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endorsement of the FVO, issues regarding hedge accounting had yet to be resolved by 
the time that E.U. came to adopt IFRS in 2005. The issue concerned the application of 
a discount rate in the valuation of core deposits and letting them qualify for fair value 
hedge accounting. IAS 39 had disallowed these practices which were frequently used 
by European banks. The banks came to influence European policy makers including 
the French President, Jacques Chirac, who, in 2003, wrote a letter to Romano Prodi, 
the President of the EC, expressing concern regarding the adoption of IFRS, in 
particular of IAS 39 (Armstrong and Jagolinzer 2005). In the end, the EC voted to 
adopt IFRS with a carve-out for these requirements and letting member countries 
decide whether to implement this feature or not. In turn, member countries chose to 
allow companies to choose whether or not to apply the feature (Armstrong and 
Jagolinzer 2005).  
This is clear evidence of lobbying having an effect both on the written standard, as 
was the case for the limitations to the fair value option, and where it failed to achieve 
its full objective, it instead affected the enforcement of the standard. As a result, the 
notes to audited financial statements for European companies listed in an E.U. 
securities market state “in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards as adopted by the E.U.” (E.U.R-Lex. 2002). U.S. and Asian constituents 
were concerned about the European influence over the standards (Sanderson 2010). It 
was anticipated at the time that this would set a precedence that may have long-term 
implications for future IFRS adoption (e.g., Armstrong and Jagolizer 2005). Recent 
developments in the next section indicate that this may be the case.  




2.5.4 Recent Developments 
As mentioned previously, the Chairman of the IASB, David Tweedie was unhappy 
with the state of IAS 39 as inherited from the IASC. However, he was hopeful about 
the prospects of international standards setting. In an interview shortly after the 
inception of the IASB he stated:  
“An interesting aspect of the new structure is that in each of our own countries 
intense pressure can force the national standard setters to issue bad 
compromise standards. As individual national standard setters, we were not 
able to rise above the competitive disadvantage argument. However, if the 
IASB and national standard setters move in tandem under the new structure 
(the partnership) the competitive disadvantage argument disappears.” (Street 
2002, p. 85). 
As long as international standards are not enforced globally, this problem still exists. 
In October 2008, the E.U. demanded a prompt change to IAS 39. The European 
Commission called for the standard to allow reclassifications of certain assets 
measured at fair value to the amortised cost category. This would make it more similar 
to U.S. GAAP and ensure that European financial institutions were not at a 
disadvantage (Bengtson 2011). In response, the IASC Foundation waived its due 
process in order to quickly implement the reclassification option (House of Commons 
Treasury Committee 2008). David Tweedie defended this decision and claimed that it 
was necessary in order to prevent “out of control” European accounting, yet 
recognised that it was a setback for the organisation (House of Commons Treasury 
Committee 2008, Ev. 30).  




In November 2009, the EC, once again, decided to defer its endorsement of IFRS 9. In 
the same month, the FASB and IASB committed to a project to reform financial 
instruments. This followed recommendations by the Financial Crisis Advisory Group 
(FCAG), a group that had been formed in 2009 to advise the IASB and FASB in their 
response to the financial crisis. In particular, the project should aim to resolve when to 
use fair value and when to use amortised cost, how to deal with the ‘own-credit’ 
problem, and loan loss provisioning.
9
 The IASB is currently undertaking a three-part 
project to replace IAS 39 with a new standard, IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. The 
standard was meant to be completed in three phases and ready for endorsement in 
2015 (IFRS Foundation 2012c). However, there have been delays to the project and 
the aim is now to require entities to apply IFRS 9 for annual periods beginning on or 
after 1 January 2018 (IFRS Foundation 2014b). 
Despite being convinced that prior IFRS requirements were sufficient and provided 
warning signs of a crisis that people chose to ignore, the current IASB Chairman, 
Hans Hoogervorst, is confident that international financial instruments accounting has 
been improved. However, he recognised that the joint project had failed as U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS still differ substantially on Classification and Measurement, 
Offsetting, and Impairment, i.e. the key features of financial instruments accounting 
(IFRS Foundation 2014a). This sentiment is echoed by the FASB on its financial 
instruments project page of its website: “Over time, the FASB and the IASB took 
different approaches to various aspects of the accounting for financial instruments” 
(FASB 2014). 
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2.6 Conclusion  
The historical developments demonstrate how the demand for international accounting 
has resulted in the emergence of a standard setter whose structure has been heavily 
influenced by U.S. policy makers. There has been widespread adoption of IFRS 
around the world, yet the U.S. has not adopted the standards. This is likely a result of 
the political tensions that are affecting the development of the standards. Instead, the 
IASB and FASB have been working on finding converged solutions. However, for the 
financial instruments project, recent developments have not been able to achieve this.  
The board was unhappy with the existing standards on financial instruments 
accounting at the inception of the IASB. Since then, continuous efforts have been 
made to improve and simplify IAS 39, but progress has been slow. In an interview in 
the Journal of Accountancy Sir David Tweedie stated: “I often say about IAS 39 that, 
if you understand it, you haven’t read it properly—it’s incomprehensible.” (Pickard 
2007).  
Questions that remain unanswered are: How could the development of IAS 39, despite 
the dialogue with third parties, lead to a standard that was considered so unacceptable 
to its constituents that the IASB waived its due process and gave in to the demands of 
the E.U.? Do parties, external to the organisation, have an influence over the decisions 
of the IASB and are these reflected in the due process? What constituents exert the 
most influence? Answering these questions will gauge an understanding of how the 
due process is facilitating influence over the standards and how this compares to the 
pressures that the organisation face outside of its due process. 




3. Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Political influence over standard setting has been defined as “purposeful intervention 
in the standard-setting process by an economic entity with the goal of affecting the 
outcome of that process to increase that entity’s economic value or wealth or achieve 
some other self-interested purpose inconsistent with the FASB’s mission” (Gipper et al. 
2013, p. 1) and “…self-interested considerations or pleadings by preparers and others 
that may be detrimental to the interests of investors and other users…” (Zeff 2002, p. 
43). These definitions suggest that the political lobbying is rooted in self-interest and 
is somehow detrimental to the quality of the standards.  
In order to understand empirical work on political lobbying the literature review first 
provides an overview of major theories of regulation and their application to 
accounting standard setting in section 3.2. This is followed by a review of the 
empirical work on accounting lobbying in section 3.3. This review also outlines some 
of the constraints imposed by the methodologies commonly applied in this line of 
research. As text analysis is proposed as a way of overcoming these constraints, 
section 3.4 outlines the use of computerised text analysis in recent accounting and 
finance literature and its potential application to accounting lobbying research. Section 
3.5 concludes. 




3.2 Theories of Regulation and the Political Process of Standard 
Setting 
General approaches to explaining the existence of regulation may have limited 
applicability to accounting as it differs substantially from other types of regulation 
(Gipper et al. 2013). However, the key features of major theories are mentioned below 
with reference to the development of the IASB and its standards.  
3.2.1 Public Interest Theory 
Public interest theory suggests that regulation is an outcome of the regulatory body 
acting as an agent for the public (Baldwin and Cave 1999). The regulator has expertise, 
which it uses to develop regulations in the public interest. Under this theory it is 
assumed that regulation emerges as a response to market failure. Without regulation, 
markets would fail due to natural monopolies, externalities, information asymmetries, 
or excess competition.  
In the context of accounting standard setting, a public goods argument can be used to 
explain the potential underproduction of accounting information that would occur, i.e. 
the non-excludable nature of the information would potentially lead to 
underproduction (Kothari et al. 2010). There has also been mention of the potential for 
over production of accounting information without regulation. For example, Fama and 
Laffer (1971) argued that costly production of information will be motivated by the 
potential for speculative trading of company shares. This trading leads only to 
redistribution of wealth and not the generation of any social product, making the 
process less than socially optimal. Leftwich (1980), and more recently Leuz and 
Wysocki (2008), were critical of the theoretical underpinnings of these arguments as a 
justification for the standardisation and regulation of accounting. They were critical of 




the extent of market failure that would actually result in the absence of regulation, and 
even if the extent of information would not be entirely socially optimal, they were 
sceptical to the extent which regulation would correct this.  
Whether accounting regulation is justified or not, standardised practices have emerged 
and are regulated by a combination of private standard setters, financial markets 
regulators, and governments. Kothari et al. (2010) acknowledge that public interest 
theory may describe the emergence of regulation. However, they question how the 
regulation is formed and, in particular, the soundness of the assumption, in public 
interest theory, that the regulator is incorruptible and infallible, and would not be 
susceptible to lobbying. 
In addition, it is difficult to reach consensus on what constitutes ‘the public interest’ in 
accounting standard setting. In the original constitution of the IASC, it was stated that 
the members should be “guided by the need to act in the public interest and the 
general interest of the accountancy profession as a whole” (Camfferman and Zeff 
2007, p. 501). This assumes that there is no conflict between the public interest and 
the interest of the accountancy profession. As outlined in Chapter 2, the IASC 
struggled to gain acceptance of its standards when the organisation was made up of 
the profession. The standard setter was instead reorganised into a body inclusive of 
other interest groups. This suggests that the public perception of accounting regulation 
is that the public interest does not necessarily equate to the interest of the accountancy 
profession.  
3.2.2 Capture Theory 
Capture Theory views regulation as the outcome of forces of supply and demand. 
Regulation leads to wealth transfers which motivate power struggles amongst interest 




groups who try to maximise the wealth of their members (Posner 1974).
10
 This theory 
has some merit in explaining the rise of accounting regulation, and the formalisation 
of a due process is evidence of standard development being subject to conflicts 
between different interested parties. As mentioned above, accounting regulation can 
lead to wealth transfers as disclosures affect speculative trading of a company’s shares 
(Fama and Laffer 1971) and auditors’ wealth is dependent on the disclosure 
requirements of their clients (Puro 1984). Moreover, the existence of accounting 
standards could be explained by managers’, accountants’, and auditors’ need to protect 
themselves against litigation. That is, if faced with a legal liability, they will prefer to 
cite authoritative legislation rather than defending their own judgement. As such, these 
groups will want accounting standards, and may capture the processes by which they 
are developed, in order to further their own agenda (Kothari et al. 2010).  
This theory has been used to explain the importance of the accounting profession in 
the U.S. and Australia. In 1976, the FASB was criticised in the Metcalf Report by the 
U.S. Congress for lacking independence from the accounting profession (Haring 
1979). Similarly, Bowrey et al. (2007) argued that the accounting profession in 
Australia captured the Public Accountants Registration Board in order to repeal 
accounting legislation.  
3.2.3 Ideology Theory of Regulation 
Similarly to Posner (1974), Kalt and Zupan (1984) recognised that public interest 
theory is more of a normative wish than an effective explanation of regulation. 
However, they criticised capture theory for failing to recognise the potential 
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importance of ideology. This was also recognised by Kau and Rubin (1979) who 
found that, in contrast to Stigler’s (1971) hypothesis that all voting could be explained 
by economic interests, ideology was significant in the voting behaviour of U.S. 
congressmen and, thus, economic theory cannot fully explain legislation. They argued 
that a theory of regulation with a broader conception of political behaviour 
incorporating both the ideology of regulators and economic forces was needed. 
Ideology theory of regulation integrates concepts of the above mentioned theories, but 
relaxes some of the more unrealistic assumptions. Like public interest theory, it 
stresses that regulation is a response to market failures. However, it also predicts that 
lobbying, motivated by economic interests, will influence the regulator. In this way 
regulation is a joint outcome of political ideologies and special interest lobbying 
(Kothari et al. 2010). Although untested within accounting research, ideology theory 
of regulation has been argued to be promising in the context of accounting standard 
setting (e.g., Kothari et al. 2010; Gipper et al. 2013). In a free market, underproduction 
of regulation would result from externalities, giving rise to regulation to correct this. 
The regulators have ideologies, for example favouring the balance-sheet primacy or 
fair value measurement, but will take account of lobbying if it can provide them with 
relevant information (Kothari et al. 2010). The ideology of the standard setter can be 
viewed as their “ingrained mindset that favors rules with certain characteristics” 
(Gipper et al. 2013, p. 10).  
3.2.4 Institutional Theory 
According to institutional theory, behaviour is assumed to be affected by the rules and 
the organisational and social setting in which institutions operate (Baldwin and Cave 
1999). In particular, it stresses that an organisation’s struggle to achieve social 




legitimacy and maintaining credibility with external constituents is the main force for 
generating action (Fogarty 1992). Fogarty (1992) analysed the institutional context of 
the FASB and proposed that institutional theory provides a good explanation of the 
constraints that an accounting standard setter faces. It was argued that the intangible 
output in the form of accounting standards cannot be effectively explained by forces 
of supply and demand which covers traditional forms of business enterprise.  
Moreover, institutional theory provides insight into the regulator’s chosen operating 
processes and, in particular, into the institutional change that resulted in the restructure 
of the IASC into the IASB in 2001. As Chapter 2 discusses, the standard setter was 
reorganised from a body made up of the accounting profession into one which 
included various stakeholder groups in its internal processes. Camfferman and Zeff 
(2007, p. 88) attribute this to the desire of certain members to achieve worldwide 
adoption of its standards, something that the profession could not achieve on its own. 
In addition, the organisation’s survival was threatened by its potential replacement by 
the FASB or the G4 (Street 2006). The restructure was therefore imperative to its 
survival as a global standard setting body.  
One key part of institutional theory is the explanation of organisations’ tendency to 
develop similar structures. For example, coercive and mimetic isomorphism have been 
identified as factors of institutional change within the accounting standard setting 
environment in the U.S. (Fogarty 1992). Together with normative isomorphism, these 
factors cause organisations to become more homogenous (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Coercive isomorphism is a result of political influence and the issue of 
legitimacy, whereas mimetic isomorphism is a response to uncertainty (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Sources of coercive isomorphism stem from cultural expectations, and 




can manifest themselves through formal or informal pressures. In order to cope with 
poorly understood technologies and ambiguous goals, organisations are encouraged to 
model themselves on other organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
These forces effectively explain the restructure of the IASC into the IASB and its 
subsequent operating structure. As the IASB cannot enforce its standards, it is subject 
to the coercive isomorphic influence of large economies that can grant the 
organisation legitimacy by endorsing the standards. In its restructure, the IASB 
became more similar to standard setting bodies in the U.S., Canada, and Australia 
(Ravlic 2000). Mimicking the structure of other standard setters could also serve to 
cope with the uncertainty of the environment and the threat of replacement. According 
to Fogarty (1992), acceptance of the need to operate according to social expectations 
demonstrates a rational, long-term objective of organisational survival. The IASB’s 
operations have been established by isomorphic influences in order to respond to 
social expectations. Through generating a widespread perception of organisational 
legitimacy, it has improved its prospects for organisational survival.  
Theories of regulation help explain the development and operating structure of the 
IASB for which institutional theory may be particularly effective. Public Interest 
Theory and Capture Theory have limited applicability in the accounting standard 
setting context. Instead, Ideology Theory provides a conceptualisation for the 
interplay between the ideologies of the standard setter, i.e. their preferred technical 
approach, and the role of special interest lobbying and its effect on the regulatory 
output. 




3.3 Lobbying Accounting Standard Setters 
The literature on lobbying of accounting standard setters can be divided into studies 
that analyse the characteristics of lobbyists and their motivations to lobby and studies 
that examine the standard setters’ response to the lobbying efforts of interested parties, 
i.e. lobbying success. The focus of the thesis is on the influence granted to interested 
parties within the IASB’s due process and therefore adds to the second stream of 
literature. However, to better understand the context in which accounting lobbying 
takes place, a brief overview of the literature on characteristics and motivations is 
provided below. 
3.3.1 Characteristics and Motivations 
Much of the research on the lobbying of accounting standard setters derive their 
theoretical foundation from Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), as developed by 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978), and Sutton’s (1984) theory of lobbying. These models 
assume that interested parties have foresight into the economic consequences of a 
change to an accounting standard, as well the probability of success of lobbying 
efforts, and are then expected to act rationally on this information.  
PAT deals with corporate participants’, or preparers’, incentives to lobby the 
accounting standard setter and assumes that this is grounded in firms’ desire to 
increase expected future cash flows. According to PAT, factors that affect firm cash 
flows and are influenced by accounting standards are: taxes, regulation, management 
compensation plans, bookkeeping costs, and political costs. Modelling the effects, 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) predicted that large firms which experience reduced 
earnings due to changed accounting standards will favour the change. All other firms 
will oppose the change. The theory was tested by examining comment letters to a 




FASB discussion memorandum that proposed reporting the effects of general price 
level changes in financial statements. It was expected that 26 out of the 53 lobbying 
firms would likely experience reduced earnings if the proposal went ahead. Out of the 
responses from these 26 firms eight were in favour of the change and these firms were 
larger than the opposing firms, thus supporting the hypothesis.  
Empirical research largely supports that self-interest guides lobbying and that a 
negative impact on firm’s cash flows or accounting numbers is a predictor of 
preparer’s tendency to submit comment letters. For example, Francis (1987) showed 
that size, leverage, and, although more inconsistently, expenses were predictors for 
submitting comment letters opposing the FASB’s (1982) preliminary views document 
on pension accounting. Later, Schalow (1995) showed that firm size (sales) and 
impact of the proposed standard on financial statements (number of retirees) predicted 
comment letter submissions on the exposure draft on SFAS 106, ‘Employer's 
Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions’. However, leverage 
position was not found to have an effect. Dechow et al. (1996) showed that greater use 
of stock options in top-executive compensation increased the likelihood of submitting 
a comment letter opposing mandatory expensing of stock option, as was proposed by 
the FASB in the 1993 exposure draft of FAS 123 ‘Accounting for Stock-Based 
Compensation’. These results were later confirmed in Hill et al. (2002). Further, Ang 
et al. (2000) looked at the incentives of Australian companies to lobby the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (AASB) on the proposals in ED 53, ‘Accounting for 
Employee Entitlements’, for the recognition of superannuation commitments. 
Companies that lobbied were compared to a sample of companies that did not lobby 
and were found to be larger and have higher income volatility than the non-lobbying 




companies. In addition, companies with defined benefit plans were more likely to 
lobby against the proposals.  
Sutton (1984) employed Anthony Down’s (1957) economic model of voting in a 
democracy to the accounting standard setting environment to predict who lobbies, 
when they lobby, and the methods by which they lobby. The model, referred to as the 
rational choice model, predicts that a party will lobby if the benefits of influencing the 
standard setter, adjusted by the probability of lobbying success, outweigh the costs. A 
key point of the model is that preparers of financial information are more likely to 
lobby than users as preparers tend to be less diversified in terms of income. Similarly, 
less diversified preparers are more likely to lobby than more diversified preparers. The 
accounting lobbying literature overwhelmingly confirms that preparers participate 
more than users (e.g., Francis 1987; Tutticci et al. 1994; Schalow 1995; Guenther and 
Hussein 1995; Dechow et al. 1996; Weetman et al. 1996; MacArthur 1996, 1999; 
Larson 1997; Ang et al. 2000; Larson and Brown 2001; Larson 2007; Stenka and 
Taylor 2010; Jorissen et al. 2012; Giner and Arce, 2012).  
Classification of comment letters according to interest groups as identified by the 
IASB, namely the accounting profession, users, preparers, stock exchanges, regulators, 
academics, and others (IFRS Foundation 2011: A18), indicate that this is also the case 
for the IASB’s financial instruments project. 11  However, Georgiou’s (2010) 
questionnaire survey of U.K. investment management firms revealed that many users 
participate through representative report user organisations. This means that their level 
of participation may be underestimated in the empirical literature. 
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Sutton (1984) also proposed that large preparers lobby more than small preparers, as 
large firms enjoy more of the benefits, which give them greater potential to outweigh 
the costs of lobbying. This is also consistently confirmed in the literature. Several 
studies, in various settings, report that firms that submitted comment letters were 
larger than a sample of benchmark firms that did not lobby (e.g., Francis 1987; Larson 
1997; Kelly 1982, 1985; Ang et al. 2000; Georgiou 2005; Jorissen et al. 2012). 
However, it should be mentioned that within the sample of comment letters relating to 
the financial instruments project, a large proportion of letters are sent by industry 
associations on behalf of various ‘hidden’ participants. Similarly to Georgiou’s (2010) 
finding that users tend to lobby through representative organisation, the potential for 
smaller firms participating as ‘hidden’ lobbyists can therefore not be refuted, nor can 
the extent of their participation be empirically established through the estimation of 
comment letter submissions alone. 
3.3.2 Lobbying Success 
The second stream of literature looks at the development of standards in light of the 
pressure that standard setters face from outside parties. This stream of literature 
mainly focuses on comment letter submissions and the extent to which there is 
alignment between positions in the comment letters and subsequent proposals or 
finalised accounting standards.
12
 The evidence on the impact of comment letter 
submissions on accounting standards is mixed.  
Some studies have found that comment letters have a limited effect and that the 
standards are issued without reaching consensus on major accounting policies. For 
example, Brown (1981) analysed comment letters of 27 regular participants in the 
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FASB’s process. The closeness of the FASB’s positions to those expressed in the 
letters was analysed. There was minimal similarity between the FASB’s positions and 
those expressed by constituents in comment letters throughout the process. Similarly, 
Mian and Smith (1990) found that the FASB went ahead with its proposal to require 
consolidation of financial subsidiaries despite strong opposition in comment letters 
sent by both users and preparers of financial reports.   
In the U.K., the majority of academic research on the accounting standard setting 
process has concluded that the U.K. Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) and 
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) have made policy changes in response to 
opposition expressed by corporate respondents in the due process of various projects 
(e.g., Hope and Briggs 1982; Hope and Gray 1982; Jupe 2000).
13
 However, Weetman 
(2001), who analysed the 99 comment letters relating to the development of ASB’s 
FRS 3 ‘Reporting Financial Performance’, argued that the process was more of a 
symbolic ritual than an opportunity for influence. The ASB had been explicitly asking 
for input in its project to develop the standards, yet the analysis showed that the views 
expressed in the 99 comment letters were rarely taken into account in the final 
standard. Only four out of the eleven issues that the standard setter had been seeking 
input on were addressed when issuing the final standard. Weetman (2001) points out 
that the standard setter has an agenda itself which may constrain the consensus 
approach to standard setting. Taking this into consideration is important as evidence of 
influence may otherwise wrongly be interpreted as reaching consensus. The ideology 
theory of regulation takes account of this as it models regulatory outcomes as the joint 
effect of the regulator’s ideology and special interest lobbying. 
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There are, however, many studies that contest the results that standard setters are not 
affected by comment letter submissions (e.g., Hope and Gray 1982; Coombes and 
Stokes 1985; Brown and Feroz 1992; Kenny and Larsen 1993; Saemann 1999; Jupe 
2000; Hodges and Woods 2004; Kwok and Sharp 2005; Hansen 2011; Giner and Arce 
2012). Some find that final standards reflect the majority positions expressed in 
comment letters.  
For example, in an Australian setting, Coombes and Stokes (1985) analysed 337 
comment letter submissions on seven exposure drafts issued by the Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation (AARF). It was identified whether letters agreed, 
expressed no opinion, or disagreed with the AARF’s final decision on 20 accounting 
policy issues that the AARF had explicitly stated as needing resolving before 
finalising the standards. For only two policy issues were there more occurrences 
where respondents disagreed than agreed with the final outcome and in all cases did 
the combined number of respondents that agreed or expressed no opinion exceed those 
that disagreed. They interpreted this as the standard setter’s propensity to take account 
of the majority view of the comment letters, especially in the absence of evidence that 
the standards were consistently more aligned with one particular constituent group 
than any other. However, the propensity for the standard setter to change its own 
position was not addressed which makes inferences about influence ambiguous. 
Kenny and Larson (1993) found similar results in a small scale study of the IASC’s 
due process but focused on issues where the IASC changed its position. They 
examined 50 comment letters from interested parties, in 1989 and 1990, prior to the 
IASC issuing IAS 31 ‘Financial Reporting of Interests in Joint Ventures’. Manual 
content analysis was used to establish whether or not the lobbyist supported the 




proposal and it was found that on issues for which there had been a change from the 
exposure draft to the standard, constituents had been opposing the original proposal 
more often than not. This goes some way to suggest that the IASC would change its 
position in light of constituents’ opinions. However, constituent support and 
opposition was fairly evenly spread and the small sample size precludes the 
presentation of any robust results in the way of statistical significance. 
Other studies limit the sample to comment letters by corporate respondents, i.e. 
preparers, to analyse the power that this group has over standard setters. An example 
is Brown and Feroz (1992), who analysed 74 comment letters from corporations to a 
first exposure draft (ED) on general price level adjustment (GPLA) and compared 
positions to the change in the FASB’s position between the first and second ED on the 
same topic. The FASB had changed its position on four issues and it was found that 
this reflected the majority positions expressed in the comment letters. This study made 
an important methodological contribution in concentrating on issues where the FASB 
changed its position. However, it does not say anything about whether there was 
opposition expressed to any policies that the FASB chose to ignore. 
There has been some evidence of the influence of banks in the IASC/IASB’s 
development of IAS 39. In particular, Hodges and Woods (2004) argued that political 
arguments prevented the IASC/IASB from implementing concepts from the 
conceptual framework. When IAS 39 was first issued in 1998, it contained a mixed 
measurement approach to valuing financial assets and liabilities. In 2000, the Joint 
Working Group (JWG) of standard setters produced a proposal that was issued by the 
IASC to initiate a move towards full fair value. Hodges and Woods (2004) looked at 
67 comment letter submissions from banks only on this report and identified the three 




issues which were most frequently mentioned in the comment letters: the use of fair 
values, the income recognition principle, and the abolition of hedge accounting. Their 
analysis showed that all banks, except two specialist institutions, either expressed 
substantial reservations or fully disagreed with the proposals on these issues. The 
following IASB exposure draft in 2002, and ultimate amendments to the standard in 
2003, contained limited revisions to the original standard and did not incorporate the 
proposals for these three issues that had been so heavily opposed. It is clear from the 
study that there was opposition by banks but it is unclear whether other constituents 
opposed these issues as well and, therefore, whose opposition the IASC/IASB 
ultimately responded to. 
Giner and Arce (2012) studied the 539 comment letters sent to the IASB on the share-
based payments project prior to issuing IFRS 2.
14
 They identified three issues that 
appeared important to constituents and for which only one changed from the exposure 
draft to the final standard, namely the reference date. The finalised standard aligned 
with lobbyist preferences on this issue, 114 letters had been in favour of the outcome 
and 103 had been opposing that outcome. However, for the other two issues, lobbyists 
disagreed with the outcome even more; 129 disagreed and 20 agreed with the outcome 
on recognition and 115 disagreed and 35 agreed with the outcome of valuation, yet the 
IASB did not change their position. It is therefore somewhat ambiguous what can be 
concluded by the IASB’s standard setting process in light of these results.  
As was described in the section 3.3.1, constituents can be grouped according to their 
interest in the standard setting. Some studies have used this type of classification to 
analyse whether some constituent groups are more successful in influencing standard 
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setters than others. In the U.K., Hope and Gray (1982) analysed the formal 
participation in the ASC’s Research and Development project by studying 115 
comment letters to two exposure drafts and recording constituents’ agreement or 
opposition to two key issues. The authors report that the ASC changed its position on 
one of the issues, the one which had been opposed by the business community, in 
particular the aerospace industry and the final standard allowed significant discretion 
in measurement and disclosure aspects of research and development. Jupe (2000) 
confirmed U.K. standard setters’ propensity to allow corporate influence over the 
standards. Content analysis of 105 responses to the ASB’s review of FRS 1 on cash 
flow statements and comparison to the final standard revealed that subsequent changes 
to the standard were most in line with comment letter responses by large companies.  
Kwok and Sharp (2005) studied the development of IASC’s segment reporting and 
intangible assets projects from 1994-1997. Comment letters were coded according to 
whether they favoured the approach in the subsequently issued IASC document and 
were classified according to constituent group. Whilst no group was found to 
completely dominate the process, the changes made to the standards most frequently 
tended to align with the preferences of preparers. The reflection of the preferences of 
other groups may therefore be due to their initial agreement with many of the IASC’s 
proposals. However, it seems that corporate respondents had the ability to persuade 
the IASC to change their position and incorporate some of their preferences. 
Most of the literature on national standard setting researches an Anglo setting. 
McLeay et al. (2000) is a notable exception and looked at the transformation of the 
Fourth European Company Law Directive into German accounting law. Using manual 
content analysis of five published comments, separated into three groups: industry, 




academic, and the profession, McLeay et al. (2000) identified whose proposals were 
most often reflected in the finalised regulation. Consistent with much of the prior 
literature, they found that the industry group representative was most likely to be 
successful in having their proposals incorporated into the law (e.g., Hope and Briggs 
1982; Hope and Gray 1982; Jupe 2000). Crucially, lobbying success was dependent 
on the support of at least one additional constituent group, a possibility that has largely 
been ignored in other research. 
The interplay between the positions of lobbyists is in other settings is largely unknown 
but, as mentioned above, it has been argued that standard setters’ own agenda and 
preferences primarily shape the standards, which can cause confusion to the 
interpretation of the results of these types of studies (e.g., Weetman 2001). Ideology 
theory of regulation stresses that this is an important component of the final regulation. 
When studying interest group influence, the initial alignment of various interest 
groups and the standard setter would therefore best be separated from the impact of 
opposition on changes in the standard setters’ position. This separation was made by 
Saemann (1999) who analysed responses by four organisations to 20 standards that the 
FASB developed in 1974-1995. Brown’s (1980) result that the FASB was initially 
most closely aligned to the user organisation was confirmed. However, in contrast to 
Brown (1980), who concluded that no group had a dominant effect on the resulting 
standards, Saemann (1999) found that the FASB then compromised on its positions 
and that the finalised standards incorporated the wishes of the preparers as well.  
The reason much of the literature finds that preparers are influential could be a result 
of them being the largest group and therefore often representing the majority view. 
For example, Yen et al. (2007) found that the FASB addressed the most common 




objections. In particular, the preparer group provided the highest level of opposition to 
the FASB’s proposal to require reporting comprehensive income per share, and the 
requirement was not incorporated into the standard.  
Evidence is mixed but cannot clearly be related to the setting or the accounting policy 
of choice. There are several reasons for this. One of the problems in this line of 
research, and particular for early studies such as Brown (1981) and Kenny and Larson 
(1993), is the small sample sizes which means that reported findings are not supported 
by statistically significant results (Gipper et al. 2013). Another problem, and potential 
reason for the mixed results in the literature, is that these studies rely on manual 
content analysis. This suffers from subjectivity and a lack of rigor and is particularly 
problematic in the analysis of comment letters as the author may support part of a 
proposal but oppose others (Francis 1987). Moreover, the lobbyist may agree that the 
standard setter needs to address and change current practice but disagree with the 
proposed approach. This makes it difficult to assess the overall position of the lobbyist 
and requires judgement on the part of the researcher.  
Finally, methodologies vary in how they interpret influence. As highlighted above, 
some interpret alignment between preferences expressed in letters and subsequently 
issued standards as influence (e.g., Coombes and Stokes 1985; McLeay et al. 2000; 
Hansen 2011) whilst some isolate the changes from the proposal to the finalised 
standard (e.g., Brown and Feroz 1992; Jupe 2000). From an ideology theory 
perspective, if the initial proposal is implemented into the finalised standard, this 
represents the ideological component of the regulatory outcome. The effect of special 
interest lobbying is then observable where the standard setter deviates from its 




intended course of action and refrains from implementing its proposal or substantially 
revises it. 
Since the inception of the IASB, there has been active participation in the due process 
through comment letter submissions on the IASB’s proposals. That means that 
samples are now available to allow a more complete analysis of its standard setting 
processes. However, the methodologies employed in prior research do not lend 
themselves to large samples due to the time consuming nature of manual content 
analysis. In addition, there is the problem of subjectivity in the analysis. Recent 
literature in accounting and finance has been taking advantage of developments in 
computer technologies and employed computerised text analysis. This has been 
suggested as a potential method to analyse accounting standard setting (e.g., Gipper et 
al. 2013) as it can cope with large samples and removes the subjectivity associated 
with manual content analysis. 
3.4 Text Analysis 
Computerised content analysis, which is objective and replicable, has been increasing 
since 2000 (Fisher et al. 2010). Recent literature in accounting and finance has started 
to employ these methods in order to quantify the vast amount of information, 
contained within financial texts, which may have an impact on decision making. The 
methods and the linguistic features under consideration vary but include measures of 
readability (e.g., Li 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2014), machine learning (e.g., 
Antweiler and Frank 2004; Li 2010), and the use of word lists (e.g., Tetlock 2007; 
Tetlock et al. 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2011). Due to the nature of comment 
letter samples, which contain at most a few thousand observations and vary greatly in 




terms of format and length of observations, the use of word lists is the most 
appropriate method for obtaining measures of textual tone. 
An example is Li (2007) who measured risk sentiment in financial reports by counting 
the frequencies of the words ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’, with relevant inflections such as 
risky and risks. Here, an increase in risk sentiment in the current annual report, in 
comparison to the previous report, was shown to predict earnings that were more 
negative in the next year. A number of studies have applied more extensive word lists 
by using predefined categorised dictionaries or word lists developed by the researcher, 
based on part of their overall sample, to arrive at a quantitative measure of textual tone. 
For example, Loughran and McDonald (2013) focused on uncertainty around IPOs. 
They measured the simple proportions of words belonging to the Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) word lists and found that high levels of uncertain texts (as 
approximated by an aggregate measure based on the uncertain, weak modal, and 
negative word lists) were associated with higher first-day returns, absolute offer price 
revisions, and subsequent volatility. 
Other articles have analysed the textual tone in media reports and earnings press 
releases to obtain measures that can predict market reactions. Tetlock (2007) used the 
‘General Inquirer’ software that classifies words based on the Harvard IV 
Psychosocial Dictionary into 77 categories. By using principal component analysis, a 
variable for media pessimism was constructed that captured the maximum variance in 
the word categories. It was found that higher pessimism in a Wall Street Journal 
column predicted downward pressure on market prices, followed by a reversion to 
fundamentals. Extreme values of pessimism were also found to predict trading volume. 
The study was extended in Tetlock et al. (2008) by looking at firm specific 




relationships between pessimism and returns. It was found that the percentage of 
negative words can forecast low firm-earnings, that stock prices briefly underreact to 
the information contained in negative words, and that earnings and return 
predictability is largest for stories that focus on fundamentals. Similarly, Davis et al. 
(2012) measured the tone in earnings press releases using the software DICTION. Net 
optimism was measured by subtracting the number of pessimistic words from the 
number of optimistic words and found to be positively associated with future return on 
assets, as well as to generate a market response.  
In the above-mentioned studies, the word classification schemes have not been 
developed to suit the specific contexts, yet are found to effectively explain investor 
decisions. Despite this, some researchers have recognised that pre-existing word lists 
are not entirely suitable to a specific research setting and develop their own lists. For 
instance, Loughran and McDonald (2011) examined the words that occurred in 5% of 
a sample of 10-K filings and developed a list of words that they believed to have 
negative meaning in a financial report context. Higher proportions of negative words, 
according to this list, were found to be associated with significantly lower excess 
returns, whereas proportions of negative words, based on the Harvard IV list, were not. 
However, when the measures were adjusted according to a recommended term 
weighting scheme, negativity measures, based on both word lists, performed equally 
well and were statistically significant. 
Others studies have used a combination of own lists and pre-existing lists. Larcker and 
Zakolyukina (2012) analysed the language in transcribed quarterly earnings 
conference calls. After reading ten transcripts, for which financial results had later 
been restated, word lists were created for the self-constructed word categories general 




knowledge, shareholder value, value creation, hesitations, extreme negative emotions, 
and extreme positive emotions. They found a weighted ratio of these words, as well as 
words from predefined categories from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
software and extended by words from the lexical database WordNet, for 8281 
observations.
15
 These were then related to financial restatements, which were 
separated into trivial and serious restatement observations, and then used to identify 
deceptive statements. Models based on the linguistic cues were found to perform at 
least as well as models based on accounting variables in predicting earnings 
misstatement. Further, they constructed a hypothetical portfolio from firms with the 
highest deception scores and found that they produce large negative returns.  
These studies demonstrate the power of this type of methodology for using texts to 
predict market reactions. It has not yet been employed in an accounting standard 
setting context but has potential to provide a more robust empirical analysis of 
comment letter submissions and their impact on accounting standards (Gipper et al. 
2013). 
3.5 Conclusion 
Institutional theory is helpful in explaining the current structure of the IASB and its 
historical development. However, the ideology theory of regulation emerges as the 
most promising model for examining the current accounting standard development. 
Due to operationalising regulation as a dual outcome of the regulator’s ideology and 
influences by special interest lobbying, it has been advocated as a promising 
framework in academic literature reviews of political influences in accounting 
standard setting (e.g., Kothari et al. 2010; Gipper et al. 2013). 
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Empirical research supports that, in general, lobbying is motivated by self-interest and 
the most frequent participants are large firms which will experience an adverse impact 
on their reported financial results (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Sutton 1984; 
Schalow 1995; Dechow et al. 1996; Hill et al. 2002; Ang et al. 2000). However, it is 
possible the participation by other interested parties is understated in the literature, as 
they may participate through representative organisations. 
Empirical evidence of the impact of comment letter submissions on finalised standards 
is mixed. However, research on the IASC’s and IASB’s standard setting suggests that 
there is some room for influence (e.g., Kenny and Larson 1993; Hodges and Woods 
2004; Kwok and Sharp 2005; Hansen 2011; Giner and Arce 2012). However, 
methodological issues, such as small sample sizes and the subjective and unreplicable 
nature of manual comment letter analysis are identified in this stream of literature. 
Computerised text analysis has the potential to overcome some of these 
methodological shortcomings but has not yet been applied in this context. It has, 
however, been a useful methodology in accounting and finance research to measure 
the predictive power of various texts over the valuation of firms (e.g., Antweiler and 
Frank 2004; Tetlock 2007; Tetlock 2008; Li 2008; Li 2010; Loughran and McDonald 
2011; Loughran and McDonald 2013). 
In order to develop a greater understanding of the IASB’s standard setting process, 
and, in particular, the development of the controversial standards for financial 
instruments, it is therefore important to study the development in an objective, and 
rigorous, manner. It is proposed that this can be enabled by the use of and ideology 
theory framework and computerised text analysis. Chapter 4 therefore explores the 




sample of comment letters sent to the IASB on its financial instruments project and 
develops the primary measurements for the empirical investigation. 




4. Sample Selection and Descriptive 
Statistics 
 
This chapter presents how the sample of comment letters has been obtained and 
filtered, and outlines the characteristics of the remaining sample. Section 4.1 presents 
the distribution of lobbying, illustrating both the geographical dispersion of comment 
letter origin, as well as the interest group dispersion. Section 4.2 presents the textual 
characteristics of the total sample of comment letters and the parsing procedures by 
which they are derived. Section 4.3 outlines the procedure for obtaining the negativity 
measure and explicit opinions in the letters, as well as provides the descriptive 
statistics of these measures at the document level. 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The analysis focuses on the formal participation in the IASB’s standard setting 
process. As such, the sample comprises comment letters responding to discussion 
papers and exposure drafts issued by the IASB for public comment. Comment letter 
analysis is appropriate as it has been theorised (Sutton 1984), and supported by 
Georgiou’s (2002) survey of U.K. companies, that the use of other lobbying methods 
is significantly associated with making comment letter submissions. Further, Georgiou 
(2002) found that corporations that do not make comment letter submissions are 
unlikely to lobby through other methods. Therefore, comment letter content analysis 
facilitates the identification of the positions of the majority of lobbyists and enables 
empirical investigation of how the IASB develops standards in the presence of 
lobbying. 




In the founding year of the IASB, then Chairman Sir David Tweedie expressed 
dissatisfaction with the standards dealing with financial instruments that had been 
inherited from the predecessor IASC (Street 2002). Since then, the IASB has issued 24 
documents for public comment in an aim to improve IAS 32 and IAS 39 as well as 
create two new standards, IFRS 7 and IFRS 9, which, when completed, are intended to 
replace IAS 32 and IAS 39. The increased transparency and new standard setting 
procedures, as well as the recommitment to develop better standards for dealing with 
financial instruments, make the founding year of the IASB, 2001, an ideal starting 
point for the analysis. The first document was issued in 2002 and as a consequence, 
the time period spans from 2002 until the time of data collection, November 2012. In 
this time, 92 jurisdictions have adopted IFRS as the required standards for all 
domestic listed companies and a further 36 jurisdictions permit or require the use of 
IFRS for some companies (Deloitte IAS Plus 2014). The selected time period 
therefore represents a time of heightened importance of IFRS which is likely to induce 
visible lobbying efforts and enable empirical analysis of constituent influence.  
The comment letters have been obtained from the IASB’s website, www.ifrs.org, 
where the organisation publishes comment letters as part of its commitment to a 
transparent standard setting process. Four standards deal explicitly with accounting for 
financial instruments: IAS 32 ‘Financial Instruments; Presentation’, IAS 39 
‘Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement’ and their superseding 
replacements IFRS 7 ‘Financial Instruments: Disclosures’ and IFRS 9 ‘Financial 
Instruments’. In order to identify exposure drafts and comment letters relating to the 
development of these standards, four sources were used. The four standards 
themselves were scanned for mentions of exposure drafts and subsequent 
developments, the timeline of the development of each standard as produced on the 




Deloitte IAS Plus website (see Appendix 3), the archive pages on the IASB’s website 
(see Appendix 4) and the page ‘Projects since 2006’ on the IASB’s website (see 
Appendix 5).  
At the time of the data collection, a total of 3064 comment letters had been generated 
in response to the 24 documents. Out of those, 1815 related to projects which are 
considered to have been completed. Table 4.1 outlines the 24 documents and the 
number of corresponding comment letters, as well as the completion status of the 
project to which they relate. The greatest volume of comment letters was received for 
the exposure draft Hedge Accounting in 2010. This is an issue which had been 
controversial since the inception of the IASB. However, the high volume of comment 
letters may be due to a combination of the salience of the issue and the overall 
increased levels of participation in the lobbying process as more countries came to 
adopt IFRS. The period prior to European and Australian adoption in 2005 generated 
an average of 102 comment letters per issued document, whereas the period after 2005 
generated an average of 138 comment letters and since 2009, an average of 166. This 
is further illustrated in Figure 4.1 which presents the number of comment letter 















Figure 4.1 Number of Comment Letter Responses per Issued Document 
 
 
This figure displays the distribution of comment letters per issued document and a three-document trend line
  
 
Table 4.1 Documents on Financial Instruments  




Amendments to IAS 32, Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, and IAS 39, Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement 207 Completed 
2003 August Exposure Draft Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate Risk (Macro Hedging)  127 Completed 
2004 April 
ED Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement: The Fair Value 
Option 116 Completed 
2004 November 
Exposure draft of proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement and 
IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts, November 2004 61 Completed 
2004 July IAS 39 Financial Instruments - Transition and Initial Recognition of Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities 37 Completed 
2004 October IAS 39 Financial Instruments- Cash Flow Hedge A/c of Forecast Intra Group Transactions, October 2004 58 Completed 
2004 October Exposure Draft 7: Disclosures 106 Completed 
2006 June 
Exposure Draft of proposed amendments relating to Puttable Instruments and Obligations Arising on 
Liquidation 88 Completed 
2007 September 
Exposure draft of proposed amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, 
Exposures Qualifying for Hedge Accounting 74 Completed 
2008 February Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Equity 125 Not Completed 
2008 March Discussion Paper: Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial Instruments 166 Not Completed 
2008 October 
Improving Disclosures about Financial Instruments (Amendments to IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures) 89 Completed 
2008 December Exposure Draft of proposed amendments to IFRS 7 (investment in debt instruments) 92 Not Completed 
2008 December Proposed amendment to IAS 39 for Embedded Derivatives Assessment 55 Completed 
2009 March Proposed amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 (Derecognition) 120 Completed 
2009 June Discussion Paper: Credit Risk in Liability Measurement 123 Not Completed 
2009 June 
Request for Information (‘Expected Loss Model’) Impairment of Financial Assets: Expected Cash Flow 
Approach 89 Not Completed 
2009 July Financial Instruments: Classification and Measurement 246 Completed 
2009 November Proposed amendment to IAS 39 for impairment of financial assets measured at amortised cost 193 Not Completed 
2010 May Exposure Draft - Fair Value Option for Financial Liabilities 138 Completed 
2010 December Hedge Accounting 249 Not Completed 
2011 January Supplementary document to the  exposure draft Financial Instruments: Amortised Cost and Impairment 212 Not Completed 
2011 January Offsetting financial assets and financial liabilities 162 Completed 
2011 August Mandatory effective date of IFRS 9 131 Completed 
  
Total 3064 
     Completed Projects 1815 





























Table 4.2 reports the impact of missing letters on the initial sample size. Three letters 
were missing due to requested confidentiality. A further 45 letters were missing or 
unavailable to download for unknown reasons, requiring the observations to be 
removed. The remaining sample, available for analysis, amounts to 3016 comment 
letters by 841 individual authors from 54 countries. This makes it the largest sample 
for content analysis in this stream of literature to date with the largest known samples 











Total number of comment letters reported by the standard setter 3064 
 
Letters excluding those missing due to requested confidentiality 3061 3 
Letters excluding those missing due to unknown reasons 3016 45 
Final number of comment letters 3016 
 
   Number of unique authors 841 
 
   Number of countries 54 
 
   Average number of letters per issued document 127.67 
 
This table reports the impact of missing letters on the initial comment letter sample size 
 
4.1.2 Interest Group Classification 
The authors are divided into interest groups according to the IASB’s own 
classification, i.e. “accountants, financial analysts and other users of financial 
statements, the business community, stock exchanges, regulatory and legal authorities, 
academics and other interested individuals” (IFRS Foundation 2011, A18). Where it 
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 Jorissen et al. (2011) analyse the characteristics of the authors of 3234 comment letters sent to the 
IASB and EFRAG relating to various issues, but the content analysis is limited to a subsample of 125 
letters to identify similarities between letters sent by the same author to both organisations. 




is unclear from the comment letter which interest group the author belongs to, this has 
been identified by searching for the author or author organisation online. 
Following Larson (1997) and Jorissen et al. (2012), letters from individuals with 
specific ties to organisations are grouped with their respective organisation unless the 
letter explicitly states that the views expressed should not be linked to the organisation. 
For this reason, or due to insufficient information regarding the author within the 
comment letter or online, there were twenty cases where individuals could not be 
classified according to an interest group. These authors are grouped as unaffiliated 
individuals. An additional three letters could not be classified due to anonymity of the 
author or not observably belonging to any of the interest groups. In total, these letters 
represent less than 1% of the final sample. 
Further subdivisions of the interest groups were made in order to enable a deeper 
understanding of the lobbyist characteristics. Accountants were split into four groups: 
(1) individuals; where the author is an accountant but the letter explicitly states that 
the views expressed are that of the individual and not of any organisation to which 
he/she can be affiliated, (2) accounting and auditing firms, (3) big four, and (4) 
professional accounting associations. Users were divided into financial analysts, as 
identified by the IASB, as well as investment firms and other users. The business 
community was divided into financial industry (including insurance) and other 
preparers. In addition, it was noted whether each letter is representing a single 
organisation, or multiple, through trade associations. Regulatory and legal authorities 
were subdivided into national standard setters, supervisors of financial markets 
(including central banks) and other regulatory and legal authorities (including 




government bodies and government advisory bodies). Following Jorissen et al. (2012), 
other interested parties were identified as actuaries and consultants. 
Table 4.3 presents the distribution of interest groups and subdivisions based on these 
classifications across the whole sample and period which is further illustrated in 
Figure 4.2. 
Table 4.3 Interest Group Classification 
Interest Group # % 
Accountants 620 20.56% 
(Individuals) 18 0.60% 
(Accounting Firms) 77 2.55% 
(Big Four) 95 3.15% 
(Professional Accounting Associations) 430 14.26% 
Users 107 3.55% 
(Financial Analysts) 23 0.76% 
(Investment firms) 120 3.98% 
(Other users) 11 0.36% 
The Business Community 1559 51.69% 
(Financial Industry) 1041 34.52% 
(Other preparers) 518 17.18% 
Stock Exchanges 7 0.23% 
Regulatory and Legal Authorities 611 20.26% 
(National Standard Setters) 360 11.94% 
(Financial Markets Regulators) 184 6.10% 
(Other Regulatory and Legal Authorities) 67 2.22% 
Academic 47 1.56% 
Other Interested Parties 42 1.39% 
(Actuaries) 29 0.96% 
(Consultants) 13 0.43% 
Unaffiliated 20 0.66% 
Unknown 3 0.10% 
Total 3016 100.00% 
This table presents the interest group dispersion of the comment letters 
 








The figure displays the distribution of interest groups in the sample. The make-up of the business community is further displayed 
as the percentage of comment letters in the total sample from the financial industry and other preparers. 
 
The greatest participating interest group, by volume of comment letters, was the 
business community which submitted over half of the comment letters. The preparer 
group being more active than the user group, as per Sutton’s (1984) conjecture, is well 
represented by comment letter samples in the literature (e.g., McLeay et al. 2000; 
Stenka and Taylor 2010; Giner and Arce 2012; Jorissen et al. 2011). It is therefore 
unsurprising that, in the present sample, users sent only 4% of the letters compared to 
preparers’ 52%. The sectioning of the business community shows that the financial 
industry sent 35% of the total letters, making this the largest group of any other 
interest group and subdivision. Their high level of participation is natural considering 
the topic of the IASB issued documents.  
Following the business community, the greatest volume of comment letters was sent 
by the accounting profession (21%), mostly from professional accounting associations 




(14%). The third largest group was regulatory and legal authorities, out of whom 
national accounting standard setters represented 12%, financial markets regulators 6% 
and other regulatory and legal authorities 2% of the total sample. The academic 
community, stock exchanges, and other interested parties were the smallest 
participants by volume, with letters from each group making up less than 2% of the 
sample. 
Unsurprisingly, the distribution of comment letters across interest groups is largely 
consistent with Jorissen et al. (2012) which analyses the characteristics of lobbyists in 
a multi-issue setting for the participation in the IASB’s standard setting process in 
2002-2006 which intersects the sample period for the present study. 
4.1.3 Geographical Classification 
In order to deal with hypotheses relating to geographical distribution of influence, 
comment letters are classified according to the home country of the author or author 
organisation. For incorporated organisations, where the sender’s country is not 
explicitly stated in the letter or disclosed on ifrs.org, the location of incorporation is 
used. This is likely to most closely represent the institutional framework in which the 
author prepares financial reports. For other organisations, the headquarters have been 
used to identify the home country. In cases where the letter represents organisations 
from more than one country, the home country is set to international. As a second 
stage of geographical classification, to be more specific regarding the geographical 
classification of authors which cannot be linked to a single country, letters are 
classified according to part of the world.  Where letters represent organisations from 
more than one continent, the part of the world is set to international. Table 4.4 shows 




the geographical dispersion of comment letters which is further illustrated in Figure 
4.3. 







 # %  # % 
Africa 68 2.25% 
 
Europe 1671 55.40% 
Africa - International 3 0.10% 
 
Europe - International 215 7.13% 
Botswana 1 0.03% 
 
Austria 29 0.96% 
Kenya 2 0.07% 
 
Belgium 47 1.56% 
Mauritius 1 0.03% 
 
Cyprus 3 0.10% 
Rwanda 1 0.03% 
 
Czech Republic 4 0.13% 
South Africa 52 1.72% 
 
Denmark 33 1.09% 
Tanzania 1 0.03% 
 
Finland 7 0.23% 
Zambia 7 0.23% 
 
France 183 6.07% 
Asia 341 11.31% 
 
Germany 224 7.43% 
China 25 0.83% 
 
Ireland 43 1.43% 
Hong Kong 30 0.99% 
 
Italy 38 1.26% 
India 44 1.46% 
 
Luxembourg 8 0.27% 
Iran 1 0.03% 
 
Malta 1 0.03% 
Israel 10 0.33% 
 
Netherlands 77 2.55% 
Japan 111 3.68% 
 
Norway 15 0.50% 
Malaysia 25 0.83% 
 
Poland 6 0.20% 
Pakistan 19 0.63% 
 
Portugal 1 0.03% 
Philippines 1 0.03% 
 
Romania 1 0.03% 
Singapore 36 1.19% 
 
Russia 15 0.50% 
South Korea 28 0.93% 
 
Slovakia 2 0.07% 
Taiwan 1 0.03% 
 
Spain 42 1.39% 
Thailand 5 0.17% 
 
Sweden 70 2.32% 
Turkey 2 0.07% 
 
Switzerland 115 3.81% 
United Arab Emirates 3 0.10% 
 
U.K. 492 16.31% 
South America 26 0.86% 
 
North America 458 15.19% 
South America - 
International 2 0.07% 
 
North America - 
International 1 0.03% 
Argentina 3 0.10% 
 
Canada 107 3.55% 
Brazil 14 0.46% 
 
Mexico 18 0.60% 
Chile 6 0.20% 
 
U.S. 332 11.01% 
Colombia 1 0.03% 
 
Unknown 10 0.33% 
Oceania 260 8.62% 
 
International 182 6.03% 
Australia 206 6.83% 
    New Zealand 54 1.79% 
 
Total 3016 100.00% 
 
This table reports the geographical dispersion of the comment letters across the whole sample 
  
 
Figure 4.3 Geographical Dispersion of Comment Letters 
 
 




























The geographical representation is dispersed over 54 countries. More than half of the 
letters were sent from Europe and out of these, U.K. authors were the greatest 
participants by volume. The U.S. was the second most represented country (16%) 
making the two best represented countries common-law jurisdictions with Anglo-
Saxon accounting traditions. Australian authors (7%) were other active participants, 
from a similar institutional environment to the Anglo-American tradition, as were 
authors from the code-law countries Germany (7%) and France (6%). South American 
countries sent the fewest letters (less than 1%) followed by African constituents (2%). 
Asian countries were better represented at 11% of which Japan was the greatest 
participant (4%). The geographical dispersion appears similar to that of Hansen (2011) 
which finds the U.K., U.S. and Australia to be the most represented countries. 
The geographical dispersion of comment letters is greater than that of donors which in 
2008 were from 40 countries, as reported by Larson and Kenny (2011). At this point, 
there were still no donors from many countries that had adopted IFRS. The greater 
geographical dispersion of comment letters suggests that there are interested parties in 
countries from which there are no donors and that these parties are not complacent, or 
indifferent, to the actions of the IASB.  
Table 4.5 combines interest group and geographical classification. It clearly illustrates 























Part of the 
World # % % % % % % % % % 
Africa 68 2.25% 1.47% 58.82% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.47% 38.24% 0.00% 
Asia 341 11.31% 2.05% 28.15% 2.35% 0.88% 32.26% 1.17% 31.09% 2.05% 
Europe 1671 55.40% 0.60% 23.10% 2.57% 0.66% 16.16% 0.00% 56.55% 0.36% 
North America 458 15.19% 3.71% 12.88% 3.49% 2.40% 14.41% 0.22% 62.01% 0.87% 
Oceania 260 8.62% 2.31% 11.15% 2.69% 1.92% 29.62% 0.38% 51.92% 0.00% 
South America 26 0.86% 23.08% 23.08% 0.00% 0.00% 23.08% 0.00% 30.77% 0.00% 
Unknown 10 0.33% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 60.00% 
International 182 6.03% 0.00% 1.65% 17.58% 6.04% 45.05% 0.00% 29.67% 0.00% 
Total 3016 100.00% 1.56% 20.56% 3.51% 1.39% 20.29% 0.23% 51.69% 0.76% 
This table reports the interest group and geographical dispersion in terms of part of the world of the comment letters across the whole sample. The percentages are the percentage of letters in the given part of the 





























From Africa, most letters came from the profession. From Asia, most letters were sent 
by regulatory and legal authorities. In Europe, North America, and Oceania, the 
business community were the greatest participants by volume at 57%, 62%, and 52% 
respectively. Out of the few letters from South America, most came from the business 
community (31%). However, the remainder of the letters were evenly dispersed 
between academics, accountants, and regulators. For the part of the sample where 
authors are classified as being international, the best represented group is 
multinational regulatory bodies of financial markets, such as the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
4.2.1 Data Processing 
Text data is considered to be unstructured data as it appears in no specified format, has 
variable length, variable spelling, contains punctuation, and other non-alphanumeric 
characters, and does not adhere to a predefined set of values (Francis and Flynn 2010). 
In order to convert the text into structured data for further analysis, the files were 
converted into simple text format and the text data was parsed to extract the words. 
4.2.2 Converting Files to Simple Text 
The comment letters appeared in .pdf or .docx format on the IASB’s and FASB’s 
websites. These were downloaded and named according to an id for which 
corresponding data for the sender was recorded. The files were then converted into 
simple text format using PDF Converter Enterprise, a software that automatically 
identifies files which contain graphics and transforms them using Optical Character 




Recognition (OCR). This was essential as many files contained letters that had been 
scanned. The size and readability of the converted files were tested programmatically. 
Unreadable files or files of a size of 1.5kb or less were compared to the original to 
identify whether the text conversion had been successful. In cases where the graphics 
had not been recognised, the conversion process was repeated, manually forcing 
OCR.
17
 Secured files, i.e. not supported by PDF Converter Enterprise, were unlocked 
using freely available software from http://www.pdfunlock.com. Appendices that 
appeared as separate files on ifrs.org were programmatically appended to their 
corresponding letters to ensure that the statistics presented below are for letters 
including appendices. 
4.2.3 Parsing the Data 
The programming language ‘Perl’, was used to undertake the textual analysis. This 
language is particularly suitable for text processing (Francis and Flynn 2010). Perl is 
available through open source software and has been successfully used in text 
processing in financial research (e.g., Weiss Hanley and Hoberg 2012) and accounting 
research (e.g., Li 2008; Twedt and Rees 2012). 
To produce the simple text statistics for the total sample, all letters were read into perl 
and using regular expression, punctuation was removed and tokens, i.e. character 
combinations, of two or more alphabetic characters were retained. One character 
tokens were removed to reduce noise from stray characters without meaning that may 
have resulted from the OCR conversions. The words from Loughran and McDonald’s 
(2011) master dictionary were used to match the tokens to words. This dictionary is 
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 In some instances, PDF Converter Enterprise fails to recognise graphics automatically. This process 
was therefore necessary to capture all these instances and extract all the available text. Manually 
forcing OCR thus involved opening the relevant file in PDF Converter Enterprise and explicitly telling 
the program that it was dealing with graphics instead of relying on the automatic identification of 
images containing text. 




based on the 4.0 of 12dicts, released in January 2003, which is oriented towards 
common words, excludes abbreviations, acronyms, inflections, and names, but 
includes both American and British English. In addition to the over 80000 words in 
the original 12dicts, Loughran and McDonald enhanced the master dictionary by 
adding words not found in the dictionary but that were found in a large sample of 10ks. 
To develop a master dictionary for this study, a similar procedure was followed. 
Initially, words were matched to the master dictionary used by Loughran and 
McDonald. Unmatched words that appeared ten or more times were evaluated for 
addition to the master dictionary. Most of the frequent but unmatched words were 
acronyms and names of people, organisations, months, and countries which therefore 
did not qualify for inclusion. However, 73 additions were made, creating a new master 
dictionary of 84403 words.
18
 Out of the total 7472657 words identified in the letters, 
7203647 matched words in the master dictionary, representing 15026 unique words.  
4.2.4 Simple Text Statistics 
In matching the words to the new master dictionary, simple statistics, regarding the 
frequency of each word and the distribution of word length in the sample, could be 
tabulated. Table 4.6 presents the distribution of the length of words, with the smallest 
words being made up of two characters, as any one-character words were removed 
when reading in the text. The longest word is “overcollateralization”, with 21 
characters, which occurs 3 times. Two-character words are the most frequent, with 
1407778 occurrences, after which the frequency tends to decrease as the length 
increases. This is illustrated in Figure 5 and unsurprising given the word frequency 
reported in Table 4.7, demonstrating that ten of the most frequent words all have a 
length of four characters or less; six of which have only two characters. Examples of 
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 For the added words, see Appendix 6 




longer words, i.e. of seventeen characters or more, are ‘reclassification’, 
‘misrepresentation’, ‘contemporaneously’, ‘telecommunications’, ‘interdependencies’, 
‘counterproductive’, and ‘disproportionately’. 
 
Figure 4.4 Distribution of Length of Words 
 
 
This figure reports the frequency of words of various lengths, ranging from the shortest words of two characters to the longest 
words of 21 characters. 
 




Table 4.6 Distribution of 
Length of Words 
 
Table 4.7 Word Frequencies for 
Comment Letter Data 
Length Comment Letter Data 
 
Rank Word Count Percentage 
2 1411346 
 
1 the 550591 7.64 
3 1264598 
 
2 of 262453 3.64 
4 884039 
 
3 to 223635 3.10 
5 690630 
 
4 in 181941 2.53 
6 527077 
 
5 and 168918 2.34 
7 514404 
 
6 that 136297 1.89 
8 540271 
 
7 be 107486 1.49 
9 490652 
 
8 for 97903 1.36 
10 383041 
 
9 is 96361 1.34 
11 292420 
 
10 we 81950 1.14 
12 105632 
 
11 not 81660 1.13 
13 63880 
 
12 financial 79700 1.11 
14 21048 
 
13 as 66373 0.92 
15 10480 
 
14 on 62730 0.87 
16 2657 
 
15 or 57513 0.80 
17 1353 
 
16 with 57188 0.79 
18 116 
 
17 would 54957 0.76 
21 3 
 
18 are 54566 0.76 
  
19 value 48716 0.68 
   
20 should 47503 0.66 
   
21 this 47422 0.66 
   
22 an 46342 0.64 
   
23 fair 42592 0.59 
   
24 accounting 41650 0.58 
   
25 if 40001 0.56 
   
26 it 39214 0.54 
   
27 instruments 39189 0.54 
   
28 do 38381 0.53 
   
29 you 37131 0.52 
   
30 why 35387 0.49 
This table reports the distribution of the length 
of word for the comment letter data sample.  
This table reports the thirty most frequent words for the comment 
letter data sample 
       
 
The comment letters contain 15026 unique words from the master dictionary. Table 
4.7 reports the thirty most frequent words. Natural language contains very few 
frequent words, a small group of words of medium frequency, and a large group of 
infrequent words (Zipf 1932). Therefore, it is not surprising that the most common 
word is the article ‘the’ which occurs 550591 times. Other words that are commonly 
used are other ‘function’ words such as ‘that’, ‘of’, ‘to’, and ‘in’. In contrast, amongst 




the 30 most frequent words are also ‘financial’, ‘value’, ‘fair’, ‘accounting’ and 
‘instruments’. The over-indexing of these words is a clear indication of the topic of the 
comment letters and the relevance of the sample to the study of the development of 
accounting treatments for financial instruments including the increasing use of fair 
value accounting. 
4.3 Negativity Analysis 
In order to manage the content analysis of such a large sample of comment letters, 
whilst maintaining objectivity, extracted words were compared to modal word lists to 
assess the level of negativity in each letter. The political nature of the accounting 
standard setting process, potentially, makes interested parties cautious of explicitly 
opposing the standard setter in case it may hinder their influence. For the same reason, 
the level of positivity in the letters may be misleading as a measure of consent. In 
addition, discontent may be wrapped in positivity by negating the positive words. 
Tetlock (2007) and Loughran and McDonald (2011) note that measuring positivity is 
of limited use for this reason. On the other hand, negativity in the discussion of a 
proposal is unnecessary unless there is opposition. This is, therefore, a key variable to 
explore lobbyists’ potential for successfully blocking proposals from becoming 
accounting standards. Measuring negativity circumvents the noise from using positive 
word lists and allows the analysis to capture even that part of the sample which avoids 
explicit opposition, yet makes its discontent with the proposal known to the standard 
setter.  
4.3.1 Negative Words 
Two word lists were considered when undertaking the analysis of negativity. The 
negative word list from the popular and non-proprietary Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial 




Dictionary (Harvard IV) and the financial negative word list (Fin-Neg), developed 
and used in Loughran and McDonald (2011).
19
 Harvard IV has been developed in 
other disciplines than finance and therefore contains words which are considered 
negative in a more general sense. As a result, Harvard IV is not always appropriate for 
specific contexts. In contrast, the Fin-Neg was developed based on a sample of 10-Ks.  
The comment letters, whilst dealing with financial accounting and, in particular, 
financial instruments, are not necessarily comparable to the financial context for 
which the Fin-Neg was developed, namely to assess the informativeness of textual 
tone in the valuation of firms. For example, the word ‘cost’ is not included in Fin-Neg 
as it is used in financial reports in a neutral manner. ‘Cost of implementation’ is a 
frequently used reason for opposing changes to accounting standards and should as 
such be classified as negative in this context. Conversely, the word ‘liability’ is 
included in the Harvard IV, but not in Fin-Neg, a word which in the context of the 
comment letters is unlikely to be used to refer to anything other than the accounting 
term and carries no negative sentiment in this context. Further examples are words 
such as ‘loss’ and ‘impairment’, classified as negative in both Harvard IV and Fin-
Neg, yet in this context, merely refer to the topic of the exposure drafts. Similarly, the 
word ‘question’, classified as negative in both lists, is the 41st most common word in 
the comment letters and occur 23686 times, most frequently to reference the questions 
that were posed in the exposure drafts. Classifying these words as negative as per the 
word lists would unjustly overstate the negative tone in the analysis. Neither word list 
seems ideal in its original form, yet to develop one’s own word list suffers from 
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 Both word lists have been made available online on Bill McDonald’s Word List Page and inflections 
have been added to the Harvard IV list to avoid the imprecision of stemming (McDonald 2013):  
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html 
 




connotations of subjectivity (see Krippendorff 2004) and would likely be unusable in 
other contexts.  
In order to reduce the noise in the measurement, a new negativity measure, was 
created by programmatically modifying the word lists. The process was repeated using 
each word list successively, thus obtaining two different negativity proportions in 
order to identify the most suitable list to be the basis for the negativity measure. The 
text of the exposure drafts was imported, parsed, and matched to the negative word list. 
In addition, the letters were read into Perl and similarly parsed. When matching words 
from the comment letters to the negative word lists, matches of words which represent 
more than 0.05% of the words in the corresponding exposure draft were blocked from 
being classified as negative. As such, misclassification was avoided for words which 
are relating to the topic of the exposure draft and therefore do not carry any negative 
sentiment in this context. A further advantage of the programmatic modification of the 
word lists is that it can be adjusted to apply to other contexts.  
4.3.2 Simple Negations 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) take account of negations within three words 
preceding positive words from their Fin-Pos dictionary. However, as they do not 
expect phrases such as ‘not terrible earnings’ in financial reports, they do not take 
account of negations preceding negative words. Conversely, in the context of 
comment letters, phrases such as ‘We have no objections to the proposal’ appear 
frequently and the measure of negativity would hence be distorted should negations 
not be accounted for when preceding negative words. Therefore, negations (‘no’, ‘not’, 
‘none’, ‘neither’, ‘never’, ‘nobody’) occurring within three words preceding a positive 
word in the same sentence, were accounted for by adding the negated positive word to 




the negative word count.
20
 Negations preceding negative words were accounted for by 
excluding the negative word from the negative word count. This serves to further 
reduce noise in the negativity measure.  
 
Table 4.8 Negative Words 





Negated Positive Words 2053 21659 
Negated Negative Words 2879 5803 
Blocked Negative Words occurring frequently in the exposure drafts 87881 228885 
Total Negative Words 85582 173222 
This table reports the effect of the programmatic modification to the two word lists in developing the Negativity measure 
 
Table 4.8 reports the effect of the programmatic modification of the two word lists on 
the number of negative words identified as negative in the total sample. The 
programmatic modification of Harvard IV appears greater as these lists contain a 
greater number of words than the financial word lists do. 
4.3.3 Term Weighting 
Term weighting schemes are applied in tone assessment as it is recognised that terms 
carry different levels of sentiment depending on their frequency (Loughran and 
McDonald 2011). The term weighting scheme is often referred to as tf.idf with tf being 
the term frequency and normalisation and idf the inverse document frequency, 
adjusting for the frequency across the sample. The term weighting scheme in equation 
4.1 was recommended by Loughran and McDonald (2011) for its suitability to 
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samples comprising documents of different length, a characteristic of the comment 
letter sample.  
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      (4.1) 
 
The weighted value, w, for each word, i, in each letter, j, is determined by the 
frequency, tf, of the term within the letter divided by the total number of words in the 
letter, a, further adjusted by the total number of letters in the sample, N, divided by the 
document frequency, i.e. the number of letters in which the word occurred, df.  
Table 4.9 reports the summary statistics for the simple proportions of negativity, as 
well as the proportions after the terms have been weighted, using both Fin-Neg, and 
Harvard IV word lists. 
 
Table 4.9 Summary Statistics for Negativity 
Fin-Neg Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Simple Proportion 1.14% 1.10% 0.56% 0.00% 5.66% 
Weighted Proportions (total) 4.51% 4.54% 2.18% 0.00% 18.06% 
Harvard IV Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Simple Proportion 2.39% 2.31% 0.92% 0.00% 8.30% 
Weighted Proportions (total) 7.35% 7.41% 2.66% 0.00% 19.62% 
This table reports the proportion of negativity according to the Negativity measure using the Fin-Neg and Harvard IV word 
lists 
 
The higher mean values for the proportions of weighted terms, as opposed to the 
simple proportions, are due to the low document frequency of the negative words, 
suggesting that they carry greater impact in the letters in which they do occur. 




Conversely, the weighting of more frequent, neutral words, makes the total weight of 
the text in the comment letters reduced, thus contributing to the increase in the 
weighted proportions of negativity. 
The inflected Harvard IV Negative Dictionary contains 4184 words, whereas the Fin-
Neg contains 2350. It is therefore not surprising that the mean and median proportions 
are higher for Harvard IV as more words will be classified as negative.  
4.3.4 Explicit Opposition 
The accuracy of the analysis will be influenced by the suitability of the applied word 
list to the context of the sample. This was demonstrated by Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) which validated the advantage of their financial dictionaries over the Harvard 
IV, in a financial context. Despite the political nature of the letters, it is probable that 
authors who unambiguously state their opposition in phrases such as ‘We disagree’ or 
‘We do not agree’ will also adopt the most negative tone throughout the letter. 
Therefore, to alleviate the concern that either of these dictionaries misclassifies words, 
even after the programmatic modification, correlations between the various negativity 
proportions and occurrences of explicit disagreement were compared. Therefore, all 
comment letters were searched for ‘disagree’ and ‘not agree’ and the number of 
occurrences was recorded. Correlations between negativity proportions and this form 
of explicit opposition were estimated, both for the number of occurrences of these 
phrases as well as for letting explicit disagreement be a binary variable, taking the 
value 1 for any number of occurrences equal to or greater than 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4.10 reports the correlation coefficients. 
 








Fin-Neg     
Simple Proportion 0.106* 0.062* 
Weighted Proportion 0.2098* 0.1787* 
Harvard IV 
  
Simple Proportion 0.017 -0.031 
Weighted Proportion 0.2115* 0.1901* 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between explicit opposition and 
various negativity proportions. Opposition is, in the second column, the number 
of occurrences of the word disagree and, in the third column, a binary variable 
taking the value 1 for one or more occurrences of the word disagree and 0 
otherwise. * Indicates that correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
 
In both columns, explicit negativity is most highly correlated with weighted measures 
of negativity. The highest correlation coefficients are found for the weighted 
proportions of negativity, using the Harvard IV dictionary. That means that higher 
proportions of negativity are accompanied by greater explicit opposition which is to 
be expected for a suitable word list. This therefore seems to be the most appropriate 
measure for negativity and will henceforth be the only measure referred to as 
negativity.  
4.3.5 Descriptive Statistics at the Document Level 
Table 4.11 reports the weighted negativity proportions for the various interest groups 
and documents issued by the IASB.  




Table 4.11 Negativity by Interest Group and Issued Document 
Panel A: Interest Group Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Accountants 620 6.87% 2.92% 0.00% 19.62% 
Users 107 7.65% 2.25% 2.29% 14.78% 
The Business Community 1559 7.67% 2.49% 0.11% 15.51% 
Stock Exchanges 7 6.33% 1.87% 2.97% 8.40% 
Regulatory and Legal Authorities 611 6.96% 2.73% 0.00% 17.74% 
Academic 47 7.64% 3.23% 1.99% 17.82% 
Other Interested Parties 42 7.79% 2.05% 3.02% 11.36% 
Unaffiliated 20 7.15% 2.93% 1.75% 13.47% 
Unknown 3 6.20% 2.56% 3.62% 8.74% 
Panel B: Issued Document Obs Mean SD Min Max 
1: Recognition and Measurement 201 8.78% 2.11% 2.39% 17.82% 
2: Macro Hedging 123 7.65% 3.16% 0.00% 14.90% 
3: The Fair Value Option 115 9.13% 2.61% 2.45% 17.74% 
4: Transition and Initial Recognition 37 4.76% 3.37% 0.00% 14.12% 
5: Cash Flow Hedge Accounting of Forecast Intra 
Group Transactions 58 5.53% 2.83% 0.00% 10.91% 
6: Disclosures 106 6.80% 2.55% 1.36% 14.16% 
7: Insurance Contracts 61 6.40% 3.16% 1.06% 14.06% 
8: Puttable Instruments and Obligations Arising 
on Liquidation 88 7.93% 2.88% 0.16% 16.38% 
9: Exposures Qualifying for Hedge Accounting 74 6.59% 2.90% 0.11% 13.36% 
10: Financial Instruments with Characteristics of 
Equity 125 7.74% 2.06% 2.73% 13.13% 
11: Reducing Complexity 162 8.12% 2.22% 2.31% 16.68% 
12: Improving Disclosures 89 6.01% 2.77% 0.73% 16.86% 
13: Investment in Debt Instruments 91 7.72% 2.75% 1.55% 15.07% 
14: Embedded Derivatives Assessment 55 4.12% 3.14% 0.00% 13.28% 
15: Derecognition 117 7.73% 2.53% 0.48% 14.60% 
16: Credit Risk in Liability Measurement 123 7.52% 2.49% 1.61% 15.51% 
17: Impairment of Financial Assets: Expected 
Cash Flow Approach 87 7.12% 2.03% 2.94% 14.78% 
18: Classification and Measurement 243 7.41% 2.11% 1.83% 12.19% 
20: Impairment of Financial Assets Measured at 
Amortised Cost 192 7.84% 2.13% 0.18% 13.19% 
21: Fair Value Option for Financial Liabilities 138 7.93% 2.70% 2.31% 17.22% 
22: Hedge Accounting 236 7.99% 1.98% 0.00% 13.13% 
23: Supplementary Document on Amortised Cost 
and Impairment 212 7.77% 1.64% 0.40% 12.79% 
24: Offsetting 162 5.84% 2.11% 0.00% 11.39% 
25: Mandatory effective date of IFRS 9 121 4.52% 2.76% 0.00% 19.62% 
This table reports descriptive statistics for values of negativity for the various interest groups (Panel A) and the issued documents 
(Panel B). 
 




Panel A of Table 4.11 reports the average proportions of negativity for each interest 
group. Comment letters from the business community and other interested parties 
contained, on average, the greatest proportion of negativity. However, the differences 
between interest groups, on an aggregate level, are marginal. Low levels of negativity 
for a particular interest group could be a sign that the proposals are developed 
according to their preferences most of the time. This could be expected for certain 
groups, for example, users, the target beneficiary of IFRS, or regulators, including 
national standard setters, which are often involved in the early stages of developing 
proposals. However, it is plausible that even if the early stages are influenced by a 
particular interest group, the effort of lobbying only seems worthwhile in certain 
circumstances. As the IASB tends to adopt its original proposal most of the time (e.g., 
Hansen 2011), there is limited value to lobbying when the lobbyist agrees with the 
proposal, as lobbying will represent an unnecessary cost. This makes it easier to 
distinguish the preferences of an interest group as differences in negativity to a 
proposal will be a feature of their preferences instead of a result of how they tend to 
lobby or the influence they have gained at an earlier stage in the process.  
Panel B of Table 4.11 reports summary statistics for negativity in comment letters 
corresponding to specific IASB issued documents. There is greater variability in the 
means amongst these than there were for interest groups which indicates that some 
proposals are more controversial than others. For example, the exposure draft relating 
to the controversial Fair Value Option was met by comment letters containing the 
highest mean level of negativity. It is unsurprising that transition and initial 
recognition as well as mandatory effective date were amongst the topics that generated 
lower levels of negativity as the timing and implementation of a change is likely to be 
less controversial than the proposed changes themselves. The following three chapters 




go on to use the measure of negativity in order to empirically analyse its impact on the 
IASB’s standard setting. 
 




5. Does the IASB Take Account of 
External Influence? A Large Scale 




Since the seminal work of Zeff (1978) on lobbying in the development of accounting 
standards, this process has been seen as a largely political exercise rather than a purely 
technical process. Moreover, the accounting literature on the motivations and 
characteristics of lobbying parties suggests that the standard setting process is 
characterised by various interest groups with differing and conflicting preferences 
(e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Jorissen et al. 2012). However, despite the 
importance of this issue for accounting standard development, and numerous calls for 
research to develop greater understanding of the international accounting standard 
setting process (e.g., Barth 2008; Kothari et al. 2010), there is still a lack of objective 
and rigorous methods in the lobbying literature for analysing comment letters. This 
has, to date, hindered our understanding of the impact of lobbyists’ comment letters on 
the development of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
This chapter aims to address this issue by developing a robust and objective 
framework for analysing lobbying and standard development. Computerised textual 
analysis is used and comment letters are examined for occurrences of explicit opinion, 
i.e. agreement or disagreement. In addition, the level of negativity surrounding their 
discussion of a proposed change is obtained by estimating a weighted ratio of negative 




words to total words based on the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial Dictionary (Harvard IV), 
but programmatically adjusted to suit the context of the study. The adjustments correct 
for misclassifications of words when a general word list, such as the Harvard IV, is 
applied to a specific context, a concern that was noted and examined in a financial 
context by Loughran and McDonald (2011). The measure of negativity that was 
developed in Chapter 4 is further programmatically adapted for analysing responses to 
specific questions within the exposure drafts (ED).  
This process aims to capture the level of discontent expressed in comment letters 
submitted to the IASB during their various consultations. Through examining the 
effect of negativity and explicit opinions stated in comment letters and the resulting 
changes to accounting standards, the impact of lobbying on standard development can 
be more fully analysed.  
The analysis focuses on formal participation in the due process of the IASB over an 
eleven year period, starting from the inception of the IASB in 2001. At this stage in 
the process, the IASB has developed an exposure draft containing the changes that the 
organisation proposes to implement to a standard, i.e. its intended course of action. 
External parties can respond and express their opinions on the exposure draft via 
comment letter submissions before the IASB decides whether to implement its 
proposed changes. As such, it can be observed whether constituents have the power to 
influence the IASB and block changes that have been proposed.  
Logistic regression analysis is then used to estimate the impact of the measures of 
negativity and explicit opinion on the IASB’s decision as whether or not to implement 
the proposed change. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to develop and employ 
an appropriate methodology to enable a large scale empirical investigation of external 




influence on the IASB’s projects to develop accounting standards. In doing so, this 
research answers calls from the academic community (e.g., Kothari et al. 2010) and 
standard setters (e.g., Barth 2008) to develop a greater understanding of the political 
process underlying the development of IFRS. Specifically, this chapter improves on 
previous research by overcoming the methodological challenges of providing a large 
scale empirical test, as opposed to a case study based approach, which is a key 
criticism of research on the political process of accounting standard setting (e.g., 
Skinner 2008; Gipper et al. 2013). 
From the descriptive statistics, it is clear that proposed changes that were rejected 
were met with significantly higher levels of negativity and disagreement, than were 
those that were implemented. In addition, the logistic regression analysis, after 
controlling for various factors that may have an impact on the decision of the IASB, 
shows that higher negativity in the responses from lobbyists, but not explicit 
disagreement, significantly increases the probability of the IASB rejecting its 
proposed changes. This suggests that the IASB does take account of aggregate 
lobbying when proposed changes are met with higher levels of negativity by its 
constituents. Marginal effects of negativity and explicit opinion are carefully 
estimated at average and theoretically significant values to address concerns that non-
linear models are often misinterpreted (e.g., Ai and Norton 2003; Brambor et al. 2005; 
Hoetker 2007). In addition, graphical representation, as recommended by Brambor et 
al. (2005), is provided to illustrate the marginal effects of negativity and explicit 
opinion. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides an outline 
of the institutional background of the development of the IASB and the standard 




setting process. The literature review, in section 5.3, discusses the theoretical and 
empirical contributions of prior literature and develops the hypotheses that are tested. 
Sample construction and variables are presented in section 5.4. The model 
specification is outlined in section 5.5. Section 5.6 presents the empirical findings and 
discussion, and section 5.7 summarises and concludes. 
5.2 Institutional Background 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the IASB was established in 2001 as a result of the 
restructuring of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), and 
inherited two international accounting standards (IAS) dealing with financial 
instruments: IAS 32 and IAS 39. The IASB has since been committed to improving 
the standards for financial instruments and issued 24 documents, to which constituents 
have been submitting comment letters, until the time of data collection, in November, 
2012. This includes the creation of two new standards, IFRS 7 and IFRS 9, for which 
parts have already been implemented, but which, when completed, are intended to 
fully replace IAS 32 and IAS 39.  
Currently, 16 members, with varied geographical and professional backgrounds, serve 
on the board which sets standards that are required or permitted in 128 countries 
worldwide (Deloitte IAS Plus 2014).
21
 In setting the standards, the IASB follows a 
process that involves several steps and consultations with its constituents. Often a 
discussion paper is issued which includes an overview, and the preliminary views of 
the IASB, of an issue that the board believes needs attention and have added to its 
agenda, although this step can be omitted. An exposure draft which includes the 
IASB’s proposed solution, and has been approved by at least nine board members is 
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then issued. The exposure draft includes an invitation to comment section and 
comment letters are reviewed before developing and issuing a new standard or a 
change to an existing standard. This also needs to be approved by at least nine board 
members.  
Although formal participation by third parties takes place at the later stages in the 
standard setting process, constituents may attempt to influence the agenda of the IASB 
and the development of an exposure draft. This raises the issue around how much of 
the political process is revealed through observable lobbying. A dialogue with 
constituents early in the process helps the standard setter to predict how managers will 
react to, or try to circumvent, future regulation (Lauren 1985). As such, the IASB can 
acquaint itself with constituent preferences, potential areas of dispute, and take 
account of these areas when developing a proposal. In addition, Lukes (2006) argued 
that the most effective exercise of power is unobservable and is exercised to shape 
preferences to prevent a conflict. However, as observed in the analysis, the IASB 
receives a large volume of comment letters after an exposure draft has been published. 
This suggests that this extreme form of power, via unobservable lobbying at earlier 
stages, has had limited effect and that comment letter authors still think it is 
worthwhile to make submissions to try to influence the standard setter. Analysis at this 
stage can, therefore, identify whether constituents have the power to persuade the 
IASB to reject the proposed changes.  
5.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
It has long been recognised that accounting standard setters are under pressure from 
groups with a vested interest in the development of a particular piece of regulation. 
The importance of managing this pressure and the potential influence exerted by third 




parties was discussed in Zeff (1978) which attributed the demise of the U.S. 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) to the failure of the organisation to effectively 
manage third party influence. Instead, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) emerged in 1973, and a formalised open due process, where constituent 
groups could actively lobby for or against proposed changes, was established 
(Saemann 1999). Zeff (2008) outlined numerous accounting issues, dealt with by the 
FASB, on which third parties have had an impact, amongst which recent examples 
include stock options and goodwill. In addition, Zeff (2008) also provided an 
anecdotal account of the third party influence on the IASC’s/IASB’s decisions on 
LIFO, share-based payments, and financial instruments. The tendency to take account 
of external parties is considered to be essential to the standard setter’s survival. It is, 
however, documented from a historical perspective rather than through empirical 
analysis. 
A number of theoretical models have been proposed to explain the process of 
accounting standard setting and four key theories were discussed in Chapter 3: public 
interest theory, capture theory, ideology theory, and institutional theory. It was 
concluded that the ideology theory, as advocated by Kothari et al. (2010), provides the 
best opportunity to arrive at a framework for developing hypotheses and guide the 
empirical analysis of the standard setting. 
5.3.1 Ideology Theory of Regulation 
Kalt and Zupan (1984) argued that public interest theory is more of a normative wish, 
than an effective explanation of regulation. However, they criticised capture theory for 
failing to recognise the potential importance of ideology. They argued that a theory of 
regulation with a broader conception of political behaviour is required. The failure to 




find empirical support for public interest and capture theories has led to the ideology 
theory of regulation, which incorporates concepts of both the theories of capture and 
public interest, but relaxes some of the more unrealistic assumptions. Therefore, like 
public interest theory, ideology theory stresses that regulation is a response to market 
failures, but predicts that lobbying will then influence the regulators, making 
regulation a joint outcome of political ideology and special interest lobbying (Kothari 
et al. 2010).  
However, to what extent there is scope for external influence is unclear. For example, 
Weetman (2001) argued that the U.K. Accounting Standards Board’s (ASB) formal 
consultation is a symbolic ritual rather than an actual opportunity for influence. 
Moreover, Mattli and Büthe (2005) argued that once a principle has been developed, it 
is near impossible for lobbyists to change it. In addition, Perry and Nölke (2006) noted 
that the development of the fair value paradigm, and its support within the standard 
setting community, reflects a contemporaneous shift in the international political 
economy stemming from greater growth in profits in the financial industry compared 
to other sectors. This may have therefore established an ideological preference, 
principle, or paradigm, which will not be altered by lobbying. Ideology theory of 
regulation considers this to be an important facet of standard development, but 
recognises that a second component remains, which affords influence to lobbying 
parties, providing they fit within the ideology (Kothari et al. 2010). 
Although the efficiency of any regulation is not predicted by the theory, the formation 
of regulation is explained, and the theory provides a conceptualisation that is suited to 
an empirical analysis of the development of regulation. Kwok and Sharp (2005) 
defines influence as: “a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors 




to act in some way they would not otherwise act”. This description encapsulates the 
role of lobbying within ideology theory of regulation. It allows for the regulator to 
have preconceptions about the right course of action, a status quo, based on an 
ideological conviction, and recognises that special interest lobbying is influential if it 
can alter this course of action, albeit within the existing paradigm. 
The IASB develops proposals with changes it intends to make according to its 
ideological preferences. Once issued, lobbying parties attempt to block or change 
proposals that are in conflict with their self-interest. In an ideology theory framework, 
the ability to prevent the IASB from implementing its intended changes is therefore 
evidence of the impact of the second component; special interest lobbying, on the 
development of accounting standards. 
5.3.2 Accounting Lobbying Literature 
As mentioned above, anecdotal evidence suggests that national standard setters, and 
the IASB, are, at least to some extent, affected by third party influences (e.g., Zeff 
2008). Public interest theory that suggests otherwise is considered to be a highly 
unrealistic representation of reality (Kalt and Zupan 1984). The due process of the 
IASB actively encourages a dialogue with external parties, yet our understanding of 
their influence is limited.  
One way of observing influence in the literature has been to compare the outcome in 
subsequently issued proposals, or finalised standards, to prior comment letter 
submissions (e.g., Haring 1979; Brown 1981; Coombes and Stokes 1985; McLeay et 
al. 2000; Kwok and Sharp 2005; Hansen 2011). By comparing the extent of agreement 
between the finalised outcome and the preferences of lobbyists, this allows for an 
evaluation of which lobbyists are best served by the regulation.  




McLeay et al. (2000) used manual content analysis of five published comments, 
separated into three groups: industry, academic, and the profession, to identify whose 
proposals were most often reflected in the finalised regulation during the 
transformation of the Fourth European Company Law Directive into German 
accounting law. They found that the industry group was more likely to be successful 
in having their proposals incorporated into the law but that their lobbying success was 
depending on the support of at least one additional constituent group.  
Similarly, Kwok and Sharp (2005) analysed comment letters, which they classified 
according to constituent group, on the IASC’s segment reporting and intangible assets 
projects from 1994-1997. Whilst no group was found to dominate the development of 
the standards, the changes made to IAS most frequently tended to align with the 
preferences of preparers. Neither McLeay et al. (2000) nor Kwok and Sharp (2005) 
however took account of a status quo reference point. As a result, they cannot separate 
what part of the regulation is actually due to the lobbying, and in which cases the 
regulation would have turned out that way anyway. Without separating the ideological 
component from the special interest lobbying component, causation cannot be 
established, and the process at least appears pluralistic. Nonetheless, in these cases, 
regulation seems to develop in order to be acceptable to industry, as long as this is 
consistent with the view of one of the other constituent groups.  
In a multi-issue setting, Hansen (2011) studied comment letters submitted on five 
exposure drafts, issued by the IASB, by using manual content analysis and coding 
observations according to whether they agreed with the final outcome. The results 
showed that lobbying success was positively related to the quality of information 
where the lobbyist is credible and the lobbyist has an impact on the viability of the 




IASB. However, if there has not been a change between the initial proposal and the 
finalised standard, significant agreement between comment letters and subsequent 
standards, implies only that the standard setter’s position and the lobbyist’s position 
are the same, and not necessarily due to lobbyist influence. Hansen (2011), therefore, 
also focused on a subsample of observations where the lobbyist disagreed with the 
proposal. This better tests the lobbyists’ ability to change the IASB’s position. Whilst 
the proxies for quality were of a lower order of significance compared to the full 
sample, and the explanatory power of impact on viability disappeared, the results 
highlight the importance of spending time in preparing a high quality comment letter 
in order to persuade the regulator not to implement a proposed change. Moreover, this 
subsample better isolates the special interest lobbying, as it is not as distorted by the 
ideological preferences of the regulator. 
Brown and Feroz (1992) took advantage of visible changes in the FASB’s position by 
analysing 74 comment letters from corporations to the first exposure draft on general 
price level adjustment (GPLA) and then identifying if the positions aligned with the 
change in the FASB’s position between the first and second ED on the same topic. 
Similarly, Kenny and Larson (1993) examined 50 comment letters from interested 
parties, in 1989 and 1990, prior to the IASC issuing IAS 31 Financial Reporting of 
Interests in Joint Ventures. Both studies used manual content analysis to establish 
whether or not the lobbyist supported the proposal and found that subsequent changes 
to the standards were more frequently represented by the views expressed in the letters 
than not. One of the drawbacks of this approach, however, is that manual content 
analysis suffers from subjectivity and a lack of rigor. Nonetheless, the idea of focusing 
on changes in the standard setters position allows the isolation of issues where 
lobbying has had an observable effect. 




The notion of some dual outcome of an initial view with some room for adjustment 
was explored by Saemann (1999). Content analysis of comment letters, sent by four 
institutional organisations that were believed to represent the views of three main 
constituent groups: preparers, users, and the profession, revealed that the FASB was 
found to agree with users initially. However, their finalised standards tended to 
incorporate the preparer view as well through compromising on the issues that 
preparers had strongly opposed. From the ideology theory perspective, it can therefore 
be argued that whilst the ideological position caters to the needs of users, as per the 
conceptual framework, there is room for influence by preparers. Consistent with this, 
Weetman (2001) found that for issues that the ASB had not actively been seeking 
input on, but that had frequently been brought up and opposed in the letters, did the 
ASB change its position. Again, this suggests that standard setters are driven by their 
ideological conviction, but there is some, albeit limited, influence from external 
parties. 
Giner and Arce (2012) studied the 539 comment letters sent to the IASB on the share-
based payments project prior to issuing IFRS 2. The IASB changed their position on 
one out of the three issues that the analysis covered, namely the reference date. The 
finalised standard aligned with lobbyist preferences on this issue, 114 letters had been 
in favour of the outcome and 103 had been opposing that outcome. However, for the 
other two issues, lobbyists disagreed with the outcome even more; 129 disagreed and 
20 agreed with the outcome on recognition, and 115 disagreed and 35 agreed with the 
outcome of valuation, yet the IASB did not change their position.  
As the literature above implies, academic research largely focuses on the 
characteristics of the lobbyists and their influence. However, some studies, such as 




Jupe (2000), Kwok and Sharp (2005), Hansen (2011) have paid closer attention to the 
effect of textual, or letter characteristics, as part of their analysis. Jupe (2000) focused 
on the type of argument used and found that the changes to the final standard were 
more in line with comment letter responses by large companies that used self-
referential arguments. Kwok and Sharp (2005), meanwhile, focused on keywords 
within the letters that referred to different facets of power. From in-depth interviews 
with board representatives, they found that the IASB were looking for persuasive 
arguments and that comment letters that included threats of sanctions were met with 
resentment and disregarded in the development. This stresses the importance for 
lobbyists to frame their wishes in a suitable way in order to have the opportunity to be 
influential.  
Moreover, Hansen (2011) found that collectively (after factor analysis) the percentage 
of questions answered, the number of pages of the letter, the number of references to 
the IASB’s constitution, framework, or other IAS/IFRS, and number of references to 
accounting standards or frameworks from national standard setters, had some 
explanatory power over the IASB’s decision. This suggests that characteristics of the 
letter itself may have an impact on the IASB’s decision, independently from its author. 
This is directly linked to the concept within ideology theory of regulation that 
arguments must be presented in a way that does not seem out of line with what the 
standard setter is trying to achieve.  
Kothari et al. (2010) argued that there is a lack of a well-developed framework to 
predict the influence of the political processes on accounting standards and that the 
resulting dearth of empirical work makes it difficult to prescribe optimal regulatory 
structures for accounting. Using the ideology theory of regulation, they explained how 




there is potential for both ideological preferences of regulators and special interest 
lobbying to affect the outcome of standards. At the overt lobbying stage of standard 
development, the ideology of the standard setters has shaped the proposals in the 
exposure drafts. Any subsequent changes to the IASB’s course of action can therefore 
be analysed in order to assess if their remains an opportunity for special interest 
lobbying to affect the standards.  
As concluded in Chapter 3, the accounting lobbying literature provides some mixed 
evidence. However, as highlighted in the literature above, there is reason to believe 
that the IASB will be responsive to lobbying. Lobbyists expect there to be some 
benefit from their lobbying, and the ideology theory of regulation as well as several 
prior studies suggest that aggregate lobbying has an effect on the finalised 
international standards (e.g., Kenny and Larson 1993; Hodges and Woods 2004; 
Kwok and Sharp 2005; Hansen 2011; Giner and Arce 2012). Therefore, it is expected 
that the higher the levels of agreement (disagreement) that a proposed change is met 
with, the lower (higher) will be the likelihood that the IASB decides to reject the 
proposed change.  
Hypothesis 5.1: Explicit agreement will reduce the likelihood of the IASB deciding not 
to implement a proposed change. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Explicit disagreement will increase the likelihood of the IASB 
deciding not to implement a proposed change. 
It is recognised that manual content analysis can introduce subjectivity (Krippendorff 
2004). In addition, it is costly where large sample analysis is required and cannot 
necessarily be replicated. Therefore, computerised textual analysis is used both to 
extract explicit opinions and negative tone in the discussion of a proposed change. 




5.3.3 Comment Letter Negativity 
Exposure drafts pose clear questions regarding the proposed changes to the standards. 
Most often, the questions are phrased ‘Do you agree?’ or ‘Is this appropriate?’ and, 
hence, give the lobbyist the opportunity to express their explicit agreement or 
disagreement. However, prior research has discovered that comment letters are often 
ambiguous in their nature (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Francis 1987; Hansen 
2011) and when analysing the responses, it is found that in only 18% of observations 
will lobbyists explicitly state that they disagree with the proposal, and in 38% of 
observations, there is no explicitly stated opinion. It is unlikely that lobbyists would 
voluntarily incur the cost of submitting comment letters unless they expect to gain 
some benefit. As a result, it is expected that the text contained in responses that do not 
explicitly state an opinion has an effect on the IASB’s decision, or at least is intended 
to influence the outcome. Textual analysis provides a tool which goes beyond manual 
classification of agreement or disagreement. It has the potential to enable large scale 
analysis of the influence that is granted to third parties, as separated from the 
ideological position of the regulator. 
Extant literature has found that lobbyists that disagree with a proposal tend to spend 
more effort in trying to convince the regulator and back up their position with more 
arguments (e.g., Giner and Arce 2012). As the IASB does change its position on a 
number of issues, albeit within the limits of the ideology, the textual feature of the 
comment letters that has the potential to communicate disagreement, without 
necessarily alienating the standard setter, is likely to be a negative tone. If a proposed 
change is discussed in a negative way by many of its constituents, it could be a 
warning sign to the IASB that the proposed change may generate unhappy 
constituents and result in a problem of implementation, or indeed future unwanted 




accountability for the IASB. If the IASB takes account of the aggregate lobbying 
efforts, then it follows that higher levels of negativity is associated with an increased 
likelihood of the IASB deciding to refrain from implementing a proposal. 
Hypothesis 5.3: Higher negativity will increase the likelihood of the IASB deciding not 
to implement a proposed change. 
5.4 Data 
5.4.1 Sample Creation 
The sample is derived from the comment letters that the IASB makes available on its 
website, www.ifrs.org, and was outlined in Chapter 4. At the time of the data 
collection, 3064 comment letters had been generated in response to 24 documents, 
issued by the IASB, relating to the development of these standards since 2001. Of 
these 3064, 1815 comment letters responded to the 16 exposure drafts that related to 
projects that are recognised as having been completed, i.e. for which there is an 
identifiable outcome. It is acknowledged, however, that there is often ambiguity when 
identifying the outcomes of proposed changes, as parts of a proposal may be adopted 
while other parts are not (Holthausen and Leftwich 1983). Equally, respondents may 
support part of a proposal and oppose others (Francis 1987). Therefore, as 
recommended by Hansen (2011), the responses to the invitation to comment section of 
the exposure drafts are analysed to reduce this ambiguity. This section of the exposure 
drafts contains questions regarding the specifics of proposed changes on which the 
IASB invites constituents to comment. The questions allow the proposal to be broken 
down into its parts, thus enabling the analysis of lobbying success in cases where 
specific parts of a proposal have been adopted and other parts have not. Chapter 4 




presented the parsing procedures and descriptive statistics on the full comment letters. 
In order to extract the answers to the specific questions, a question reference at the 
beginning and end of each answer is inserted into the letters before reading them into 
Perl and repeating the parsing procedure described in Chapter 4. The lines in between 
a beginning and end question references then represent a letter question observations 
and are analysed for explicit opinion and negativity. 
To remove ambiguity from the sample, a number of specific exposure drafts, and the 
comment letters on these drafts, are excluded. For Derecognition: Proposed 
Amendments to IAS 39 and IFRS 7, as issued in April, 2009, the whole proposal was 
withdrawn and the organisation decided to retain previous accounting treatments. This 
also occurred for Offsetting Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities, as issued in 
January, 2011. As such, the observations cannot be reliably compared to the outcome 
of separate issues within the exposure draft, leaving 1695 comment letters for analysis.  
As the chapter focuses on lobbyists’ ability to prevent proposals from becoming 
standards, only the 70 questions that refer to proposed amendments to which lobbyists 
have an opportunity to communicate their opposition or concerns are included in the 
analysis. These questions take the form “Do you agree…” or “Is this appropriate…” 
for example, and relates to the proposed amendment, not an alternative. The majority 
of the questions (86 out of 107) take this form, out of which 16 are removed as they 
are in the exposure drafts for the two projects which were abandoned. Not all letters 
contain responses to the questions posed by the IASB and those that do, do not all 
answer all the questions in the exposure draft. Table 5.1 outlines the distribution of the 
sample across comment periods. The sample contains 5083 question-observations, i.e. 















Table 5.1 Sample Selection 
 





2002 June Disclosure, Presentation, Recognition and Measurement 14 12 207 978 
2003 August Fair Value Hedge Accounting 2 2 127 120 
2004 April The Fair Value Option 6 3 116 176 
2004 July Transition and Initial Recognition 3 1 37 22 
2004 July Cash Flow Hedge Accounting 3 1 58 34 
2004 July Disclosures 10 8 106 539 
2004 November Financial Guarantee Contracts 5 4 61 155 
2006 June Puttable at Fair Value 4 4 88 214 
2007 September Exposures Qualifying for Hedge Accounting 4 3 74 160 
2008 October Improving Disclosures 8 7 89 406 
2008 December Embedded Derivatives 5 5 55 137 
2009 April Derecognition 11 0 120 0 
2009 July Classification and Measurement 15 11 246 1,404 
2010 May Fair Value Option for Financial Liabilities 10 7 138 590 
2011 January Offsetting Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities 5 0 162 0 
2011 August Mandatory effective date of IFRS 9 2 2 131 148 
    Total: 107 70 1815 5,083 
This table reports the exposure drafts, relating to financial instrument projects that have been completed, issued by the IASB for public comment, questions contained in the invitation to 






















5.4.2 Dependent Variable - Outcome 
The proposed amendments, referred to in each question, are compared to the 
subsequently issued amendments to the standards. If the proposal, to which the 
question relates, is not incorporated in the subsequent amendment, i.e. there has been a 
change from the proposal to the finalised standard; the variable REJECT is coded 1 
and 0 otherwise. The outcome was independently classified by four researchers, 
including three senior chartered accountants. The classifications were compared, and 
in instances of disagreement; 14 out of 70 questions, the outcomes were discussed 
until consensus was reached. A change is identified for 28 questions (40%), not 
dissimilar to the 69 questions in Hansen’s (2011) study which identified a change for 
46% of the issues in a multi-issue setting. 
5.4.3 Independent variables – Negativity and Explicit Opinion 
Negativity: A Continuous Measure of Opposition 
The negativity measure, developed in Chapter 4, is further adapted to suit the letter 
question observations, as opposed to the whole comment letters. As per the negativity 
measure in Chapter 4, the negative word list that is used is taken from the Harvard 
IV.
22
 It contains words that are considered negative in a general sense and is, in this 
context, preferred to the negative financial word list (Fin-Neg), as developed by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011). The Fin-Neg has been developed to edit the 
classification of words that carry sentiment in general text but not in a financial 
context, and vice versa. Whilst the Fin-Neg has been applied in financial research, and 
                                                 
22
 The version used in the analysis comes from Bill McDonald’s word list page where the Harvard IV 
has been extended to include relevant inflections. The list is available at: 
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Data/Harvard%20IV_Negative%20Word%20List_Inf.txt  




proven useful in assessing the informativeness of textual tone in the valuation of firms 
(e.g., Loughran and McDonald 2011; Engelberg et al. 2012; Mayew and 
Venkatachalam 2012), it would misclassify words in the comment letters. For example, 
the word “cost”, a negative word according to Harvard IV, is not included in Fin-Neg 
as it is used in financial reports in a neutral manner. However, in the context of 
comment letters, the “cost of implementation” is a frequently used reason for opposing 
changes to accounting standards, and should therefore be classified as negative.  
Harvard IV also misclassifies other words in a comment letter/lobbying context. For 
example, the word “liability” is included in the Harvard IV, but in the context of the 
comment letters, it is unlikely to refer to anything other than the accounting term, and 
therefore carries no negative sentiment, in this case. Further examples are words such 
as “loss” and “impairment”, which are classified as negative by both Harvard IV and 
Fin-Neg, yet in this context, merely refer to the topic of the exposure drafts. 
Classifying these words as negative, as per the word lists, would therefore overstate 
the negative tone in the analysis. Neither word list seems ideal in its original form, yet 
to develop one’s own word list suffers from connotations of subjectivity (Krippendorff 
2004) and would likely be unusable in other contexts.  
In order to reduce the noise in the measurement, the negativity measure is obtained by 
programmatically modifying the classifications to better suit the text, to which it is 
applied. Words that occur frequently in an exposure draft, and are classified as 
negative by Harvard IV, are, when used in a corresponding comment letter, likely to 
be a reference to its occurrence in the exposure draft. In order to edit the classification 
scheme accordingly, if a word is classified as negative in Harvard IV, but occurs with 




a frequency of more than 0.05% of the words in the exposure draft, it is removed from 
the negativity count, so as not to unduly increase the negativity score.  
Whilst there are still occasions of misclassification, the programmatic modification 
improves the classification scheme. For instance, the word cost was excluded from the 
negative word count in comment letters corresponding to five exposure drafts. In all 
known examples, it refers to amortised cost, i.e. the topic of proposed changes and 
carries no negative sentiment. An example is EFRAG’s response to the 2004 Exposure 
Draft of Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement: The Fair Value Option: 
“EFRAG supports the pragmatic approach as regards the transitional 
requirements – i.e. no retrospective application when an entity changes the 
measurement from at fair value through profit and loss to amortised cost.” 
[Emphasis added] 
Conversely, in the letter from the Australian “Group of 100”, in response to the 2003 
Exposure Draft of Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement: Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge 
of Interest Rate Risk. The word ‘cost’ was included in the negative word count, as it 
carried a negative sentiment, as increased costs are a portrayed as an unfavourable 
economic consequence of the proposed change. 
“Core deposits are a significant fixture of the Australian banking system. The 
inability to apply fair value hedging in respect of core deposits is likely to 
result in the use of cash flow hedging for core deposits. This will lead to the 
duplication of systems where these entities use portfolio hedging in respect of 




other activities, increases in transaction costs and potentially to changes in 
product design and pricing and funding arrangements.” [Emphasis added] 
Table 5.2 presents the most frequent words that were excluded from the negativity 
measure due to this modification. 
 






Risk 3601 12 
Liabilities 2305 13 
Loss 1915 14 
Liability 1820 13 
Cost 1678 5 
Board 1616 16 
Hedge 1555 7 
Losses 1082 9 
Impairment 809 3 
Question 663 13 
Capital 548 2 
Risks 466 5 
Ineffectiveness 401 2 
Particular 382 9 
Need 250 5 
Make 227 3 
Costs 163 6 
Foreign 149 4 
Liquidation 122 1 
Imposed 108 1 
Volatility 104 1 
44 other words which were blocked less than 100 times 987 
 Total: 20951 
 
This table reports the most frequently blocked words, i.e. words that are classified as negative by Harvard IV, but 
appear frequently in an exposure draft, thus likely making it a non-negative reference in the corresponding comment 
letters. The number of times the word was blocked is reported, as well as the number of exposure drafts for which the 
word appeared with a frequency greater than 0.05 percent, qualifying it to be blocked from comment letters 
corresponding to those exposure drafts. 
 
In addition, any negative words that occur in a question are blocked from the 
negativity count in the corresponding answers. An example is from the July 2009 
exposure draft: ‘Financial Instruments: Classification and Measurement’, where one 




question was “Do you agree that reclassification should be prohibited?” In this 
question, the word “prohibited” is a negative word but an answer may contain this 
word without conveying negative sentiment in the following way “Yes, we agree that 
reclassification should be prohibited.” If the word “prohibited” were to be classified 
as negative, it would obtain a relatively high negativity score despite the comment 
expressing no negativity. The additional words to be removed from the negativity 
count due to occurring in a corresponding question are reported in Table 5.3.  
 


























This table reports the additional words that were removed 
from the negativity counts in observations due to 
occurring in the question.  
 
Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) pointed out that hand-collected wordlists, such as the 
one used by Loughran and McDonald (2011), may suffer from researcher subjectivity 




and miss linguistic features that a more comprehensive psychosocial dictionary 
includes. However, they also recognised that the advantage of hand-collected 
dictionaries is that the researcher has to take care to identify relevant linguistic 
constructs and the related words. An advantage of programmatic modification is that it 
removes the potential for subjectivity bias, yet retains the advantages of a more 
precise identification of the words related to the linguistic constructs. In addition, it 
can be adjusted to apply to each exposure draft and each question, and, importantly, to 
other contexts.  
Further, as described in Chapter 4, negations (“no”, “not”, “none”, “neither”, 
“never”, “nobody”) occurring within three words preceding a positive word, in the 
same sentence, are accounted for by adding the negated positive word to the negative 
word count.
23
 Negations preceding negative words are accounted for by excluding the 
negative word from the negative word count. In addition, the same term weighting 
scheme, described in Chapter 4 and recommended by Loughran and McDonald (2011), 
which accounts for terms carrying different levels of sentiment depending on their 
frequency was applied to the negativity ratio.  
As Fagan and Gencay (2011) note, it is considered appropriate to remove so-called 
stop words from the analysis, as they are highly frequent words that are sometimes 
added as fillers, or for grammatical purposes, rather than for conveying information, 
and have the potential to distort the overall negativity score. Therefore, stop words 
were removed from the counts of negative and non-negative words.
24
 Four 
observations contained only stop words and a negativity score for these observations 
                                                 
23
The positive words come from the Harvard IV-4 Psychosocial dictionary available at  
http://www.webuse.umd.edu:9090/tags/. 
24
 The list of generic stop words has been downloaded from   
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html 




could not be obtained.
25
 The resulting measure generates a continuous negativity score, 
NEG, between 0 and 1, with 1 being the most negative and 0 the least negative. 
Explicit Opinion  
To capture unambiguously stated opinions in the responses, if available, agreement 
and disagreement are defined and obtained as follows. As the questions included in 
the analysis take the form: “Do you agree…?” or “Is this appropriate…?”, the first 
word in the answer being “yes” is identified as agreement and “no” as disagreement. 
Further, unless negated, occurrences of “agree”, anywhere within the answer, are 
identified as agreement and, if negated, as disagreement. Occurrences of “disagree” 
or “oppos” (the stem is used to allow for different grammatical variations e.g., oppose, 
opposition etc.) are, unless negated, taken to indicate disagreement. In 141 cases the 
responses contain occurrences of both agreement and disagreement, according to the 
definition. To avoid bias from the effect of these ambiguous responses, these 
observations are removed from the sample. The effect of missing observations is 
reported in table 5.4. There remain three possible classes of explicitly stated opinion in 
the observations and a variable, EXPLICIT, contains the three groups: agreement 
(2173 question letter observations), disagreement (865 question letter observations), or 
no explicitly stated opinion (1900 question letter observations). In order to test the 
effect of explicitly stated opinion, no explicitly stated opinion serves as the reference 
group in the logit regression analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
25
 When excluding stop words in the analysis, the results of the analysis are qualitatively the same. 








less: unavailable negativity 
  
4 
less: unavailable explicit opinion 
  
141 
Total:     4938 
This table presents the effect of missing variables on the total sample size 
    
If lobbyists have the ability to prevent proposals from making it into accounting 
standards, it is expected that mean levels of negativity and disagreement will be higher 
for those proposals that were not adopted, i.e. blocked proposals, in comparison to 
proposals that were implemented. 
Control Variables 
The model (equation 5.3), includes four control variables that, potentially, have an 
independent effect on the IASB’s decision. Macroeconomic factors are known to 
affect the political pressure on regulators (Bertomeu and Magee 2011). Therefore, an 
indicator variable, POSTC, takes the value 1 for the exposure draft being issued after 
the commencement of the financial crisis, as defined by the bankruptcy filing of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for 
the increased political pressure on the organisation that followed the problems with 
the standards that were highlighted in the financial crisis (Bengtson 2012). This 
criticism is very closely related to financial instruments and, as such, the decision to 
reject certain proposals may have resulted from political pressure that falls outside of 
the comment letter lobbying. In addition, it is possible that the salience of the topic 
under consideration, and the volume of comment letters received, makes the 
organisation more hesitant in going ahead with implementing proposed changes. 




Therefore, the log of the volume of comment letters corresponding to the exposure 
draft, VOLLG, is included in the model. 
In addition, the length of the responses may signal that the proposed change is 
particularly complicated or controversial which may therefore lead the IASB to reject 
the proposed change or defer its implementation. LENGTH, the number of lines in the 
answer to the question and WORDS, the number of words in the letter, are therefore 
included as control variables. 
5.5 Model Specification 
To identify whether there is the potential for lobbying to influence the standard 
setter’s decision as whether or not to implement proposed changes, logistic regression 
analysis is used. The IASB’s decision to reject its proposed change is modelled as a 
function of lobbyists’ level of negativity and explicitly stated opinions.  
          |                        (5.1) 
           (
 
   
)            (5.2) 
The dependent variable, REJECT, is a binary variable which takes 1 if the IASB 
rejects its original proposal. X is a vector of independent variables and their linear 
combination is Xβ. The second representation is a logit transformation of the first 
model which takes the logarithm of the odds of the event happening. The coefficients 
in β measure the impacts of the variables on the natural logarithm of the relative 
probability of blocking a proposal, compared with it being implemented. The variables 
in X are made up of the negativity score, NEG, the two indicator variables for explicit 
opinion, AGREE and DISAGREE, as well as the control variables. To allow for the 




possibility that the effect of negativity is conditional on explicit opinions in the 
observations, the model (presented in equation 5.4) includes interaction terms for 
negativity and the variations of explicit opinion.  
                                                       
                                                         
                      (5.3) 
Where i indicates the comment letter and t the specific question. The logit model is 
estimated and the results are reported in a conventional way in Table 5.6. However, it 
has been reported that estimation and interpretation of conditional hypotheses in non-
linear models are problematic (e.g., Ai and Norton 2003; Brambor et al. 2006; Hoetker 
et al. 2007) as the sign and significance of the marginal effects of a variable is a 
function of the coefficient of the interacted variables and the values of all other 
variables and can therefore not be deduced by the coefficient alone. In logit and probit 
models, the effect of a change in any variable depends on the initial probability 
(Hoetker 2007). This means that an equal change in a discrete variable will have 
different impact at different levels of the other variables, and an equal change in a 
continuous variable will have a different impact depending on the base level of the 
change as well as all the other variables. The magnitude of the coefficient tells us little 
about the effect of a variable in logit models, and the sign and significance of the 
coefficient can be unrepresentative of the sign and significance of the impact of a 
variable as this can vary at different probabilities. Therefore, following Brambor et al. 
(2006), the marginal impact of the explanatory variables i.e. the constitutive parts of 
the interaction variables are tested at meaningful values of the covariates.  




5.6 Empirical Results 
Panel A of Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables 
and the control variables, for all the observations, as well as separated by REJECT, i.e. 
whether or not the proposed change was rejected. The significance of the difference in 
means between the two separate groups is tested by two-sample t-tests and 
significance at the 5% level is indicated in the last column. In addition, Panel B 
reports the Spearman and Pearson correlations for explanatory and control variables. 
The indicator variables for explicit opinion are defined as follows in the descriptive 
statistics: AGREE is 1 if there is an occurrence of explicit agreement, 0 otherwise, 
DISAGREE is 1 if there is an occurrence of explicit disagreement, 0 otherwise, NO 




Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Logistic Regression Analysis 










4938 question observations 
 
2874 question observations 
 
2064 question observations 
  
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 




NEG 0.059 0.050 0.068 
 
0.045 0.054 0.063 
 
0.066 0.057 0.074 
 
yes 
AGREE 0.440 0 0.496 
 
0.484 0 0.500 
 
0.378 0 0.485 
 
yes 
DISAGREE 0.175 0 0.380 
 
0.159 0 0.365 
 
0.198 0 0.399 
 
yes 
NO EXPLICIT 0.385 0 0.487 
 
0.357 0 0.479 
 
0.423 0 0.494 
 
yes 
VOLLG  4.987 4.927 0.471 
 
4.961 4.927 0.464 
 
5.023 4.927 0.478 
 
yes 
POSTC 0.531 1 0.499 
 
0.434 0 0.496 
 
0.667 1 0.471 
 
yes 
LENGTH  12.93 6 19.90 
 
13.09 6 20.97 
 
12.70 7 18.29 
 
no 
WORDS    2763 2036 2808 
 
2866 2051 3027 
 




Panel B: Spearman (below the diagonal) and Pearson (above the diagonal) correlation (n=4938) 
 
NEG AGREE DISAGREE NO EXPLICIT VOLLG POSTC LENGTH WORDS 
NEG 
 
-0.2483* 0.2414* 0.0647* 0.0880* -0.0807* 0.1179* 0.0874* 
AGREE -0.3113* 
 
-0.4085* -0.7011* -0.0940* 0.0869* -0.1458* -0.0643* 
DISAGREE 0.2894* -0.4085* 
 
-0.3644* 0.0656* -0.0765* 0.2756* 0.1263* 
NO EXPLICIT 0.0916* -0.7011* -0.3644* 
 
0.0447* -0.0289* -0.0666* -0.0331* 
VOLLG 0.0847* -0.0914* 0.0519* 0.0527* 
 
0.2756* 0.012 0.3621* 
POSTC -0.0815* 0.0869* -0.0765* -0.0289* 0.3922* 
 
-0.0938* -0.1395* 
LENGTH 0.4466* -0.2643* 0.2615* 0.0654* 0.0540* -0.0323* 
 
0.2939* 
WORDS 0.1776* -0.1314* 0.1316* 0.0312* 0.4954* -0.1070* 0.3000* 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for explanatory variables and control variables, where NEG is the modified weighted ratio of negative to non-negative words, AGREE is1 if there is an 
occurrence of explicit agreement, 0 otherwise, DISAGREE is 1 if there is an occurrence of explicit disagreement, 0 otherwise, NO EXPLICIT is 1 if there is no explicit opinion, 0 otherwise, POSTC is 1 
if the observation relates to exposure drafts issued after the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008, 0 otherwise, VOLLG is the natural logarithm of the number of comment letters responding to 
the exposure draft, LENGTH is the number of lines in the observation, and WORDS is the number of words in the letter. In Panel A distributional descriptive statistics are displayed for all observations, 
the observations relating to implemented proposed changes, and observations relating to proposed changes that were rejected. Significant differences in means, at the 5% level, between the two groups of 























Consistent with the prediction that the IASB’s decision to implement a proposal will 
depend on the responses in comment letters, explicit agreement is more common for 
proposals that were implemented and no explicit opinion and explicit disagreement are 
more common in responses to proposals that were subsequently rejected. Equally, the 
mean level of negativity is higher for proposals that were rejected. The means for all 
of the explanatory variables are significantly different for the two groups. These initial 
findings suggest that the IASB takes account of the comment letter lobbying, and that 
the mean levels of agreement, disagreement, and negativity are important to the 
organisation in deciding whether to implement a proposed change. 
The mean for POSTC is 0.531 as the observations are well dispersed between the 
period before and after the commencement of the financial crisis. The mean is 
significantly higher for observations relating to proposed changes that were rejected 
than to those that were implemented. The IASB abandoned more proposed changes 
after the start of the financial crisis. The increased criticism of IFRS, especially as 
regards to financial instruments, which resulted because of the financial crisis, may 
have made the IASB more hesitant to implement its proposed changes. Equally, the 
mean for VOLLG is significantly greater when proposed changes were rejected which 
suggests that the IASB is more hesitant to implement its proposals when political 
pressure, or interest, is greater. However, the correlation matrix in panel B reveals that 
VOLLG and POSTC are highly, and significantly, positively related, suggesting that 
they may both be capturing the post-crisis criticism, or increased interest in the 
standard setting process of the IASB. 
Amongst the explanatory variables, negativity and explicit disagreement are positively 
correlated, whilst both are negatively correlated with explicit agreement. This 




confirms that lobbyists that disagree tend to use more negative language than lobbyists 
that agree and confirms that the negativity scores capture discontent with the proposed 
change. Negativity is also positively correlated with no explicit opinion but at a much 
lower magnitude than it is with disagreement. 
The large and significant positive correlations between length (number of lines in the 
observation) and negativity and disagreement are consistent with the findings in Giner 
and Arce (2012) that disagreement is backed up by more arguments than agreement is. 
This is likely due to the perception that it is more likely that the IASB will go ahead 
with its intended course of action, and that additional effort will be required to prevent 
it. This is also true for the number of words in the letter, but the relation is not of the 
same magnitude. This suggests that whilst lobbyists that are negative to some changes 
will spend more effort in preparing the full response, the specific issues for which they 
are negative receive the greatest attention.  
The coefficients for the logistic regressions are presented in Table 5.6.  
  





Table 5.6 Multivariate Model Estimates 
     Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 









-0.418*** -0.346*** -0.459*** 
  
(0.062) (0.083) (0.087) 
Disagreement 
 
0.052 0.034 0.094 
  









   
(1.215) (1.289) 
VOLLG 
   
-0.085* 
    
(0.047) 
POSTC 
   
1.069*** 
    
(0.048) 
LENGTH 
   
-0.001 
    
(0.001) 
WORDS 
   
-0.000* 
    
(0.000) 
Constant -0.492*** -0.160*** -0.309*** -0.429* 
 
(0.040) (0.046) (0.066) (0.239) 
LR chi2 34.19 60.48 83.06 598.64 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.57% 0.83% 1.12% 5.77% 
Correctly classified                         58.44% 58.20% 58.79% 63.57% 
Observations 4938 4938 4938 4938 
This table presents the coefficients from the logit regressions where the dependent variable, REJECT takes 1 when the 
IASB rejects its proposed change, 0 otherwise. NEG is the modified weighted negativity score of the question letter 
observation based on Harvard IV. Agreement is the occurrence of explicit agreement in reference to the omitted group, i.e. 
no explicitly stated opinion. Disagreement is the occurrence of explicit disagreement in reference to the omitted group, i.e. 
no explicitly stated opinion. POSTC takes 1 if the observation relates to exposure drafts issued after the commencement of 
the financial crisis in 2008, 0 otherwise, VOLLG is the natural logarithm of the number of comment letters responding to 
the exposure draft, LENGTH; the number of lines in the observation, and WORDS is the number of words in the letter. 
Errors are clustered on comment letters and in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
As Table 5.6 shows, the coefficient for negativity, NEG, is positive and significant in 
all models, indicating that, as predicted, a proposal being met with higher aggregate 
levels of negativity is more likely to persuade the IASB not to implement the change. 
However, the effect of increased negativity on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its 
change may vary at different probabilities, i.e. it is conditional on different levels of 




negativity and all other variables. As both the sign and magnitude of the effect may 
vary, it is unclear whether the sign and significance of the coefficient accurately 
represents its effect. Therefore, predictions based on the average marginal effects of 
negativity are displayed in figure 5.1 to illustrate its average marginal effect at 
different, fixed levels of explicitly stated opinion and negativity, but letting all other 
variables vary.  
Figure 5.1 Predicted Probabilities of REJECT 
 
This figure shows the predicted probabilities of the IASB’ rejecting the change (REJECT), at regular intervals of negativity 
(NEG), given the occurrence of one of three possible levels of explicitly stated opinion: agreement, disagreement, or no explicit 
opinion. All are significant at the 5% level. 
Figure 5.1 shows that whether observations contain agreement, disagreement, or no 
explicit opinion, higher levels of negativity, on average, predict higher probabilities of 
the IASB rejecting its proposal. This is indicated by the upward sloping curves. 
Including interaction terms in the models allows the slope of the curves to vary. 
However, according to the insignificant coefficients and, more importantly, the visual 




representation of the predicted probabilities in Figure 5.2, the impact of equal 
increases of negativity does not seem to be conditional on explicit opinion. Instead, 
explicit agreement shifts the curve downwards, indicating that it reduces the 
probability of the IASB rejecting the proposal. In addition, all curves seem to tail off 
slightly at higher levels of negativity, indicating that increases from very low 
negativity to high negativity has more of an effect than increases in negativity from 
already high levels to very high levels of negativity. This is more evident in Figure 5.2 
which presents the average marginal effects of negativity at regular intervals of 
negativity given the occurrence of agreement, disagreement, or no explicit opinion.  
Figure 5.2 directly corresponds to Figure 5.1 as the points representing average 
marginal effects are the derivatives, i.e. the gradients of the points in Figure 5.1. From 
a level of negativity of approximately 0.2, the average marginal effect is declining. It 
is still significant and positive but its magnitude is less than at lower values. Given 
that the average level of negativity is 0.06, and that less than 5% of observations have 
negativity levels of over 0.20, the turning point represents an already high level of 
negativity. Therefore, it is not surprising that increasing negativity beyond this point 











By including confidence intervals (at 95%), it can be concluded that these marginal 
effects are different from 0 in all instances and, therefore, that there is a consistent, 
significant positive relation between negativity and the likelihood of the IASB 
rejecting a proposal. This confirms hypothesis 5.3. 
As a summary of the average marginal effects for negativity, given varying 
occurrences of explicit opinion, Table 5.7 reports the average of the marginal effects 
at the levels of negativity that are present in the sample, but holding constant the 
occurrences of explicit opinion. It was recommended by Brambor et al. (2005) to 
calculate the average marginal effects at theoretically meaningful values. These three 
Figure 5.2 Average Marginal Effects of Negativity 
 
This figure shows the average marginal effects of negativity at regular intervals of negativity (NEG), given the occurrence of one 
of three possible levels of explicitly stated opinion: agreement, disagreement, or no explicit opinion. 95% confidence intervals are 
indicated by the bars. 




points of interest are chosen as it is theoretically plausible that the presence of explicit 
opinion would make the effect of negativity redundant. 
 
Table 5.7 Marginal Effect of Negativity 
  dy/dx Std. Err. z 
No explicit opinion 0.638 0.173 3.70 
Agreement 0.570 0.176 3.23 
Disagreement 0.593 0.213 2.78 
This table reports the derivatives of the response with respect to 
negativity for three values of explicit opinion. 
 
The average marginal effect of negativity on the IASB’s decision is positive and 
significant whether or not the response also contains explicit opinions. When the 
answer contains agreement, the impact of a unit increase in negativity is, on average, 
57%, and when there is disagreement, the average marginal effect is 59.3%. However, 
the average marginal effect of negativity is the greatest when explicit opinion is absent, 
63.8%. The highest point in Figure 5.2 is found in the graph representing marginal 
effects of negativity, given no explicitly stated opinion. This indicates that negativity 
plays a greater part in deciphering, and acting upon, constituent preferences when 
opinions are ambiguous, and is evidence that the IASB makes an effort to take account 
of constituent preferences when deciding whether to implement its proposed changes.   
The coefficient for explicit agreement in Table 5.6 is consistently found to be 
significant and negative, but interestingly, there is no significance for explicit 
disagreement. This indicates that agreement reduces the probability of the IASB 
rejecting a proposal and that disagreement has no effect. However, as explained above, 
marginal effects analysis can help to better understand these effects.  




Figure 5.1 plots the predicted probabilities of REJECT. It is apparent that the predicted 
probabilities of REJECT are lower when there is explicit agreement. To demonstrate 
the significance of the marginal effect of explicit agreement, Table 5.8 presents the 
marginal effect of a change from no explicit opinion to agreement (column 2) or 
disagreement (column 5) on REJECT at various values of negativity.  
 
Table 5.8 Average Marginal Effect of Explicit Opinion 




Level of NEG   dy/dx Std. Err. z 
 
dy/dx Std. Err. z 
0 
 
-0.101* 0.020 -5.15 
 
0.021 0.030 0.69 
0.1 
 
-0.108* 0.019 -5.56 
 
0.017 0.021 0.81 
0.2 
 
-0.112* 0.041 -2.75 
 
0.013 0.039 0.33 
0.3 
 
-0.113 0.065 -1.75 
 
0.008 0.063 0.13 
0.4 
 
-0.111 0.087 -1.28 
 
0.003 0.085 0.04 
0.5 
 
-0.106 0.105 -1.02 
 
-0.001 0.103 -0.01 
0.6 
 
-0.099 0.117 -0.84 
 
-0.004 0.116 -0.04 
0.7 
 
-0.090 0.125 -0.72 
 
-0.007 0.123 -0.06 
0.8 
 
-0.080 0.126 -0.63 
 
-0.009 0.124 -0.07 
0.9 
 
-0.069 0.123 -0.56 
 
-0.010 0.121 -0.08 
1   -0.059 0.116 -0.51   -0.010 0.115 -0.09 
This table presents the average marginal effect for AGREE, i.e. occurrences of explicit agreement in responses and 
DISAGREE, i.e. occurrences of explicit disagreement in responses at regular intervals of NEG, i.e. the negativity score based 
on a modified ratio of negative to total words. *Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Explicit disagreement is still not found to have a significant marginal effect at any of 
the tested values of negativity. However, explicit agreement has a significant negative 
effect if negativity is less than 0.27. All but 54 (1%) observations fall within this range. 
Out of the 54 observations falling outside this range, 15 expressed explicit agreement. 
To highlight, and ensure, the significant impact of explicit agreement at the more 
typical values of negativity, Figure 5.3 plots the marginal effect of explicit opinion at 
a range of values for negativity from 0 to 0.3 which provides a clearer visualisation.  





Figure 5.3 Average Marginal Effects of Explicit Opinion at Various Values of 
Negativity 
 
This graph displays the average marginal effects of a change from no explicit opinion to explicit agreement or disagreement for 
values of negativity, NEG, ranging from 0 to 0.3 (99% of the sample). Confidence intervals are indicated at 95% 
 
The graph illustrates that a discrete change from no explicit opinion to explicit 
agreement has, on average, a significant negative effect on the probability of the IASB 
rejecting its proposal for the common values of negativity, i.e. below 0.27. The 
marginal effects are around -0.1 for agreement, i.e. the likelihood of the IASB 
rejecting a proposed change is reduced by around 10% if met with agreement at 
common values of negativity, until it becomes insignificant at 27% negativity and 
above. This is consistent with hypothesis 5.1 and suggests that proposed changes that 
are met with explicit agreement are less likely to be rejected than changes that are met 
with the same levels of negativity and no explicit agreement.  




The observation below is an example of one of the fifteen observations with 
exceptionally high levels of negativity, yet explicitly stating agreement. This 
observation, with a negativity score of 0.35 is taken from a comment letter from the 
German Accounting Standards Committee in response to IASB’s 2002 ED on 
Disclosure, Presentation, Recognition and Measurement.  
“We agree with the proposed guidance. However, additional guidance would 
be helpful to distinguish between an active market and a non-active market, 
since the definition provided in IAS 38.7 is not sufficient. We also see a need 
for additional guidance how to deal with market disturbance, market 
narrowness, the valuation of block trades or the valuation of irregular trades.” 
This demonstrates the ambiguity of these observations as there is support for the IASB 
to implement a change, yet dissatisfaction with the change as it stands. The average 
marginal effect of agreement in these cases is not significant and could indicate that 
the IASB views this similarly to how it views observations without agreement. 
However, the small number of observations in this range makes this difficult to 
substantiate. 
Disagreement has no significant marginal effect on the probability of the IASB 
rejecting proposals across the range of negativity scores presented in Table 5.8 and 
Figure 5.3.
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  The absence of an effect for disagreement is inconsistent with 
hypothesis 5.2. Grossman and Helpman (2001) theorised that lobbyists must phrase 
their transfer of information in a way that aligns with the ideology of the regulator that 
they are trying to influence. As the exposure drafts are produced according to the 
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 As reported in Table 5.6, when excluding negativity from the model, the coefficient for disagreement 
remains insignificant. 




conceptual framework and ideology of the organisation, explicit disagreement may be 
seen as a signal of incongruence between the views of the lobbyist and the IASB. It is 
therefore likely that the IASB is reluctant to consider such submissions.  
The coefficient for POSTC is positive and significant as the IASB has rejected more 
of its proposals since the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008, for reasons 
not captured by the measures of opinion in comment letter submissions.  
5.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter set out to investigate whether the IASB takes account of formal lobbying 
within its due process. Whilst this is a major issue within accounting literature, the 
lack of an appropriate methodology, and an appropriate theory of regulation to guide 
the methodology, has hindered empirical investigation of this issue. In their review of 
accounting literature and its implications for GAAP, Kothari et al. (2010) identified 
ideology theory of regulation as a potential framework for studying accounting 
standard development. This, as of yet neglected, framework more effectively explains 
the role of external influence than public interest theory or capture theory, as it 
recognises that accounting standards are a joint outcome of the ideology of the 
standard setter and special interest lobbying.   
Prior literature has been more effective in explaining what induces lobbying than how 
the standard setter responds. However, it is generally recognised that various standard 
setters tend to align their standards, in part, to the wishes of lobbyists. In addition, 
extant literature has highlighted various elements of the process that demonstrate 
lobbying influence, which has led to a focus on disagreement, as well as occasions 
where the standard setter deviates from its intended course of action by rejecting its 




proposed changes. Combining these elements allows the isolation of the self-interested 
lobbying component of the standard setting. 
Lobbyists do not always explicitly state their opinion, yet incur the cost of submitting 
comment letters. This suggests that lobbyists expect to have some influence and 
potentially block proposed changes by expressing their discontent in an alternative 
way. To overcome the methodological challenges stemming from the ambiguous 
nature of comment letters, and to avoid connotations of subjectivity that result from 
manual content analysis, computerised textual analysis was undertaken to generate a 
method that can assess the negativity in comment letter responses to proposed changes 
presented in exposure drafts issued by the IASB. Based on the methodological 
advances in accounting and finance literature and programmatic modifications to suit 
the lobbying context, a continuous negativity score is obtained for the responses of 
lobbyists.  
The descriptive statistics of this measure show that disagreement or high levels of 
negativity tend to be combined with longer responses, both in terms of the answer to 
the question relating to the specific change with which the lobbyist disagrees, and for 
the total letter. This signals that lobbyists spend greater effort when they oppose the 
proposed change and are trying to change the position of the IASB than when they 
agree with the proposed change. 
Further, it is found that the IASB is less likely to implement a proposed change if it 
has been met with higher levels of negativity. Logistic regression analysis provides 
robust results that whilst explicit opinion is only significant when a lobbyist agrees 
with the proposal, the measure of negativity is consistently found to affect the IASB’s 
decision as whether or not to implement a change.  




Overall, these findings provide support for the ideology theory of regulation in this 
setting and provide robust, objective evidence that the IASB takes account of 
aggregate special interest lobbying. That is, whilst an ideological conviction guides 
the development of proposals, there is room for influence at a later stage in the process. 
Consistent with the ideology theory, there is no evidence of influence being granted to 
lobbyists who explicitly disagree with proposed changes. One possible interpretation 
of this finding is that this approach alienates the standard setter by seemingly opposing 
the ideology. Instead, discussing the change in a negative way has the possibility to 
persuade the standard setter to reject its proposals or substantially alter them.  
Whilst this chapter provides strong evidence for IASB’s susceptibility to lobbying, 
Chapters 6 and 7 further investigate the characteristics that make lobbyists more or 
less likely to be ideologically aligned with the IASB, as well as more influential in 
shaping the outcome of the final standard. 




6. The Influence of Constituent Group 
Lobbying in the Development of IFRS: 




The legitimacy of the standard setting process of the IASB is crucial to the recognition 
of IFRS around the world as the appropriate accounting standards. However, one of 
the major criticisms of the IASC, that prompted its restructure, was a lack of 
transparency in the standard setting process (Collett et al. 2001; Street 2006; 
Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 15). The IASB recognises the importance of this issue 
and, as part of the restructure in 2001, made a commitment to a transparent standard 
setting process by publicising comments from interested parties to its proposals made 
in discussion papers and exposure drafts. This provides an opportunity to scrutinise 
the organisations’ decisions in the light of lobbying, and identify sources of influence, 
in order to evaluate the legitimacy of the process.  
There have been numerous calls from the academic community for research to 
develop greater understanding of the international accounting standard setting process 
(e.g., Barth 2008; Arnold 2009; Kothari et al. 2010). In promoting research that 
enhances understanding of the relationship between micro accounting practices and 
the macroeconomic and political environment, Arnold (2009) draws attention to a key 
area of importance, namely how financial reporting standards are shaped by, and have 




helped shape, the financialization of the economy, and, in particular, the extent to 
which the financial industry is influential in the standard setting agenda.  
This chapter focuses on the development of international standards for financial 
instruments. The financial industry is the main user of these standards and has a keen 
interest in the outcome of the process, and this is evident from the extensive 
participation of this constituent group via comment letter submissions. The 
development of the standards in question is particularly important in light of the 
financial crisis and the resulting scrutiny of bank asset valuation practices. 
“…solvency and survival of our major financial institutions now turns on how 
accountants value bank assets and the extent to which auditors require firms to 
consolidate off-balance sheet entities” (Arnold 2009, p. 803). 
Whilst conflicting preferences of constituent groups are recognised to be a key feature 
of the political process underlying IFRS (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Sutton 
1984; Jorissen et al. 2011), numerous factors have hindered robust results of the 
identification of sources of influence. Arnold (2009) cites the overreliance on 
quantitative databases as a cause for the disregard of such research topics. In addition, 
there is a question of how much of the influence is actually observable to academic 
researchers, and what can be inferred about what goes on behind the scenes. In 
addition, the lack of a suitable theoretical framework complicates the interpretation of 
results at an intermediate time in the standards’ development.  
The ideology theory of regulation recognises that there are two components to the 
development of regulation: the ideology of the regulator and the special interest 
lobbying (Kothari et al. 2010). This framework provides a conceptualisation for 




interpreting the results of prior studies and guides the methodology in this chapter. 
The findings in Chapter 5 support the theory by confirming that there is room for 
influence by constituents after the IASB has issued an exposure draft, as the IASB is 
found to take account of the aggregate levels of negativity and agreement in the 
responses to the invitation to comment section of its exposure drafts when deciding 
whether to reject or implement its proposed changes.  
The aim of this chapter is to extend the analysis from Chapter 5 to test whether the 
room for influence is limited to the aggregate preferences of all constituents or if 
certain lobbying constituent groups are more influential. A composite measure of 
opposition is therefore developed based on factor analysis of the opinion measures 
developed in Chapter 5, namely explicitly stated agreement and disagreement in the 
responses as well as level of negativity, measured as a modified weighted ratio of 
negative to non-negative words. This chapter, therefore, further analyses the ideology 
theory of regulation in the context of accounting standard setting by assessing whether 
the IASB proposes changes that are particularly acceptable to certain constituent 
groups, and whether there is room for influence to shape the final version of the 
standard.  
In the first stage of the analysis, the level of opposition is regressed on constituent 
group and control variables. Linear predictions based on marginal effects are 
generated in order to assess the tendency to oppose the proposed changes within the 
various constituent groups, thus capturing the ideological alignment of the standard 
setter and the group. The results from the first stage of the analysis strongly support 
that groups differ in their level of opposition to the IASB’s proposals and that the 




greatest amount of opposition came from the financial industry and the least from 
regulators. 
The second stage analysis examines the impact of opposition and its dependence on 
constituent group on the IASB’s decision to implement or reject a proposed change. 
Logit regression analysis is, therefore, used to test the effect of constituent groups’ 
opposition on the likelihood of rejection by including an interaction term for the 
constituent group and opposition. Predictions and marginal effects of opposition on 
the IASB’s decision to reject a proposal are generated for the various constituent 
groups. The results from the second stage analysis support that accountants, the 
financial industry, regulators, the business community, and standard setters are 
influential in the development of accounting standards when the proposed changes 
concern classification and measurement issues. However, for disclosure and other 
issues, the influence is limited to lobbyists from the business community. 
Section 6.2 discusses prior literature and develops hypotheses. Section 6.3 outlines the 
research design and descriptive statistics. Section 6.4 presents the results including the 
graphs from the analysis of the marginal effects. Section 6.5 concludes. 
6.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This section reviews extant literature on the impact of various constituent groups on 
accounting regulation. Ideology theory of regulation provides the theoretical lens for 
interpreting prior findings as well as for developing hypotheses regarding lobbying 
success of the various constituent groups. 




6.2.1 Motivations and Characteristics 
As discussed in Chapter 3, literature on the motivations indicates that the process is 
characterised by constituents with different, sometimes conflicting, preferences and, 
as such, provides the context for the empirical analysis of constituent group influence. 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), as developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) or 
Sutton’s (1984) economic theory of lobbying usually provide the theoretical 
underpinning for this strand of literature. PAT makes predictions as to the positions 
taken by firms to proposed changes to accounting standards. In their model, all parties 
aim to maximise their utility and firms will lobby for policies that further their self-
interest. The empirical literature confirms that lobbying is motivated by self-interest 
and the most frequent participants are large firms which will experience an adverse 
impact on their reported financial results (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Sutton 
1984; Schalow 1995; Dechow et al. 1996; Hill et al. 2002; Ang et al. 2000) 
Sutton’s (1984) model predicts that two factors affect the decision to lobby: the 
potential effect of the accounting standard and the likelihood that the lobbying efforts 
will influence the standard setter. Preparers of financial information are predicted to 
lobby more than users of financial information. This occurs as preparers of financial 
information tend to be less diversified in terms of income, making the potential effect 
more significant. Similarly, less diversified preparers of financial information are 
more likely to lobby than are more diversified preparers. There is a large amount of 
support for this prediction across settings (e.g., Jupe 2000; McLeay et al. 2000; Stenka 
and Taylor 2010; Jorissen et al. 2011; Giner and Acre 2012).  




With regards to a wider set of constituent groups, Jorissen et al. (2012) analysed 
characteristics of senders of comment letters to multiple IASB exposure drafts, from 
2002-2006, across a range of issues. They found that preparers, accountants, and 
standard setters reacted more when accounting numbers were subject to change, 
whereas there was greater participation by users, stock exchanges, and regulators 
regarding disclosure issues, indicating that the different issues at stake motivate 
lobbying by different constituent groups.  
In terms of agreement between constituent groups, Puro (1984) observed a 
relationship between auditor lobbying and accounting data for their clients but found 
that this agency relationship did not hold for accounting changes that decreased clients’ 
wealth, yet directly increased auditors’ wealth. This was deduced from auditors’ 
tendency to support increased disclosure requirements which would result in higher 
fee income for the auditor, whilst imposing additional costs on their clients. Similarly, 
Brown (1981) found that preparers and auditors represented distinct clusters in terms 
of positions taken on a large number of selected FASB projects in the years 1974-
1977. That is, there may be similarities in how certain auditors and their clients lobby 
but in terms of average preferences they represent distinct interest groups. In addition, 
Saemann’s (1999) content analysis of four institutional lobbyists revealed that marked 
differences between the views of users and preparers are causing controversy in the 
process. 
Tendencies to care about different issues, and the different economic motivations of 
various parties, lead to a standard setting process that is characterised by conflicting 
preferences. The standard setter is therefore faced with a decision as whether to 




change its course of action in light of the lobbying that occurs in response to a 
proposed change. 
Sutton (1984) theorised that influence would be more effective at an earlier stage in 
the process than at a later stage, and preferably through unobservable means. However, 
the literature has not provided empirical support for the greater propensity to lobby in 
the early stages of the process (e.g., Georgiou 2010; Jorissen et al. 2012). Nevertheless, 
this does not exclude the possibility that the activities of influential parties are 
effective early on in the process, even if unobservable to researchers. Sutton (1984) 
recognised that although aspects of the process are unobservable, the total lobbying 
process can be effectively approximated by analysing the distribution of observable 
lobbying, as the use of various lobbying methods are related. This was supported by 
Georgiou’s (2010) survey of investment management firms, which found that 
comment letter submissions were related to the use of other forms of lobbying. 
Therefore, whilst the observed influence after the exposure draft has been issued is 
limited to special interest lobbying, the period leading up to the issuance of the 
exposure draft does not necessarily exclude all special interest lobbying. However, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the formation of the exposure draft includes more of the 
ideological component, and, as such, the level of opposition to proposed changes can 
reveal the extent of ideological alignment between the IASB and the lobbyists. 
Whilst this stream of literature does not, in itself, contribute to our understanding of 
the effects of lobbying, it highlights that the process is characterised by conflicting 
preferences. In addition, although PAT and Sutton’s (1984) lobbying model focus on 
ex-ante lobbying decisions, as opposed to the outcome of lobbying, the implication is 
that whoever lobbies does so to obtain some benefit and so there is a reasonable 




probability that their views will be taken into account. The level of opposition 
expressed to the changes proposed by the IASB is therefore predicted to vary 
according to the constituent group to whom the lobbyist belongs. 
Hypothesis 6.1: Opposition to proposed changes is dependent on constituent group. 
6.2.2 Constituent Groups and Lobbying Success 
The ideology theory of regulation stresses that regulation is a response to market 
failure, but predicts that lobbying will then influence the regulators, making regulation 
a joint outcome of political ideology and special interest lobbying (Kothari et al. 2010). 
The ideology of the IASB therefore guides the agenda setting and the proposed 
changes of the exposure drafts. As a result, the reaction of lobbyists to the changes 
that the IASB proposes in its exposure drafts is likely to depend on the closeness of 
the ideological views of that constituent group and that of the IASB. If one were to 
analyse the alignment between the finalised standard and the comment letters, there is 
no opportunity to establish whether closeness is due to successful lobbying, as the 
most closely aligned constituent group may have agreed with the initial proposal. In 
order to establish causation, the initial reaction needs to be considered in order to 
assess its ability to affect the standard setter, making ideology theory a suitable 
framework for analysing lobbying success.  
The IASB classifies the various constituent groups as “accountants, financial analysts 
and other users of financial statements, the business community, stock exchanges, 
regulatory and legal authorities, academics and other interested individuals” (IFRS 
Foundation, 2011, p. A18). Kwok and Sharp (2005) interviewed IASC board members 
in their analysis of IASC’s segment reporting and intangible assets projects. The 




interviews revealed that board members tended to aggregate the opinions within letters 
of separate stakeholder groups when considering the comment letters. Therefore, the 
IASB’s own grouping of stakeholders serves as a suitable starting point for a 
classification to detect sources of influence. The potential for ideological alignment 
and lobbying success by the constituent groups is discussed below. 
Users and preparers 
If the role of financial reporting is to increase transparency in an aim to promote 
efficient capital allocation and prevent market failure, which is its role according to 
the prevailing paradigm of accounting research (Arnold 2009), then providers of 
capital are the key stakeholder group. This is consistent with IASB’s conceptual 
framework which states:  
“The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing 
resources to the entity. Those decisions involve buying, selling or holding 
equity and debt instruments, and providing or settling loans and other forms of 
credit.”  (IFRS Foundation 2011: 9, OB2).  
As such, it would follow that the IASB has a self-imposed obligation to develop the 
standards to incorporate changes that will benefit users. However, in the earlier stages 
of international accounting standard setting it was argued that the voice of users is 
represented on a rhetoric basis by members of the audit industry, as opposed to in 
person by users themselves (Hopwood 1994). 




Taking account of user views, as conveyed in comment letters, would be a natural 
choice when considering comment letters in relation to the conceptual framework. 
However, consistent with Sutton’s (1984) model and Hopwood’s (1994) argument, the 
participation of this constituent group is relatively limited. Georgiou (2010) finds that 
the reason for the low participation of this group is due to the perceived high costs of 
lobbying, whilst Durocher et al. (2007) argues that it is due to the perception amongst 
users that their views will not be taken account of as this would not increase the 
perceived legitimacy of the standard setter. Alternatively, as lobbyists are perceived to 
more frequently lobby to oppose a change in the status quo (e.g., Kenny and Larson 
1993), if changes are proposed to benefit users, as per the conceptual framework, then 
incurring the cost of lobbying is unnecessary as users expect the beneficial change to 
go ahead.  
Mian and Smith (1990) found that whilst the FASB had argued that its proposal to 
require consolidation of financial subsidiaries was developed in the interest of users, 
this group most often opposed the proposal. In contrast, Saemann’s (1999) content 
analysis of comment letters, sent by four institutional organisations, on twenty FASB 
accounting standards showed that the FASB’s position tended to align with that of 
users initially, and they retained their favour for increased uniformity and increased 
additional disclosure, but their finalised standards also incorporated preparer 
preferences by compromising on the issues that preparers had strongly opposed, 
namely costly disclosure, volatility, and conservatism.   
However, identifying users of financial reports requires some arbitrary classification. 
Jorissen et al. (2012) classified the user group as investors, financial analysts, 
consumer organisations, and other parties that use financial information for decision 




making. This was separated from financial preparers, which included individual 
financial institutions including insurance firms. Separating institutional investors and 
those who use financial information for decision making, from the rest of the financial 
industry will necessarily involve some arbitrary allocations, as the financial industry 
arguably belongs to both the preparer group and the user group. As the main 
holders/traders of financial instruments, the financial industry can be considered a 
preparer group, in particular when it comes to financial instruments accounting. The 
motivations for users and preparers are potentially different. For example, whilst users 
have been found to prefer increased uniformity and increased additional disclosure, 
preparers oppose costly disclosure, as well as volatility and conservatism (Saemann 
1999).  
Similar to Sutton’s (1984) prediction that preparers are more likely to lobby than users 
due to being less diversified in terms of income, it is likely that preparer motives 
would take precedence, as the impact of a change on their own reports and ability to 
raise external finance will be more important than the potential impact on their ability 
to analyse certain investment opportunities as part of a diversified portfolio. 
Investment associations have previously been separated from the financial industry 
(e.g., Jorrissen et al. 2012), and thought to represent users. However, constituent 
groups are likely to conduct research and lobby on behalf of their members (Grossman 
and Helpman 2001) and their members are from the financial industry, with primarily 
preparer objectives, and are therefore grouped along with the rest of the financial 
industry. 
Whilst the financial industry is considered a preparer group in the context of the 
chapter for the reasons above, the concerns of undue influence in the development of 




accounting standards for financial instruments are particularly attributed to the 
financial industry. For example, Perry and Nöelke (2005) conducted network analysis 
of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), the IASB, and their 
different committees and working groups. They found that actors from the financial 
sector have more opportunities for influence than other business actors. If their 
influence has been prominent at earlier stages in the development, then this group is 
likely to be more positive to proposed changes than the rest of the business 
community. Moreover, the financial industry has been argued to effectively have 
captured financial market regulators (Hardy 2006). Therefore, the financial industry, 
including financial analysts and investment firms, is treated as a distinct group from 
the rest of the business community.
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As mentioned above, users, as opposed to preparers, are a key target group of the 
conceptual framework on which the IASB develops it standards (IFRS Foundation 
2011). Therefore, it is likely that preparers will react negatively to proposed changes 
as they may have been developed without them in mind. However, support of the 
preparer group, or at least their compliance with the standards, has been found to be 
crucial for the development of sustainable standards. For example, Rahman et al. 
(1994) noted that after the stock market crash in 1987, many companies in New 
Zealand ceased to comply with the standard on investment property accounting and 
the standard was subsequently withdrawn as it could not be effectively enforced. 
Further, in Europe, the macro-hedge issue that led the E.U. to adopt IAS 39 with a 
carve-out stemmed from concerns amongst banks (Armstrong and Jagolinzer 2005). 
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This again illustrates how support from this group is crucial to the enforcement of the 
standards. 
There is some evidence in the literature of the influence of preparers. For example, 
McLeay et al. (2000) used manual content analysis to identify whether the 269 
proposals contained within five published comments by preparers, auditors, and 
academic experts were reflected in the finalised regulation during the transformation 
of the Fourth European Company Law Directive into German accounting law. They 
found that whilst the preparer group, initially, appeared more likely to be successful in 
having their proposals incorporated into the law, this was dependant on the support of 
at least one additional constituent group. Further, in a study that focused solely on 
preparers, Brown and Feroz (1992) manually coded letters, that responded to the first 
exposure draft, according to their position on four issues on the FASB’s project on 
general price level adjustment. The study found that changes between the first and 
second exposure draft frequently represented views expressed in the letters. In 
addition, Kwok and Sharp (2005) empirically analysed comment letters within the 
development of projects for segment reporting and intangible assets, as undertaken by 
the IASC, the predecessor to the IASB, and found that no group had absolute power, 
but that the final outcome tended to align with the majority view, which was often 
expressed by preparers. Similarly, Yen et al. (2007) concluded that the FASB 
addressed the most common objections in the comment letters to the FASB’s 
Comprehensive Income Reporting exposure draft.  
In light of the empirical evidence highlighted above, in addition to the importance of 
preparers’ acceptance of accounting standards for their effective enforcement, it is 
plausible that the sheer volume of lobbying by preparers, and its resulting 




representation of the majority view, compels standard setters to take account of the 
preferences of this group.  
The Profession 
The standing of accounting professionals has risen as a result of accounting functions 
growing in numbers and importance in organisations and serving as the basis for 
decision making (Hopwood 1992). Further, the profession, in particular the big four, 
are considered to be centrally involved in accounting regulation, including, but not 
limited to, the standard setting processes, both nationally and internationally (Cooper 
and Robson 2006). For example, the IASC was traditionally made up of members of 
the profession. However, in its restructure into the IASB, the membership on the 
board became more diverse, as outside parties, in particular the FASB and the SEC 
were sceptical of the prior structure and its strong ties to the profession (Camfferman 
and Zeff 2007, p. 15).  
Early critique of U.S. accounting standard setting organisations’ closeness with the 
profession resulted in the 1976 Metcalf Staff Report concluding that the U.S. 
accounting standard setting lacked independence from the profession, and was in 
particular dominated by large accounting firms. However, the report did not provide 
any objective evidence and sparked academic responses from Hussein and Ketz 
(1979), Newman (1981), and Brown (1981) who all concluded that these concerns 
were exaggerated. The Newman study computed empirical power indices by 
measuring how often the fifty members on the two boards had voted on the winning 
side, and how crucial the vote was to winning. It was concluded that neither on the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB), nor on its successor body, the FASB, did the 
profession completely dominate the standard setting processes.  




Rahman et al. (1994) used a case study approach to exploring the establishment, 
withdrawal, and reestablishment of the standard on investment property accounting in 
New Zealand, SSAP 17. They reviewed the minutes of the standard setter’s meetings 
and found that auditors expressed most concern regarding diverse accounting practices, 
which led to adding the project to the standard setter’s agenda, and the establishment 
of the standard in 1983. However, as mentioned above, as companies ceased to 
comply with the standard after the 1987 stock market crash, it was withdrawn and, 
crucially, was only reintroduced after constituent preferences had been established. 
Similarly, Pong and Whittington (1996) studied the withdrawal of current cost 
accounting in the U.K. Compliance with SSAP 16, issued in 1980, was initially high 
but as companies increasingly ceased to comply with the standard, it was made non-
mandatory and eventually withdrawn in 1988. 
Auditors have the potential to spot problems, or occurrences where accounting 
practices diverge, and bring them to the attention of the IASB. This group also 
participates with national standard setters and can provide technical expertise to the 
board. As such, this group does not only benefit from avenues of influence early in the 
process, but is in fact integral to the direction and development of new and existing 
standards. The probable ideological alignment with the IASB is therefore expected to 
result in low levels of opposition to proposed changes.  
Regulators 
Regulators, including government bodies and financial market regulators, are also in a 
good position to influence the agenda of standard setters. According to the ideology 
theory of regulation, regulators aim to identify and address causes of market failure 
(Kalt and Zupan 1984). In this pursuit, they can spot divergence in accounting 




practices or potential problems with the application of accounting standards. The 
IASB has previously revealed that it was taking account of prudential bank regulators’ 
concerns during the development of IAS 39. When issuing the amendments to the 
FVO in 2005 they stated:  
“In particular, as a result of continuing discussions with constituents, the 
Board became aware that some, including prudential supervisors of banks, 
securities companies and insurers, were concerned that the fair value option 
might be used inappropriately... In response to those concerns, the Board 
published in April 2004 an Exposure Draft of proposed restrictions to the fair 
value option. In March 2005 the Board held a series of round-table meetings 
to discuss proposals with invited constituents. As a result of this process, the 
Board issued an amendment to IAS 39 in June 2005 relating to the fair value 
option.” (IASCF 2005, p. 16) 
This demonstrates the avenue for influence for regulators at an early stage in the 
process. Taking account of regulators’ views, and openly announcing it, could be a 
strategy to improve the perception of legitimacy of the organisation, as the IASB are 
seen to collaborate with a constituent group that is perceived to be promoting the 
public interest in addressing causes of market failure. Moreover, the IASB lacks 
enforcement power which means that regulators and policy makers are crucial in the 
implementation of its standards.  
Bank regulators have been argued to be particularly susceptible to regulatory capture, 
due to working in close proximity to the financial industry, a necessity in order to set 
appropriate regulations (Hardy 2006). Zeff (2008) and Armstrong and Jagolinzer 




(2005) indicate that although the pressure that resulted in the limitation of the FVO, 
prior to the E.U. adoption of IFRS, appeared to come from E.U. officials, the true 
source of the pressure stemmed from the banking industry in France. Similarities 
between levels of opposition between regulators and the financial industry are 
therefore particularly interesting.  
National Standard Setters 
National standard setters work in collaboration with the IASB to develop standards. 
Büthe and Mattli (2011) argued that the technical nature of accounting standards is 
what justifies the power of the IASB. Similarly, Perry and Nölke (2006) argued that 
the structure of the organisation has restricted the debate regarding its standards to 
their technical nature. Consistent with this, Giner and Acre (2012) found that the 
IASB only took account of conceptual arguments in comment letters, whereas 
economic arguments, which only appeared in comment letters from the preparer group, 
were ignored. National standard setters, as well as representatives from the accounting 
profession, have the ability to provide expertise on technical issues which, according 
to these arguments, put these groups in an advantageous position to influence standard 
development.  
It is widely recognised that institutional/cultural settings affect accounting practices 
(e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Ball 2006) which can at times make them less preferable to 
national accounting standards (Collett et al. 2001). This may prompt national standard 
setters to oppose proposals if they are incompatible with the institutional setting in 
their country. Further, Büthe and Mattli (2011) argue that institutional similarities 
make U.S. actors more likely than European actors to be influential in the IASB’s 
standard setting processes. Therefore, it is unlikely that this group would represent a 




coherent group. Both the ideological alignment and the special interest lobbying 
influence are likely to depend on the closeness between the institutional similarities, 
including the accounting traditions, of the national standard setter and its home 




Standard setters have argued that the input of the academic community is valuable as 
academics do not have a stake in the outcome, rendering their comments unbiased 
(Barth 2008). Despite this, academic participation in comment letter writing has been 
low throughout history and made up only three percent of all comment letters written 
to the IASB in the years 2001-2008 (Larson and Herz 2011). Tandy and Wilburns’ 
(1996) survey of academics, in relation to their participation in the FASB’s standard 
setting, reveals that the reluctance to submit comment letters originated from the 
perception that they are unlikely to be successful, lack of time or resources, inadequate 
rewards, and the technical nature of the issues. The IASB does not target the academic 
community in setting standards, and this group lacks bargaining power in terms of 
enforcement powers or threat of non-compliance that may benefit other groups. In 
addition, as argued by Leisenring and Johnson (1994), academic research is difficult 
to understand for practitioners, including standard setters. The influence by the 
academic community is therefore likely to be limited.  
There are motivations to lobby and certain groups are more inclined to do so, probably 
because there is a reasonable chance of success and a desire to avoid the potential 
negative effect of a proposed change. It seems that while there is the potential for 
several groups to be considered by the IASB in its development of accounting 
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standards, the ideological view of the standard setter is most likely to be aligned with 
regulators and the profession. However, both the ideological alignment and the effect 
of opposition is a topic for empirical investigation. Therefore, it is examined if there is 
a difference between constituent groups in the likelihood of blocking changes to a 
standard by opposing them in comment letters. 
Hypothesis 6.2: The impact of opposition will depend on constituent group. 
6.3 Research Design  
6.3.1 Sample  
The sample used in the analysis for this chapter is the same as in Chapter 5 and 
outlined in section 5.4.1. The same 4038 letter-question observations for which a 
negativity score can be obtained and where there is not both explicit agreement and 
disagreement are used in the analysis. These observations represent responses to 70 
questions from the invitation to comment section in fourteen exposure drafts which 





As explained in Chapter 5, four researchers identified the outcome of the projects by 
comparing proposed amendments, referred to in each question, to the subsequently 
issued amendments to the standards. If the proposal, to which the question relates, had 
not been incorporated in the subsequent amendment, i.e. the proposal has been 
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rejected or there has been a substantial change from the proposal to the finalised 
standard; the variable REJECT is coded 1, otherwise 0.  
6.3.3 Interest Group Classification 
As the analysis focuses on the impact of opposition from certain constituent groups, 
the comment letters are classified according to the constituent group to whom the 
author belongs. The starting point is the IASB’s own classification, i.e. “accountants, 
financial analysts and other users of financial statements, the business community, 
stock exchanges, regulatory and legal authorities, academics and other interested 
individuals” (IFRS Foundation 2011, A18). Accountants, ACC, are 
accounting/auditing firms, associations, and individuals who work for 
accounting/auditing firms.  
Prior literature has classified financial analysts and institutional investors as the users 
(e.g., Jorissen et al. 2012). However, as discussed above, separating financial analysts 
and institutional investors from insurance firms and banks, which are considered to be 
preparers, will pose a problem when dealing with the financial industry as a 
potentially influential group. Therefore, the financial industry, including financial 
analysts, institutional investors, banks and insurance firms, are treated as one group, 
denoted by FIN, separate from the rest of the business community, BUS. 
National standard setters, denoted by STA, are separated from other regulatory and 
legal authorities as the IASB outsource standard setting to national standard setters 
which may grant them special access. Regulatory and legal authorities, REG, include 
supervisors of financial markets and other regulatory and legal authorities (including 
government bodies and government advisory bodies). Stock exchanges are also 




grouped with regulators as they share enforcement powers. Academics, ACA, are 
authors who indicate affiliation with a university either as students or staff. Following 
Jorissen et al. (2012), other interested parties were identified as actuaries and 
consultants, denoted OTH.  
If it is unclear from the comment letter which constituent group the author belongs to, 
this is identified by searching for the author or author organisation online. Following 
Larson (1997) and Jorissen et al. (2012), letters from individuals with specific ties to 
organisations are grouped with their respective organisation unless the letter explicitly 
states that the views expressed should not be linked to the organisation. There are 
seven letters (23 observations) for which authors could not be classified according to a 
constituent group. These observations represent less than 0.5 percent of the sample 
and are removed from the analysis.  
6.3.4 Composite Opposition 
The opinion variables developed in Chapters 4 and 5 are used to create a composite 
measure of the level of opposition in the responses. It is based on the variable for 
negativity, NEG, and on the occurrences of explicit agreement and disagreement. NEG 
is a weighted ratio of negative to total words. The tone classifications of words are 
primarily based on the Harvard IV Psychosocial Dictionary but programmatically 
modified, as described in detail in Chapters 4 and 5, to better suit the context. Explicit 
agreement and disagreement are identified as in Chapter 5 and included as two binary 
indicator variables (0/1). Agreement, AGREE, is where the first word in the answer is 
‘yes’ or if there are any non-negated occurrences of ‘agree’ and disagreement, 




DISAGREE, if the first word is ‘no’ or if there are any occurrences of ‘disagree’ or 
‘oppose’ or negated occurrences of  ‘agree’. 
These measures are correlated and are all measuring opinion to the proposed change 
within the responses. To derive a single measure of opposition, OPPOSE, to the 
proposed change, principal component analysis is used to generate a composite factor 
based on the measures of negativity (NEG), explicit agreement (AGREE), and explicit 
disagreement (DISAGREE). Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics and the results 
of the factor analysis generating OPPOSE. 
  




Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics and Factor Analysis of Opinion in 
Comment Letters 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Opinion in Comment Letters (n=4938) 
 
NEG AGREE DISAGREE 
 Minimum 0 0 0 
 Mean 0.059 0.440 0.175 
 Median 0.050 0 0 
 Maximum 1 1 1 
 Standard 
Deviation 0.068 0.496 0.380 
 
NEG is the adjusted weighted ratio of negative to total words. AGREE is the occurrence of explicit agreement. 
DISAGREE is the occurrence of explicit disagreement. 
     Panel B: Pairwise Correlations of Opinion Measures 
 
NEG AGREE DISAGREE 
 
     NEG 
 
-0.248*** 0.242*** 
 AGREE -0.311*** 
 
-0.409*** 
 DISAGREE 0.289*** -0.409***     
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level 
   Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are shown above (below) the diagonal. 
  
     Panel C: Results of Factor Analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.606 0.804 0.535 0.535 




     Factor Loadings 
   Variable OPPOSE Uniqueness 
  NEG 0.6286 0.6049   
 DISAGREE 0.7761 0.3977   
 AGREE -0.7803 0.3911     
     Panel D: Descriptive Statistics of OPPOSE 
  
  










Minimum -1.113 -1.113 -0.134 1.137 
Mean 0.000 -0.880 0.240 1.684 
Median -0.134 -1.113 0.185 1.612 
Maximum 6.900 1.555 2.712 6.900 
Standard 
Deviation 1.000 0.323 0.367 0.493 
     
Column 2 displays summary statistics for all observations. Column 3-5 show the descriptive statistics of OPPOSE for 
the observations separated by the occurrence of explicit opinion, with column 3 where AGREE=1, column 4 where there 
is no explicit opinion, i.e. AGREE=0 and DISAGREE=0, and column 5 where DISAGREE=1. 
 




Panel A of Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the opinion measures, with the 
mean level of negativity being 0.059 (5.9 percent), agreement occurring in 44 percent 
of observations, and disagreement in 17.5 percent. Panel B shows that NEG and 
DISAGREE are positively and significantly correlated and both these measures are 
negatively and significantly correlated with AGREE. Panel C shows the results for the 
factor analysis and factor 1, which is the only one with an eigenvalue over 1, explains 
53.5 percent of the variation. The descriptive statistics of the composite factor, 
OPPOSE, are displayed in panel D. For all observations, the mean is 0 with a standard 
deviation of 1. The lowest value is -1.113 which is obtained only for values that also 
contain agreement, as indicated by the summary statistics in columns 3-5 which show 
the summary statistics of OPPOSE for observations separated by the level of explicit 
opinion in the response. The highest value (6.9) is obtained where the observation 
contains explicit disagreement. To further illustrate the composition of OPPOSE, 
Figure 6.1 plots the value for OPPOSE for each observation along the negativity score, 












Figure 6.1 Composite Opposition 
 
This figure plots the points for the composite opposition measure, OPPOSE, against the negativity score, NEG. The markers 
indicate wheter the observation includes explicit agreement, AGREE, disagreement, DISAGREE, or no explicit opinion, NONE. 
 
Figure 6.1 above illustrates the composition of OPPOSE, the composite opposition 
measure. It shows that observations that contain explicit agreement and no negativity 
obtain the lowest opposition scores whilst observations with disagreement and high 
negativity obtain high scores. The composite opposition measure therefore captures 
explicit opinion coupled with negativity on a continuous scale. 
There are 395 observations in the range where OPPOSE takes a value between 1.13 
and 1.56. This range represent the minimum level of OPPOSE for an observation that 
contains disagreement (1.13) and highest level of OPPOSE where there is explicit 
agreement (1.56). The OPPOSE scores in this range are fairly high, greater than one 




standard deviation above the mean. As such, it is expected that these responses 
express stronger than average opposition to the proposed changes. Out of these 395 
observations only 37 do not contain explicit disagreement and out of which six contain 
agreement. OPPOSE is, therefore, constructed so that the level of opposition for 
observations that contain agreement and those that contain disagreement rarely 
overlap, and that observations that contain explicit disagreement almost always obtain 
a higher level of opposition than those that contain explicit agreement. 
6.3.5 Accounting Issues 
As the literature on motivations and characteristics implies, the tendency to lobby and 
the opinion of lobbyists vary across constituent groups on various accounting issues 
(e.g., Saemann 1999; Jorissen et al. 2012). To account for this, the proposed changes 
are classified according to the type of accounting issue that they relate to, i.e. 
classification and measurement or disclosure and other issues including scope, 
transitional requirements, and implementation guidance. A dummy variable, CLASS, 
takes the value one for classification and measurement issues, and 0 otherwise. 
6.3.6 Control Variables 
The OLS regression models include a range of control variables that may 
independently affect the alignment of the lobbyist and the IASB. First, as international 
accounting is commonly identified as being grounded in Anglo-Saxon accounting 
traditions with a strong emphasis on equity investors as the main target group (Nobes 
2003), an indicator variable, ANGLO, takes 1 if the accounting system in the lobbyists’ 
home country is rooted in Anglo-Saxon traditions, and 0 otherwise.  




Similarly, dummy variables for the part of the world that the lobbyist is from is 
included in the models to capture potential differences in preferences by lobbyists 
from Africa, Asia, South America, Oceania, Europe, and North America. These 
controls aim to capture some of the ideological similarities that stem from the 
similarity in institutional environment and cannot be attributed to the constituent 
group of the comment letter author.
30
 
In addition, financial contributors may have earned influence at earlier stages of the 
process and, therefore, do not oppose the proposed changes to the same extent. The 
IASC Foundation has disclosed the origins of financial donations in different ways 
during the sample period. From 2002-2005, supporters were separated into categories 
depending on their classification as an underwriter or supporter as well as other 
characteristics of the contributor, such as the type of organisation. In 2006, 
contributors were named but not separated according to the magnitude of contribution, 
and since 2007, contributors have been categorised by country and magnitude of 
contribution. Therefore, the model cannot incorporate a continuous measure of 
contributions, but can account for if the lobbyist was a named financial contributor in 
the year of the comment period or not. Financial contributor, CONT, therefore, takes 
the value 1 if the lobbyist is a named financial supporter in the IASCF’s financial 
report in the year of the comment period and 0 otherwise. 
Both the OLS and the logit regression models include two control variables that, 
potentially, have an independent effect on both the direction of lobbying and on the 
resulting decision by the IASB. Macroeconomic factors are known to affect the 
political pressure on regulators (Bertomeu and Magee 2011). Therefore, an indicator 
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variable, POSTC, takes the value 1 for the exposure draft being issued after the 
commencement of the financial crisis, as defined by the bankruptcy filing of Lehman 
Brothers on 15 September 2008, and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the 
increased political pressure on the organisation that followed the allegations of its role 
in the financial crisis (Bengtson 2012). The urgency of potential economic 
consequences may have altered the rhetoric and level of opposition in the letters. 
Further, as the criticism was very closely related to financial instruments, the decision 
to reject certain proposals may have resulted from political pressure that fell outside of 
the comment letter lobbying, such as the above-mentioned pressure to allow 
reclassification. 
In addition, it is possible that the salience of the topic under consideration affects the 
level of opposition in the letters. Less substantial alterations may trigger, not only 
fewer responses, but it is plausible that lobbyists will oppose these matters less in 
order to seem more ideologically aligned with the organisation, so as not to alienate 
the standard setter and damage the potential for influence when opposing more 
important matters. The volume of comment letters received, could, therefore, make the 
organisation more hesitant in going ahead with implementing proposed changes. 
Therefore, the log of the volume of comment letters corresponding to the exposure 
draft, VOLLG, is included as a control in the models. Moreover, the length of the 
responses may signal that the proposed change is particularly complicated or 
controversial which may therefore increase the likelihood of the IASB rejecting the 
proposed change or deferring its implementation. LENGTH, the number of lines in the 
answer to the question and WORDS, the number of words in the letter, are therefore 
included as additional control variables. 




6.3.7 Model Development 
To test the whether some constituent groups are better served by the ideological 
component of the standard setting, and thereby tend to oppose the changes less, the 
composite opposition measure, OPPOSE, obtained from factor analysis of NEG, 
AGREE, and DISAGREE, is regressed on constituent group, type of accounting issue, 
the interaction between constituent group and accounting issue, as well as the control 
variables discussed in section 6.3.7. Equation 6.1 represents the most complete model 
used in the OLS regression. However, Table 6.4 also reports the results of models 
based on the constituent parts of equation 6.1 to indicate the robustness of the result to 
the inclusion of interaction terms and selection of control variables. 
         
              ∑                        ∑                        
       
  
                    (6.1) 
Where i indicates the comment letter and t is the specific question that the observation 
addresses. Class is a dummy variable that takes 1 f the observation relates to proposed 
changes to classification and measurement issues and 0 otherwise. Constituent_Group 
represents the constituent group dummy variables for accountants, financial industry, 
regulators, standard setters, academic community, and others, leaving the business 
community as the omitted group.  
Logit models are used to test the impact of opposition and interest groups on the 
likelihood of the IASB rejecting the proposed change.  




             
               ∑                     ∑                     
       
  
                             (6.2) 
Where REJECT is a binary dependent variable where y=1 if the IASB rejects its 
original proposal, 0 otherwise. The interaction term, Interest_Group * Oppose, allows 
for the possibility that the impact of opposition is conditional on which constituent 
group it comes from. 
6.4 Results 
It is hypothesised that constituent groups are likely to differ in their level of opposition 
to the IASB’s proposed changes due to the differences in ideological alignment 
between the constituent groups and the IASB. The impact of opposition is then 
hypothesised to depend on constituent group. The results from the investigation of 
ideological alignment are presented followed by the impact of opposition expressed by 
each constituent group on the IASB decision, i.e. the effect of special interest lobbying.  
6.4.1 Ideological Alignment 
As a result of the principal component factor analysis, OPPOSE, the central variable 
to the hypotheses, has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Table 6.2 presents 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the multivariate analysis. In 
separating the observations according to the type of accounting issues that the 
proposed change relates to, it is apparent that changes relating to classification and 
measurement are met with more opposition than are those relating to disclosure 
requirements and other issues. This is reflected in panel B of Table 6.2 which shows 




that all except the smallest constituent group in the sample, ‘other interested parties’, 
have higher mean levels of opposition for classification and measurement issues than 
for disclosure and other issues. As well as generating more opposition, classification 
and measurement issues are met with longer responses, as shown by the higher means 
of LENGTH and WORDS. As discussed in Chapter 5, this is likely to be a result of the 
greater effort spent when trying to convince the standard setter to change its position, 




Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Multivariate Models 





Disclosure and Other  
(n=1864) 
  
Classification and Measurement 
(n=3074) 
Variable   mean sd median 
  
mean sd median 
  
mean sd median 
OPPOSE 
 
0.000 1.000 -0.134 
  
-0.164 0.878 -0.134 
  
0.100 1.055 -0.041 
ANGLO 
 
0.486 0.500 0 
  
0.489 0.500 0 
  
0.484 0.500 0 
POSTC 
 
0.531 0.499 1 
  
0.521 0.500 1 
  
0.537 0.499 1 
VOLLG 
 
4.987 0.471 4.927 
  
4.760 0.452 4.663 
  
5.125 0.426 5.333 
CONT 
 
0.179 0.384 0 
  
0.180 0.384 0 
  
0.179 0.384 0 
HIDL 
 
0.240 0.427 0 
  
0.245 0.430 0 
  
0.236 0.425 0 
LENGTH 
 
12.93 19.90 6 
  
10.70 16.39 6 
 
 
14.27 21.64 7 
WORDS 
 
2763 2808 2036 
  
2217 2000 1752 
  
3094 3154 2201 
               Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of OPPOSE separated by Constituent Group 





Disclosure and Other  
(n=1864) 
  
Classification and Measurement 
(n=3074) 
Interest Group n mean sd median 
 
n mean sd median 
 
n mean sd median 
ACC 1329 -0.132 0.970 -0.353 
 
559 -0.343 0.803 -0.580 
 
770 0.022 1.049 -0.134 
FIN 1695 0.174 0.979 0.091 
 
637 0.070 0.916 0.004 
 
1058 0.237 1.010 0.117 
BUS 803 -0.002 1.014 -0.134 
 
281 -0.206 0.810 -0.134 
 
522 0.108 1.093 -0.086 
REG 255 -0.320 0.919 -0.732 
 
84 -0.488 0.878 -1.113 
 
171 -0.237 0.929 -0.467 
STA 657 -0.027 1.034 -0.134 
 
254 -0.212 0.863 -0.134 
 
403 0.090 1.114 -0.018 
ACA 134 -0.032 1.180 -0.134 
 
27 -0.063 1.058 -0.134 
 
107 -0.024 1.214 -0.134 
OTH 65 -0.236 0.716 -0.134 
 
22 -0.202 0.851 -0.134 
 
43 -0.253 0.647 -0.134 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the multivariate models. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables split by the accounting issue that the change 





















Table 6.2 (Continued)  
Panel C: Variable Definitions 
   POSTC The exposure draft was issued after the commencement of the financial crisis 
ANGLO The accounting culture of the constituent is rooted in Anglo-Saxon Accounting 
VOLLG Natural log of the volume of comment letters sent to the exposure draft 
CONT Indicator variable that takes 1 if the author is a listed financial contributor to the IASC Foundation 
HIDL Author/Author Organisation is a consultant or business association 
LENGTH The number of lines in the response 
WORDS The number of words in the letter 
ACC Author/Author Organisation is grouped as Accountants 
BUS Author/Author Organisation is grouped as Business Community 
FIN Author/Author Organisation is grouped as Financial Industry 
REG Author/Author Organisation is grouped as Regulators 
STA Author/Author Organisation is grouped as Standard Setters 
ACA Author/Author Organisation is grouped as Academics 























The distribution of changes relating to the two types of accounting issues amongst the 
two periods, before and after the start of the financial crisis, is similar. Overall, there is 
only a slightly higher proportion of observations in the latter period, as indicated by 
the mean of POSTC, 0.531, for the pooled observations. This corresponds to 2624 
observations in the period after the beginning of the financial crisis compared to 2314 
in the pre-crisis period. Similarly, there is no concern about the distribution of 
observations with regard to respondents from Anglo-American accounting traditions 
or financial contributors. Lobbyists from Anglo-American accounting regimes 
represent nearly half (48.6 percent) of the overall respondents. 
The descriptive statistics of the composite opposition measure show that regulators 
express the lowest mean levels of opposition out of the identified constituent groups. 
Similarly, accountants and other interested parties express low levels of opposition, 
although other interested parties make up only 65 observations (1.3 percent). The 
financial industry expresses the highest mean levels of opposition to the proposed 
changes, followed by the rest of the business community. The hypothesised 
differences amongst the groups are supported by the descriptive statistics and are 
further investigated by regressing OPPOSE on the constituent groups, the type of 
accounting issue, and various controls that may have independent effects on the 












Table 6.3 Regression Output 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
ACC -0.130*** -0.112** -0.137* -0.114 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.072) (0.072) 
FIN 0.176*** 0.183*** 0.276*** 0.272*** 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.070) (0.070) 
REG -0.318*** -0.323*** -0.282** -0.207* 
 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.122) (0.122) 
STA -0.025 -0.015 -0.006 0.010 
 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.085) (0.085) 
ACA -0.030 -0.069 0.143 0.253 
 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.198) (0.199) 
OTH -0.234* -0.237* 0.004 -0.024 
 
(0.128) (0.127) (0.217) (0.216) 
CLASS 
 
0.263*** 0.314*** 0.185** 
  





























   
(0.267) (0.264) 
CONTROLS 
   
Yes 
     
Constant 0.174*** 0.010 0.070* -0.900*** 
 
(0.024) (0.030) (0.039) (0.167) 
 
    
Observations 4938 4938 4938 4938 
R-squared 0.021 0.037 0.039 0.066 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression (Equation 6.1) where ACC are 
accountants, FIN, financial industry, REG, regulators, STA, national standard setters, ACA, 
academics, and OTH, other interested parties. The omitted group is BUS: the business 
community. CLASS takes 1 if the observation relates to a proposal that would alter a 
classification and measurement issue, 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6.3 displays the coefficients from the multiple regressions. The business 
community serves as the reference category for the constituent group variable. The 
financial industry (FIN) opposes issues significantly more than the business 




community. Regulators oppose proposed changes significantly less but when 
controlling for financial contributions, hidden lobbyists, and part of the world, the 
difference is of a lower order of significance (10%). Accountants also appear to 
express less opposition. However, when including the controls, the significance 
disappears.  
The multivariate regression confirms that opposition varies with constituent group and 
that classification and measurement issues provoke more opposition than disclosure 
and other issues do. To further illustrate the differences in the levels of opposition 
among the constituent groups, Table 6.4 and Figure 6.2 present the linear predictions 
of OPPOSE for each constituent group and type of accounting issue based on equation 
6.1. 
Table 6.4 Predictions of OPPOSE based on Average Marginal Effects 
   
   
 
Interest group Margin Std. Err. z 
Disclosure and Other Issues Accountants -0.318 0.043 -7.43 
 
Financial Industry 0.037 0.040 0.94 
 
Business Community -0.231 0.059 -3.95 
 
Regulators -0.407 0.109 -3.75 
 
Standard Setters -0.190 0.063 -3.02 
 
Academics 0.053 0.191 0.28 
 
Other Interested Parties -0.278 0.209 -1.33 
     Classification and Measurement Accountants 0.034 0.037 0.91 
 
Financial Industry 0.229 0.031 7.30 
 
Business Community 0.035 0.044 0.80 
 
Regulators -0.168 0.076 -2.20 
 
Standard Setters 0.121 0.051 2.36 
 
Academics 0.099 0.098 1.01 
  Other Interested Parties -0.266 0.151 -1.77 
This table displays the predicted value of OPPOSE based on the average marginal effects for the constituent groups, 
separated by accounting issue.  
 




Figure 6.2 Linear Predictions of OPPOSE based on Average Marginal Effects 
 
 
This figure presents the linear predictions of oppose for each constituent group.  
 
Whilst the predictions of OPPOSE for all groups are lower for disclosure and other 
issues than they are for classification and measurement issues, the level varies with 
constituent group. The profession (accountants) are more similar to the business 
community in opposition for the classification and measurement issues, but potentially 
less so for disclosure and other issues, although the significance disappears when 
including control variables. The linear predictions indicate that regulators seem 
particularly well served by the ideological component of the standard setting process 
even if, when including control variables, the difference between regulators and the 
business community is of a lower order of significance, at 10%. This is potentially an 
indication of regulators’ opportunity to bring things to the agenda of the IASB prior to 
this stage in the development and, as a consequence, the proposed changes align with 
their preferences.  




In contrast, the financial industry, the largest group, representing 34 percent of the 
observations, is found to oppose proposed changes at above average levels for changes 
belonging to either category of accounting issue. The initial alignment between the 
proposed changes and the preferences of the financial industry are less aligned than 
for any other group and significantly different from the rest of the business community.  
National standard setters express similarly high levels of opposition as the business 
community to classification and measurement issues and similarly low levels to 
disclosure and other issues. Academics and other interested parties represent a small 
proportion of the observations at 2.7 percent and 1.3 percent respectively, and whilst 
the linear prediction of OPPOSE is above average levels for academics and well 
below for other interested parties, the opposition for neither group is significantly 
different from the business community.  
6.4.2 Special interest Lobbying Influence 
As regards the special interest influence of the various constituent groups, the first 
evidence of the impact of opposition on the IASB’s decision to reject a proposed 
change is indicated in Table 6.5 which presents the descriptive characteristics of 
OPPOSE for each constituent group and separating observations according to the 
IASB’s decision to implement or reject a proposed change. For accountants, the 
financial industry, the business community, regulators, and standard setters the levels 
of OPPOSE are significantly greater at the 5% level, in responses to proposed changes 
that were subsequently rejected or substantially changed. Only for the smaller groups, 
i.e. the academic community and other interested parties, is there no significant 




difference. This is suggesting that overall, the IASB responds to the lobbying of the 
major constituent groups. 

















ACC 798 -0.216 0.945 
 
531 0.043 0.993 yes 
FIN 966 0.121 0.989 
 
729 0.244 0.962 yes 
BUS 496 -0.158 0.968 
 
307 0.251 1.036 yes 
REG 127 -0.503 0.834 
 
128 -0.137 0.964 yes 
STA 386 -0.143 0.955 
 
271 0.139 1.117 yes 
ACA 65 -0.133 0.952 
 
69 0.063 1.361 no 
OTH 36 -0.193 0.815 
 
29 -0.289 0.581 no 
Total 2874 -0.093 0.973 
 
2064 0.130 1.022 yes 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the composite opposition measure (OPPOSE) for each constituent group, 
separated by whether the proposed change was implemented or rejected. The difference in means is tested by two-group 
mean comparison t-test and reported at the 5% level in the last column. 
 
Table 6.6 shows the results of the logit models. The coefficient for OPPOSE is 
positive and statistically significant in all models suggesting that increases in the 
composite opposition measure are associated with increases in the likelihood of the 
IASB rejecting the proposed change. However, as explained in Chapter 5, the same 
level increases can have different effects at different values and are conditional on the 
initial probabilities, i.e. the values of all other variables. In addition, interaction terms 
for opposition and constituent groups are included to test if the impact of opposition is 
conditional on the constituent group that the lobbyist belongs to. Therefore, the 
coefficients tell us little about the effects of increases in opposition and how it varies 
for constituent groups. Instead, predictions, based on model 5, i.e. the most advanced 




Table 6.6 Logit Regressions 
 
Pooled Sample N=4938 C & M N=3074 D & O N=1864 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 
        Constant -0.334*** -0.485*** -0.494*** -0.417*** -0.758* -0.026 -1.776*** 
OPPOSE 0.224*** 0.230*** 0.401*** 0.410*** 0.458*** 0.453*** 0.465*** 
ACC 
 
0.104 0.112 0.105 0.118 0.057 0.164 
FIN 
 
0.16 0.189* 0.186* 0.07 0.014 0.188* 
REG 
 
0.567*** 0.652*** 0.658*** 0.375** 0.372* 0.327 
STA 
 
0.134 0.142 0.139 0.13 0.159 0.018 
ACA 
 
0.556** 0.559** 0.578** 0.282* 0.141 0.729* 
OTH 
 
0.322 0.231 0.232 0.164 0.223 0.133 
ACC*OPPOSE 
  
-0.178* -0.175* -0.072 0.035 -0.261 
FIN*OPPOSE 
  
-0.273*** -0.277*** -0.245** -0.154 -0.405** 
REG*OPPOSE 
  
0.051 0.051 -0.003 0.151 -0.303 
STA*OPPOSE 
  
-0.134 -0.135 -0.096 0.019 -0.405* 
ACA*OPPOSE 
  
-0.255 -0.264 -0.251 -0.182 -0.733* 
OTH*OPPOSE 
  
-0.594 -0.605 -0.393 0.251 -1.283* 
CLASS 
   
-0.120* -0.136* 
  POSTC 
    
1.033*** 0.916*** 1.162*** 
VOLLG 
    
-0.02 -0.156 0.16 
LENGTH 
    
-0.002 -0.012*** 0.025*** 
WORDS 
    
0 0 -0.000*** 
LR 59.82 81.56 95.57 99.43 390.99 279.28 465.38 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
McFadden's 0.89% 1.22% 1.42% 1.48% 5.83% 6.18% 9.02% 
This table presents the coefficients from the logit regression analysis, equation 6.2. Column 2-6 presents the results of the models for the full sample, column 7 only for observations relating 
to classification and measurement issues, and column 8 for observations relating to disclosure and other issues. The dependent variable, REJECT, takes 1 if proposed change is rejected, and 0 
otherwise. The coefficients for the dummy variables for constituent groups are ACC if Author/Author Organisation is grouped as Accountants, FIN for Financial Industry, REG for Regulators 
and Legal Authorities, STA for National Standard Setters, ACA for Academics, OTH for Other Interested Parties. The omitted group is the Business Community (BUS). CLASS takes 1 if the 
proposed change relates to classification and measurement issues. POSTC takes 1 if the exposure draft was issued after the commencement of the financial crisis. VOLLG is the natural log of 























Figure 6.3 Predictive Margins for the Pooled Sample 
 
 
This figure displays the predicted probabilities of the proposed change being rejected at regular intervals of opposition for the 7 
constituent groups for the pooled sample based on model 5.  
 
Figure 6.3 plots the predicted likelihood of REJECT at regular intervals of OPPOSE 
from its minimum value of -1.113 to its maximum value 6.90 for each constituent 
group based on model 5, the most advanced model. The more level slopes for 
academics, other interested groups, and the financial industry suggest that increases in 
opposition by these groups have less of an impact than they do for accountants, the 
business community, national standard setters and regulators, which have steeper 
slopes. In addition, at most common values of OPPOSE, comments by regulators, 
seem to lead to the greatest likelihood of rejection. It seems that the IASB is 
particularly hesitant in implementing its proposals if they generate interest from this 




group and even more so if met with opposition from this group. This is consistent with 
the need for legitimacy.  
To test whether the positive effects of increases in opposition on the likelihood of 
rejection are statistically significant for each constituent group, average marginal 
effects are generated for unit increases in OPPOSE given the constituent group. The 
average marginal effects of a unit increase (one standard deviation) in OPPOSE at the 
same values as in Figure 6.3 above, i.e. the minimum (-1.113) to the maximum (6.90) 
for each constituent group, are displayed in figure 6.4. The values of the points in 
Figure 6.4 directly correspond to the points in Figure 6.3, as average marginal effects 
are the derivatives of the function, i.e. the gradients of the slopes in Figure 6.3. 
Confidence intervals (95%) are indicated by the grey area around the curves. The 
opposition for the group ‘other interested parties’ is insignificant at all values of 
OPPOSE and the graph is omitted from Figures 6.4, 6.6, and 6.8 for presentation 
purposes. 





Apart from for academics and other interested parties, the overall picture suggests that 
the major constituent groups are influential in the process. The marginal effect of a 
unit increase in OPPOSE, within the confidence intervals, is above 0 for the most 
common values of OPPOSE for accountants, the financial industry, the business 
community, and regulators. The magnitude of the average marginal effect is greater at 
lower values which is the range where most observations fall and where a unit 
increase is likely to represent the difference between agreeing and disagreeing. At 
higher values of OPPOSE, from around 1.56, observations almost always contain 
explicit disagreement and an increase is the difference between disagreeing and being 
a little negative or disagreeing and being highly negative. The average marginal 
Figure 6.4 Average Marginal Effects 
 
This figure displays the average marginal effects of unit increases (one standard deviation) on the probability of REJECT given 
the constituent group that the author belongs to. For presentation purposes, the plot for the group ‘other interested parties’ has 
been removed. The marginal effects for this group were insignificant at all values. The areas around the curves represent the 95% 
confidence intervals. 




effects at these values are still positive and significant indicating that negativity is an 
important component of the OPPOSE measure as the IASB is more likely to reject 




Only the coefficient for the interaction of the financial industry and opposition, among 
the interaction terms of constituent group and opposition, is consistently negative and 
significant. It may, therefore, appear that the effect of opposition of this group is the 
only one that is significantly different (less of an impact on the IASB’s decision to 
reject changes) from the reference category, i.e. the rest of the business community. 
However, in non-linear models, both the sign and the significance of the interaction 
term can vary at different levels of probability, i.e. different values of all other 
variables (Ai and Norton 2000). Therefore, the statistical significance (5% level) of 
the difference in the marginal effect of opposition by other constituent groups, in 
comparison to the business community, is analysed using an F-test at regular intervals 
of OPPOSE. The marginal effect of opposition expressed by the financial industry is 
significantly less than when expressed by the business community at all levels of 
oppose up to 4.89 (in the 99
th
 percentile). For regulators, the marginal effect is 
significantly less only at values of oppose above 2.38 (in the 99
th
 percentile). For 
academics, the marginal effect is significantly less for values above 1.88 (in the 90
th
 
percentile). Thus, whilst accountants, the financial industry, the business community, 
regulators, and standard setters are all influential the process, opposition by the 
financial industry has significantly lower impact than that of the business community, 
at the 5% level. 
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 The full analysis is repeated on a sample that excludes the upper 99
th
 percentile of the observations. 
The results are qualitatively the same. 




The changes that relate to classification and measurement issues are found to be less 
likely to be rejected, as indicated by the negative coefficient (significant at the 10% 
level). The OLS regression output indicates that constituents lobby differently 
depending on the type of accounting issue considered. In particular, constituents are 
found to be less supportive of changes to classification and measurement than to 
disclosure and other issues. On the other hand, the logit regression output indicates 
that the IASB is less likely to reject its proposed changes at the same levels of 
opposition if they relate to classification and measurement issues than to disclosure 
and other issues. By splitting the sample on the type of accounting issue that the 
propose change relates to, model 5, the most advanced model, is run separately on 
observations relating to classification and measurement issues and those relating to 
disclosure and other issues. The last two columns of Table 6.6 display the coefficients 
for the model for the split sample. 
The coefficients for OPPOSE are positive and significant for both types of issues, 
indicating that the IASB is more likely to reject proposals on either issue to which the 
constituents express more opposition. Predictions of the impact of opposition by the 
various constituent groups, based on model 5, are illustrated in Figure 6.5 for 
classification and measurement issues, with average marginal effects in Figure 6.6, 
and in Figure 6.7 for disclosure and other issues, with average marginal effects in 
Figure 6.8. 





Figure 6.5 Predictive Margins for Classification and Measurement Issues 
 
 
This figure displays the predicted probabilities of the proposed change being rejected at regular intervals of opposition for the 
seven constituent groups. The predictions are based on model 5, the most advanced model. Only observations relating to 
classification and measurement issues are included. 
 
 
For classification and measurement issues, the curves are all inclining, suggesting that 
at greater values of OPPOSE for all groups, there is a greater likelihood of the 
proposed change being rejected. The significance of the marginal effect for each group 
is illustrated in Figure 6.6. 








This figure displays the average marginal effects of unit increases (one standard deviation) on the probability of REJECT given 
the constituent group that the author belongs to, based on model 5. Only observations relating to classification and measurement 
issues are included. For presentation purposes, the plot for the group ‘other interested parties’ has been removed. The marginal 
effects for this group were insignificant at all values. The areas around the curves represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Similar to the results for the pooled sample, for accountants, the financial industry, the 
business community, regulators and standard setters, a unit increase in OPPOSE 
generates a significant positive marginal effect on the probability of the proposed 
change being rejected at most values of OPPOSE. This is suggestive of the fact that 
these groups are influential in the later stages of standard development and, potentially, 
that the room for special interest lobbying for these types of issues, is a compromise of 
the preferences of the major constituent groups. The difference of the marginal effect 
of OPPOSE for each group is compared to the marginal effect of OPPOSE for the 
business community. From this, the only group for which the marginal effect is 




significantly less at common values of OPPOSE is the financial industry, however 
from -0.61 to 2.39, the most common values, the difference is at a lower order of 
significance (10%). 
 
Figure 6.7 Predictive Margins for Disclosure and Other Issues 
 
This figure displays the predicted probabilities of the proposed change being rejected at regular intervals of opposition for the 
seven constituent groups. The predictions are based on model 5. Only observations relating to disclosure and other issues are 
included. 
 
The curves in Figure 6.7 are not as uniform as they were for classification and 
measurement issues in Figure 6.7. The curves for academics and other interested 
parties are downward sloping, however, the average marginal effect of neither of these 
groups are significantly different from 0 at any level of OPPOSE. The curve for the 
business community is steeper than the ones for the other groups, indicating that this 
group is particularly influential. 




Figure 6.8 Average Marginal Effects of OPPOSE for Disclosure and Other Issues 
 
This figure displays the average marginal effects, based on model 5,  of unit increases (one standard deviation) on the probability 
of REJECT given the constituent group that the author belongs to. Only observations relating to disclosure and other issues are 
included. For presentation purposes, the plot for the group ‘other interested parties’ has been removed. The marginal effects for 
this group were insignificant at all values. The areas around the curves represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Contrary to the results from classification and measurement issues, the only group 
with influence when it comes to disclosure and other issues is seemingly the business 
community. It is the only group where the marginal effect of opposition is significant 
at common values of OPPOSE. In addition, the F-test reveals that the marginal effect 
of opposition is consistently greater for the business community than the financial 
industry, standard setters, academics and other interested parties at the 5% 
significance level. 
In summary, the results from the logit analysis suggest that accountants, the financial 
industry, the business community, regulators, and standard setters are all influential 




the process, but that these results are mainly driven by their influence for classification 
and measurement issues. The financial industry, whilst influential on these issues, is 
significantly less influential than the rest of the business community. For disclosure 
and other issues, the business community is the only influential constituent group. 
6.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Criticism of the legitimacy of the processes of developing international accounting 
standards triggered the restructure of the IASC into the IASB, who has made a 
commitment to a transparent standard setting process in response to these concerns 
(Collett et al. 2001; Street 2006; Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 15). However, there 
are still concerns that some parties wield undue influence on the standards, especially 
regarding the influence of the financial industry in the development of standards for 
financial instruments (e.g., Arnold 2009). In addition, there have been numerous calls 
for research to develop a greater understanding of the standard setting processes (e.g., 
Barth 2008; Arnold 2009; Kothari et al. 2010). This chapter responds to these calls by 
grouping comment letter responses according to stakeholder groups and identifying 
sources of influence by comparing the effect of opposition on the likelihood of the 
IASB rejecting the proposed changes. 
Different constituent groups have different and conflicting preferences when it comes 
to accounting standards (e.g., Jupe 2000; McLeay et al. 2000; Stenka and Taylor 2010; 
Jorissen et al. 2011; Giner and Acre 2012). The extent to which the final standard 
incorporates the preferences is likely to depend on two factors. First, the degree to 
which the preferences coincide with the IASB’s original proposal, i.e. the alignment of 
the ideology guiding the development of proposed changes to IFRS and the ideology 




of the lobbyist. Second, where lobbyists disagree with the proposed changes, how 
successful they are in convincing the IASB to reject the change. The ideology theory 
of regulation has been proposed to provide a suitable framework for studying the 
political process underlying the development of accounting standards as it recognises 
that accounting standards are a joint outcome of the ideology of the organisation and 
special interest lobbying (e.g., Kothari et al. 2010). In letting the theory guide the 
methodology, the analysis is divided in two stages. First, the ideological alignment of 
the various constituent groups and the IASB is compared by analysing the extent of 
opposition to the proposed changes by OLS regression. Second, the effect of 
opposition on the IASB’s decision as whether or not to reject its proposed changes is 
compared for constituent groups by comparing marginal effects from logit models. 
The accounting profession, national standards setters, and regulators are active in 
bringing issues to the fore and their ideological conviction is likely to coincide with 
that of the IASB, which is guiding the development of proposed changes. Contrary, 
preparers, including the business community and the financial industry, are more 
likely to lobby based on self-serving incentives, such as avoiding volatility and costly 
disclosure (see Saemann 1999). Moreover, the position, and therefore the lobbying, 
does not coincide with the ideological conviction of the IASB, i.e. to develop 
standards in the interest of financial reporting users, according to a conceptual 
framework which is promoting a decision-usefulness approach (IFRS Foundation 
2011).  
The results confirm that, ideologically, regulators are the most similar to the IASB, as 
indicated by the lack of opposition in comment letters. The levels of opposition from 
this group are significantly less than for the business community. However, based on 




the OLS regression there is no concluding evidence of ideological differences between 
the business community and accountants or national standard setters. It is proposed 
that incongruence between the ideology of the IASB and national standard setters can 
be a result of the inappropriateness of international standards to certain cultural and 
institutional settings, a topic which is further explored in Chapter 7. In terms of the 
profession, the linear predictions reveal that their opposition is lower than that of the 
business community for proposed changes that relate to disclosure and other issues. 
Their opposition is significantly less in regression models 1-4 for the pooled 
observations, but the significance disappears when controls are included. A parallel 
can be drawn to Puro’s (1984) findings that auditors lobby as an agent for its clients 
but that the agency relationship does not hold for changes that propose more 
disclosure, as these have the potential to increase auditors’ wealth but decrease the 
wealth of their clients.  
Regulators have been argued to be particularly susceptible to capture by the financial 
industry (e.g., Hardy 2006). It has further been argued that fair value accounting 
represents the perspective of the financial sector in representing reality as a set of 
numbers, a central part of the discourse that surrounds financialization (Nölke and 
Perry 2007). In addition, the indirect influence of this group was demonstrated when 
the E.U. forced a change to the fair value option as well as adopted IFRS with a caveat 
for macro hedge treatments in 2005 (Armstrong and Jagolinzer 2005). It is therefore 
plausible that the power of the financial industry extends to the core of the standard 
setting processes. However, the financial industry is found to oppose the proposed 
changes the most, significantly more than the business community and regulators, 
suggesting that they are the least aligned with the IASB’s ideology guiding the 




development of financial instruments accounting. The incongruence with both the 
IASB and other regulators goes some way to alleviating concerns that this group is 
further capturing the accounting standard setting development.  
All groups are found to oppose classification and measurement issues more than 
disclosure and other issues but the distribution of opposition remains similar, with the 
financial industry being the most vocal in their opposition, and regulators the least so. 
In terms of special interest lobbying, increases in opposition from the major 
constituent groups, i.e. accountants, the financial industry, the business community, 
regulators, and national standard setters, are found to increase the likelihood of the 
IASB rejecting a proposed change. Interestingly, the financial industry is the only 
group with significantly less influence than the business community. This also holds 
for the classification and measurement issues. This serves to further refute the 
concerns of undue influence by the financial industry. For issues relating to disclosure 
and other issues, this type of influence is limited to the business community with no 
other constituent group being found to have a significant effect on the IASB’s decision.  
As mentioned above, preparers lobby mainly in opposition to proposed changes, 
suggesting that their incentives for lobbying are incongruent with the ideology that is 
guiding the standard setting. However, the results indicate that the IASB is still likely 
to grant them influence. If preparers do not accept the standards, there is a possibility 
of a collapse of the standard setting process due to non-compliance with the standards 
or by applying pressure on policy makers with enforcement powers. This was found in 
New Zealand in relation to the investment property accounting (Rahman et al. 1994) 




as well as internationally, in the example mentioned above, resulting in changes and a 
caveat in relation to the E.U. adoption.  
In conclusion, whilst ideologically, preparers are not the group catered for, it is the 
group that most actively takes advantage of the remaining room for influence by 
extensive comment letter submissions, and the IASB is likely to grant them influence. 
This confirms results from prior literature that indicate that where standard setters 
change their position, this is line with the wishes of the preparer group. This has been 
found in accounting standard setting in the U.S. (e.g., Brown and Feroz 1992; 
Saemann 1999) and the U.K. (e.g., Hope and Gray 1992; Jupe 2000) and 
internationally for the IASC (e.g., Kwok and Sharp 2005). However, the financial 
industry, whilst influential, is significantly less influential than the rest of the business 
community.  
Whilst this chapter provides evidence as regards the ideological alignment of the 
IASB and various constituent groups, as well as the influence granted to the various 
groups in shaping the standards, Chapter 7 goes on to examine the impact of country 
characteristics on these relationships 
  




7. Do Country-Specific Characteristics 
Matter in Lobbying the IASB?  
 
7.1 Introduction 
One of the concerns regarding the global adoption of IFRS is the suitability of the 
standards across different countries. Whilst many explanations have been given for the 
way that accounting standards and accounting practices have developed on a country 
by country basis, they primarily stem from the sources of external finance available to 
firms which determine the demand for, and purpose of, financial reporting (Nobes 
1998). The differences in financing systems affect the reporting environment as a 
whole, both in terms of mandated practices, e.g., the standards themselves, and the 
reporting incentives of managers and therefore voluntary disclosures (see Ball et al. 
2000; Leuz et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006). These differences will, therefore, 
affect how constituents from different countries react to new international accounting 
developments, and may give rise to conflicts and compromises in the standard setting 
process.  
For example, Nölke and Perry (2007) argued that IFRS’ financial market orientation is 
not suitable in countries where firms primarily rely on debt financing and build up 
hidden reserves in order to smooth future crises and prevent breaching debt covenants. 
Fair value accounting removes the conservative bias from reported income and 
therefore prevents the building up of hidden reserves. Firms in these countries are 
likely to oppose increased use of fair values as they would have to change their risk 
strategies as a consequence of implementing a new accounting system.  




The developments of IAS 39, and its controversial fair value treatments, arguably 
demonstrate these issues more than any other standard. Several aspects of the 
preparation for the European IFRS adoption of 2005 illustrate this. For example, in 
many European countries, harmonisation programs were undertaken prior to the 
effective date of adoption to make domestic standards closer to IFRS, and thereby 
smooth the transition from local GAAP. However, certain requirements and standards, 
specifically those that required extensive use of fair value, such as IAS 39, were 
considered to be at odds with conservative valuation of book value of net assets, and 
therefore not incorporated into the domestic accounting systems until the time of 
adoption in 2005 (Hellman 2005).
32
 Further, the complexity of IAS 39 was cited as the 
most anticipated problem of implementation amongst firms that had to apply the 
standard (Larson and Street 2004; Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski 2006). 
Certain treatments within the standard, in particular the abolition of macro-hedging for 
core deposits, was extremely contentious and was heavily opposed by French banks 
and the French government, leading to the E.U. adopting the standard with a carve-out 
for this (Armstrong and Jagolinzer 2005). 
Armstrong et al. (2010) further illustrate the differing reactions across countries to 
IFRS adoption. They found that in 2005-2008, there were generally positive market 
reactions to events that increased the likelihood of IFRS adoption. However, for firms 
domiciled in civil-law countries, there were incrementally negative market reactions to 
the same events. On suggestion was that this was a reflection of the concern for weak 
enforcement of accounting standards in these countries. However, it was also 
recognised that it could be due to other factors, such as the possibility that IFRS do not 
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adequately reflect regional differences in these economies. Similarly, Daske et al. 
(2008) found that capital market benefits associated with adoption occur only in 
countries where earnings management was low prior to IFRS adoption and where 
legal enforcement is strong. Low earnings management prior to IFRS adoption was 
assumed to represent an institutional environment which provided firms with 
incentives to be transparent. Increased positive expectations, and subsequent benefits, 
are thus a function of legal and institutional factors and, therefore, potentially a sign of 
IFRS being more suitable to the reporting environment in some countries than in 
others. This raises questions regarding the development of international accounting 
standards, and the role of country-specific factors in determining the final standards. 
International disputes concerning financial instruments accounting are not yet resolved. 
As per the main recommendations of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (FCAG) 
and the G20, the IASB and the U.S. standard setter, the FASB, stepped up efforts to 
reach convergence on financial instruments accounting in light of the financial crisis. 
However, the current chairman, Mr Hans Hoogervorst, in his speech “Closing the 
accounting chapter of the financial crisis” recognised that the project of bringing the 
requirements in IFRS 9 together with U.S. GAAP had failed.
33
 This was due to 
unresolved differences for key areas of financial instrument accounting, including 
classification and measurement, offsetting, and impairment (IFRS Foundation 2014a). 
The problematic nature of financial instruments accounting in an international setting 
makes it ideal for studying the influences of country-specific factors and special 
interest lobbying on the development of IFRS. 
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Despite the remaining differences, formalised channels of U.S. influence, such as the 
Norwalk Agreement of 2002, are causing some concern that IFRS will be too similar 
to U.S. GAAP.
34
 For example, in 2009, Atsushi Saito, president and chief executive of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, raised concerns that changes to IFRS 9, to bring 
requirements closer to U.S. GAAP, would jeopardise Japan’s adoption plans 
(Sanderson 2009). Another concern is the political force of U.S. actors stemming from 
their power in international affairs. De Lange and Howieson (2006) for example argue 
that the U.S. has a culture of superiority, making U.S. standard setters unlikely to 
share power over their accounting standards, and is therefore likely to result in either 
the capture of the IASB or a wholesale rejection of IFRS.  
As 128 countries now require or allow IFRS (Deloitte IAS Plus 2014), it is in the 
constituents’ interest to understand how standards have developed to suit the reporting 
environment of certain countries more than others. In recognising that the IASB 
comes under political pressure in its standard setting activities, Barth (2008) asks “Do 
political forces from different countries offset or reinforce each other?” The 
accounting literature to date shows that institutional factors of countries have an 
impact on properties of accounting earnings (Ball et al. 2000), on the differences in 
accounting standards across countries (Ding et al. 2007), and on the informativeness 
of earnings even when complying with IFRS (Daske et al. 2008). However, there is, as 
yet, no research into whether these factors have an impact on the development of IFRS. 
Therefore, in an attempt to shed some light on the standards setting of the IASB, this 
chapter assesses if country-specific factors predict constituents’ opposition to the 
IASB’s proposals, as well as their lobbying success. As per previous chapters, 
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ideology theory of regulation is guiding the methodology, and it is recognised that 




The analysis follows on from Chapter 6 and uses the composite opposition measure 
based on textual analysis of responses. The chapter first analyses if constituents from 
different countries differ in the level of opposition according to key features of the 
reporting environment, namely legal origin and equity orientation, and formal and 
informal channels of influence available to particular countries and parts of the world. 
The analysis of these factors shows that constituents from English common-law 
countries are more ideologically aligned with the IASB, especially when it comes to 
classification and measurement issues. European constituents express the highest 
levels of opposition to the IASB’s proposed changes. The second stage of the analysis 
examines whether these characteristics impact on the likelihood of success in blocking 
changes to the standards that the lobbyist opposes. From this second stage of analysis, 
the results show that for classification and measurement issues, the IASB seems to be 
mainly concerned with aggregate opposition. However, for disclosure and other issues, 
influence is limited to lobbyists from English common-law countries and 
Scandinavian civil-law countries and for lobbyists from countries in which the 
importance of equity is the greatest. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 discusses the 
literature on the differences in accounting and other institutional characteristics around 
the world and how this may affect the political processes of international accounting. 
Section 7.3 describes the research design and the variables used in the analysis. 
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Section 7.4 presents the empirical results. Section 7.5 summarises the results and 
discusses their implications. 
7.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This section focuses on the differences in legal, cultural, and institutional 
environments that have led to cross country differences in the reporting environment. 
Moreover, it explores some avenues for influence in the standard setting process.  
7.2.1 Differences in Reporting Environments across Countries. 
The accounting literature advocates a holistic view of financial reporting and 
recognises that the reporting environment is a function of various factors including 
economic culture, accounting standards and their interpretation and enforcement (e.g., 
Barth et al. 2008; Cieslewicz 2013). In addition, the accounting literature tends to 
operationalise accounting quality by using earnings management and timely loss 
recognition where lower earnings management and timelier loss recognition are taken 
to mean higher levels of accounting quality (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003; 
Barth et al. 2008). Accounting standards and their enforcement have been shown to 
constrain opportunistic earnings management (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). 
However, earnings management and timeliness of loss recognition have also been 
shown to depend on country-specific factors, in particular the sources of external 
finance available to firms (Ball et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003). Consistent with this, 
Nobes’s (1998) review of the international accounting literature proposed that the 
major reason for differences in financial reporting is its different purposes across 
countries. This in turn was concluded to be a function of the differences in financing 
systems, i.e. the level of equity dependence. Therefore, when predicting the reactions 




to the IASB’s proposals, it is likely to vary with how well it fits the purpose of 
financial reporting in the constituents’ home countries.  
Legal Origin 
Studies in finance and political economy show that legal and cultural factors have an 
impact on the corporate environment. Notably, La Porta et al. (1997) showed that 
common-law countries protect both shareholders and creditors the best, French civil-
law countries the least, and German and Scandinavian civil-law countries somewhere 
in the middle, which explains the size of capital markets and opportunities for external 
finance across countries. Further, La Porta et al. (1998) showed that laws pertaining to 
investor protection and their enforcement vary across countries, and have an impact on 
corporate governance practices. In particular, limitations to investor protection 
predicted higher levels of ownership concentration. In a similar vein, Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) found that religion has an impact on investor protection and that 
creditors are better protected in Protestant than Catholic countries but that openness to 
international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights. 
It follows that the purpose and nature of financial information requirements will vary 
with complementary governance practices. Consistent with this, Ball et al. (2000) 
showed that timeliness and conservatism of accounting income vary internationally 
and that economic losses are incorporated in accounting income significantly quicker 
in common-law countries than in civil-law countries. They argued that the more 
timely and conservative accounting income serves to monitor managers in common-
law countries where there is a greater distance between providers of capital and 
managers. It was suggested that in civil-law countries, information asymmetry is 
instead resolved by other institutional features, such as closer relationships with 




stakeholders. Features of accounting income are thus a function of its purpose in the 
context of other institutional arrangements which may effectively be captured by legal 
origin.  
As international accounting is heavily rooted in Anglo-American accounting (Ball 
2011) and the restructure of the IASC into the IASB was heavily influenced by the 
Group of Four (G4) all of which are common-law countries, the accounting system is 
likely to be more suitable to the institutional arrangements in common-law countries.
36
 
Characteristics pertaining to the reporting environment of common-law countries, 
such as low levels of earnings management, are compatible with the objective of 
international accounting and the fair value paradigm in financial instruments 
accounting, as it denies preparers the opportunity to smooth earnings by building up 
hidden reserves (Nölke and Perry 2007).  
Accounting Culture 
Gray (1988) viewed the accounting system as a subculture to the overall culture in a 
country and developed hypotheses regarding different features of the accounting 
systems around the world based on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. For measurement 
and disclosure, i.e. the purpose and practicalities of financial reporting, the accounting 
systems were evaluated along the dimensions of secrecy to transparency, and 
optimism to conservatism. Three accounting systems; Anglo, Nordic, and Asian-
Colonial, were identified as being more reliant on notions of optimism and 
transparency whereas all other identified accounting systems; Germanic, Less 
Developed Asian, African, Less Developed Latin, More Developed Latin, Near 
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Eastern, and Japan, were thought to be more influenced by secrecy and conservatism. 
Optimism and transparency are arguably the values most akin to the investor 
orientation and the fair value paradigm in international accounting as it prevents the 
conservative bias in reported earnings. 
Alexander and Archer (2000) argued that the cultural definitions of accounting, 
referring to Anglo or non-Anglo, are exaggerated in terms of creating a hegemonic 
alliance in the international politics of accounting regulation. However, others, notably 
Nobes (2003), dispute this, and point to the formation of the G4, which was a result of 
the Anglo block of IASC members sharing conceptual frameworks and wanting to 
move ahead with convergence faster than the IASC. Further, empirical findings by 
Chatham et al. (2010) reveal that in the responses to IASC’s (1997) discussion paper 
(DP) ‘Accounting for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities’, there was some 
clustering of opinions that seems to conform to cultural traditions. For instance, whilst 
there were high levels of disapproval to the proposals by Europeans, constituents from 
Nordic countries represented in the sample, i.e. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, were 
in general in favour of the proposals.
37
  
The reliance on cultural dimensions of accounting, especially using Hofstede’s 
framework, has been heavily criticised for its lack of sound theoretical basis (e.g., 
Baskerville 2003). However, the cultural dimensions in Gray (1988) and the responses 
to the Financial Instruments Discussion Paper (Chatham et al. 2010) imply that a 
crude classification of countries as common law and civil law may insufficiently 
capture the differences in the reporting environment. Therefore, a more fine-tuned 
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classification of legal origin, as provided by La Porta et al. (1997), which 
distinguishes between Scandinavian, French, and German civil law allows for the 
financial reporting environment to vary accordingly and better capture the perceived 
suitability of IFRS to the lobbyist’s home country.  
Legal origin is expected to have an effect on the alignment between constituents’ 
positions and that of the IASB. The IASB proposes changes according to its ideology, 
which is rooted in Anglo-American accounting and, as a result, likely to be most 
acceptable to constituents in countries where the institutional arrangements can be 
approximated by English common law. It is therefore expected that constituents from 
countries of other legal origin will opposed changes to a greater extent. Either IFRS 
turn out more similar, or suitable, to certain environments due to the effective 
lobbying from constituents in countries which share a the ideological conviction of 
IASB, that the purpose of financial accounting is to enable investor decisions. 
Alternatively, IFRS is developed in the Anglo-American tradition but then made more 




Hypothesis 7.1 A: Opposition will depend on the legal origin of the lobbyist’s home 
country. 
Hypothesis 7.1 B: Influence will depend on the legal origin of the lobbyist’s home 
country. 
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Although using a more fine-tuned classification of legal origin is an improvement on 
relying on common-law/civil-law classifications alone, there is likely still some 
overlap in institutional settings between countries, which will be affecting the 
accounting system and the suitability of IFRS. For example, Ding et al. (2007) 
compared differences between domestic standards and IAS based on a survey of 
domestic accounting compiled by the five largest auditing firms in 2001.
39
 They 
developed two measures to test the impact of institutional setting on accounting 
standards. The first measure was ‘absence’, i.e. the extent to which the domestic 
accounting standards lacked coverage of the same issues as IAS, and the second 
measure was ‘divergence’, the extent to which the domestic standards, covering the 
same issues as IAS, differed in accounting treatments and application. They found that 
absence was higher in countries with less developed equity markets and with higher 
ownership concentration. Divergence was positively associated with the level of 
economic development and the importance of the accounting profession, but 
constrained by the importance of equity markets. This emphasises the role of equity 
dependence as the driver for congruence between IFRS and the domestic financial 
reporting environment. 
One of the key differences in the reporting systems that target equity investors, as 
opposed to banks and other creditors, is the more extensive disclosure requirements 
(Nobes 1998). This was confirmed by La Porta et al. (2006) who found that disclosure 
requirements are positively correlated with more developed stock markets and is 
linked to the information demands in outsider systems, typical of common-law 
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countries, where information asymmetry is resolved by public disclosure (Ball et al. 
2000). There is empirical evidence that the legal origin facilitates opportunities for 
raising external finance (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997) and that reported earnings in 
common-law counties better meet the information demands of investors than in civil-
law countries (e.g., Ball et al. 2000). However, direct measures of the importance of 
equity in a country may better capture the investor focus, and thus the ideological 
alignment between international accounting and the domestic financial reporting 
system.  
Hypothesis 7.2 A: Opposition will depend on the extent of equity dependence in the 
lobbyist’s home country. 
Hypothesis 7.2 B: Influence will depend on the extent of equity dependence in the 
lobbyist’s home country. 
 
7.2.2 Channels of Influence and Political Power 
Features of the reporting environment may explain incentives to lobby the IASB and 
generate some hypotheses as to how lobbyists from different countries compete for 
standards that will suit their reporting environment. There are, however, a number of 
other factors to consider when predicting lobbying success and the kind of power 
constituents from various countries may have over the development of standards. 
The U.S. and the E.U. 
Perry and Nölke (2005) argued that the IASB’s favourable stance on fair values is 
indicative of the financial sector orientation of IFRS, and a function of the processes 
and structure of the private, as opposed to public, mode of governance of the IASB. 
The structure of the IASB was largely a result of the American influence on the 




restructure of the IASC which made its organisation similar to the U.S. standard setter, 
the FASB (see Camfferman and Zeff 2007).
40
 This mode of governance, and how it 
facilitates influence, is further discussed and tested in Büthe and Mattli (2011) whose 
survey results support that American preparers are more satisfied with the level of 
influence they have on international standard development compared to their 
European counterparts. Büthe and Mattli (2011) proposed that the similarities between 
the IASB and FASB provide an institutional fit which facilitates influence by U.S. 
actors. Conversely, European constituents, who are represented by fragmented 
competing domestic standard setting institutions, are less able to represent a cohesive 
view, and therefore less able to gain influence (Buthe and Mattli 2011). Similarly, 
familiarity with the system of having a private standard setter whose structure has 
served as the template for that of the IASB, may make constituents both more willing 
to participate, and more competent at influencing a private standard setter. Along 
these lines, Jorissen et al. (2013) found that non-familiarity with a system of private 
standard setting negatively affects the participation of non-preparers in the IASB’s 
standard setting process. 
Others have argued that U.S. influence is facilitated by the country’s recurring 
influence in international affairs. For example, DeLange and Howieson (2006) 
recognised that this influence stems not just from its military and economic power, but 
also from aspirations of nations and people to embrace American culture, which may 
translate to an accounting standard setting context. In particular, they recognised that 
IASB members may aspire to American values and ideals and, therefore, grant U.S. 
actors extra influence over international standard setting. Moreover, the U.S. has not 
yet adopted IFRS, and the desire of the IASB to be a truly global standard setter may 
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mean that U.S. constituents will have bargaining power over standard development 
that is not afforded to constituents from countries which have already adopted IFRS 
(Collett et al. 2001). 
Conversely, some have argued that E.U. governmental regulatory power exceeds that 
of the U.S. in this setting as the standards are developed by a standard setting body 
operating out of London, as opposed to the FASB (Posner 2010). Moreover, the E.U. 
has put explicit pressure on the IASB in the past, for example in October 2008 when 
the European Commission called for a change to IAS 39. The change concerned 
allowing reclassification out of the fair value category into an amortised cost category, 
and the Commission announced that regardless of the IASB’s response, European 
companies would be allowed to do so. At this point, the IASC Foundation waived its 
due process in order to quickly implement the reclassification option in order to 
prevent what they described as “out-of-control” European accounting (House of 
Commons Treasury Committee 2008). In addition, as mentioned in the introduction, 
there were pre-adoption controversies regarding IAS 39 amongst European 
constituents. In particular, the fair value option which allowed entities to irrevocably 
designate any financial asset or liability to be measured at fair value through profit or 
loss. This issue was another potential European carve-out from IAS 39, but the IASB 
resolved the issue by suggesting some limitations to its application (IASCF 2004).  
Further, it has been argued that countries outside of Europe and the U.S. struggle to 
have their voices heard in debates about the international accounting standards (e.g., 
Chand and Cummings 2008). This may affect all aspects of the process, from agenda 
setting, to influence over the final amendments to a standard. Therefore, the influence 
of U.S. and European constituents may affect both the extent to which the lobbyists 




oppose the IASB’s proposals and their potential for influence. Political discourse and 
anecdotal evidence suggest that this is the case, yet it has not been empirically tested. 
Due to the above-mentioned similarities in accounting philosophies and organisational 
structures of the FASB and the IASB, it is hypothesised that U.S. constituents will be 
more ideologically aligned with the IASB and will, as a result, oppose the IASB’s 
proposals to a lesser extent than other constituents. However, when it comes to special 
interest influence, both the E.U. and the U.S. seem to have power to influence IFRS. It 
is therefore predicted that lobbyists from these large economies are granted more 
influence than other constituents.  
Hypothesis 7.3 A: Opposition is greater in responses from non-U.S. constituents than 
from U.S. constituents. 
Hypothesis 7.3 B: Lobbying success is greater for U.S. and E.U. constituents than for 
other constituents. 
 
7.3 Research Design 
The research design largely follows that of Chapter 6. The focus is on the ability of 
lobbyists to block proposed changes to the four standards dealing with financial 
instruments: IAS 32, IAS 39, IFRS 7, and IFRS 9. It is examined by analysing the 
effect of lobbyist opposition on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its proposed 
changes. Therefore, the same fourteen exposure drafts which relate to completed 
financial instruments projects are included in the analysis to enable the identification 
of an outcome, i.e. whether the proposed change was implemented or rejected, and 
only the 70 questions (out of a total 91) from the invitation to comment section of the 
exposure drafts that allow the respondent to express opposition to the proposed change 
are included.  




To measure the opinion in the responses to the IASB’s proposals, the same opposition 
measure is used that was developed in Chapter 6, i.e. the composite measure, 
OPPOSE, based on principal component factor analysis of negative tone and explicit 
agreement and disagreement in responses.
41
 There are 5083 responses to the 70 
questions. A negativity ratio could not be obtained for 4 observations as these 
responses contain only stop words and there are 141 responses which contain both 
explicit agreement and disagreement, making the observations ambiguous. Therefore, 
only the 4938 observations for which a reliable opposition measure can be obtained 
are included in the analysis.  
7.3.1 Independent Variables 
Legal Origin 
Legal origin is classified as English common law, French, German, or Scandinavian 
civil law. The data on legal origin comes from the work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 
and 2006) and was obtained from Professor Andrei Shleifer’s web page: 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications/economic-consequences-legal-origins  
Equity Orientation 
In order to capture the importance of equity in a country, a measure is constructed in a 
similar way to Leuz et al. (2003) and uses the mean rank of two variables used in La 
Porta et al. (1997). The first variable is constructed as a ratio of the aggregate stock 
market capitalization to gross national product for the entire time period 2002-2011, 
scaled by a measure of ownership concentration in the country, developed by La Porta 
et al. (2006). Scaling the variable by ownership concentration adjusts the ratio for the 
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greater information demands in equity markets with greater dispersion of ownership. 
The second variable is the number of listed domestic firms per capita.
42
 The mean 
rank is constructed so that higher scores indicate greater importance of equity.  
There is missing data on ownership concentration for 11 countries: Czech Republic, 
China, Mauritius, Tanzania, Luxembourg, Romania, Cyprus, UAE, Russia, Poland, 
and Rwanda. This corresponds to 160 observations, i.e. 3.2% of the observations. 
These countries are likely to place lower importance on equity, and, as a result, to the 
extent that deleting these observations creates bias in the results, this would likely 
understate the differences in the importance of equity amongst the lobbyists and 
reduce the magnitude and significance of the results. Table 7.1 presents the rank of the 
importance of equity in the financing system of the country and indicates percentiles 
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Table 7.1 Importance of Equity Mean Rank 
Below Median Equity Importance 
 
Above Median Equity Importance 
Country Mean Rank Observations 
 
Country Mean Rank Observations 
Low Importance of Equity  Average to High Importance of Equity 
Mexico 2 29 
 
Israel 29.5 12 
Kenya 4 2 
 
Malaysia 29.5 33 
Argentina 7 9 
 
South Korea 29.5 59 
Colombia 7 6 
 
U.S. 29.5 350 
Turkey 7.5 2 
 
Japan 30 139 
Brazil 9 2 
 
Switzerland 32 281 
Italy 9.5 86 
 
Canada 34.5 189 
Pakistan 9.5 49  High Importance of Equity 
Philippines 9.5 3 
 
Singapore 35 67 
Austria 11.5 60 
 
U.K. 35 1,097 
Germany 13.5 437 
 
Australia 35.5 419 
Thailand 15.5 6 
 
Hong Kong 41 47 
India 16 89 
    Ireland 17.5 90 
    Belgium 19.5 81 
    New Zealand 19.5 124 
    Low to Average Importance of Equity     
Netherlands 20 151 
    France 22.5 405 
    South Africa 23.5 131 
    Chile 24 16 
    Denmark 24 75 
    Finland 25 7 
    Norway 26.5 17 
    Spain 28.5 107 
    Sweden 29 101 
    
This table ranks the countries in the sample according to importance of equity in the economy. The left (right) side 
presents the countries for which the mean rank of the two variables for importance of equity falls below (above) the 
sample median. Quartiles are indicated by dotted lines to display the groupings used to test the hypotheses. 
 
The U.S. and the E.U. 
All observations are classified according to the home country of the author or author 
organisation of a comment letter. For incorporated organisations, where the sender’s 
country is not explicitly stated in the letter or disclosed on ifrs.org, the location of 
incorporation is used. This is likely to most closely represent the institutional 
framework, in which the author prepares financial reports. For other organisations, the 




headquarters have been used to identify the home country. E.U. and U.S. authors are 
indicated by dummy variables. 
7.3.2 Control Variables 
To control for the potentially increased influence of financial contributors, an 
indicator variable, CONT, takes the value 1 if the lobbyist is a named financial 
supporter in the IASCF’s financial report in the year of the comment period and 0 
otherwise.  
An indicator variable, BOARD, takes the value 1 if there is at least one member on the 
IASB from the constituent’s home country during the consultation period for the 
relevant comment letter. The data is obtained from the IASC/IFRS Foundation’s 
annual reports.  
Following Hansen (2011), a dummy variable for hidden lobbyist, HIDL, is included if 
the comment letter author is a business association or a consultant because it will be 
difficult to determine whose incentives are influencing the opposition. 
Political power and influence may be a factor of economic power. To control for this 
MARK is the market capitalisation of listed companies in the country as a percentage 
of market capitalization of listed companies in the world, in the year of the 
observation. 
Following Jorissen et al. (2013), an indicator variable, PRIV, takes 1 if there is/was a 
private standard setting body in the lobbyist’s home country to control for the 
lobbyist’s familiarity with the private standard setting process. This data was obtained 
from the survey data posted on the website of the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC):  http://www.ifac.org/ComplianceAssessment/published.php  




An indicator variable, POSTC, takes the value 1 for the exposure draft being issued 
after the commencement of the financial crisis, as defined by the bankruptcy filing of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, and 0 otherwise. This variable controls for 
the increased political pressure on the organisation that followed the accounting 
standards being criticised for problems during the financial crisis (Bengtson 2012).  
In order to control for the salience of the issue under consideration, the log of the 
volume of comment letters corresponding to the exposure draft, VOLLG, is included 
in the model. In addition, the length of the responses may signal that the proposed 
change is particularly complicated or controversial which may therefore increase the 
likelihood of the IASB rejecting the proposed change or deferring its implementation. 
LENGTH, the number of lines in the answer to the question and WORDS, the number 
of words in the letter, are therefore included as additional control variables. 
7.3.3 Model development 
The initial reaction to proposed changes indicates the alignment between the 
ideological component guiding the IASB in its standard setting process and that of the 
lobbyist. In order to test hypotheses 7.1-7.3.A, i.e. whether the reaction depends on the 
country-specific factors, the results are reported for variants of regression 7.1 for the 
pooled sample as well as split by type of accounting issue: 
             ∑                              (7.1) 
Where OPPOSE is the composite opposition measure based on computerised textual 
analysis, developed in Chapters 4-6. Independent variables are describes in section 
7.3.1 and controls in 7.3.2, i indicates the comment letter and t the specific question 
that the observation relates to. 




Analysis of the average marginal effects of OPPOSE interacted with the independent 
variables for various levels of OPPOSE is then based on variations of the logit model 
7.2 for the pooled sample as well as split by type of accounting issue: 
                            ∑               ∑              
       
  
                   (7.2) 
where REJECT is an indicator variable that takes 1 if the change was rejected or 
substantially changes, and 0 otherwise. 
To further test the ability of lobbyists to block changes that they oppose, two 
subsamples are created. One includes only responses in which the lobbyist explicitly 
disagrees with the proposed change as identified by occurrences of ‘disagree’ or 
‘oppos’ (the stem is used to allow for different grammatical variations e.g., oppose, 
opposition etc.), unless negated, or negated occurrences of ‘agree’. The second uses 
the observations for which OPPOSE falls in the top quartile, i.e. the highest degree of 
opposition. Assuming that these observations represents occasions where lobbyists 
disagree with the proposed change, the dependent variable, REJECT, is equal to 
lobbying success. In order to test whether country-specific characteristics increase the 
likelihood of lobbying success, marginal effects from variations of the logit regression 
7.3 are analysed.  
                 ∑                             (7.3) 





7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The full sample consists of 4938 letter question observations from constituents in 47 
countries. The geographical distribution of the observations closely follows the 
distribution of the original population of comment letters and is presented in Table 7.2 
along with the country-specific dependent variables.
43
 The majority of the 
observations come from European constituents which represent 62.43% of the 
observations. In terms of countries, the greatest numbers of observations are from the 
U.K. (22%), Germany (9%), Australia (8%), France (8%), and the U.S. (7%). Further 
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7.3. 
                                                 
43
 Chapter 4 included comment letters sent in response to projects that had not yet been completed, this 
included letters that could not be classified as belonging to a specific country. When filtering the 




Table 7.2 Geographical Distribution and Country-Specific Variables 





Indicator Freq % 
 





Indicator Freq % 
Africa 
      
Europe 
     Kenya English Common Law Low 0 2 0.04 
 
Austria German Civil Law Low 0 60 1.22 
Mauritius French Civil Law NA 0 9 0.18 
 
Belgium French Civil Law Low 0 81 1.64 
Rwanda French Civil Law NA 0 2 0.04 
 
Cyprus English Common Law NA 0 8 0.16 
South Africa English Common Law Low-Average 0 131 2.65 
 
Czech Republic German Civil Law NA 0 11 0.22 
Tanzania English Common Law NA 0 11 0.22 
 
Denmark Scandinavian Civil Law Low-Average 0 75 1.52 
        155 3.14 
 
Finland Scandinavian Civil Law Low-Average 0 7 0.14 
Asia 
      
France French Civil Law Low-Average 1 405 8.2 
China German Civil Law NA 1 38 0.77 
 
Germany German Civil Law Low 1 437 8.85 
Hong Kong English Common Law High 0 47 0.95 
 
Ireland English Common Law Low 0 90 1.82 
India English Common Law Low 1 89 1.8 
 
Italy French Civil Law Low 0 86 1.74 
Israel English Common Law Average-High 0 12 0.24 
 
Luxembourg French Civil Law NA 0 5 0.1 
Japan German Civil Law Average-High 1 139 2.81 
 
Netherlands French Civil Law Low-Average 0 151 3.06 
Malaysia English Common Law Average-High 0 33 0.67 
 
Norway Scandinavian Civil Law Low-Average 0 17 0.34 
Pakistan English Common Law Low 0 49 0.99 
 
Poland German Civil Law NA 0 13 0.26 
Philippines French Civil Law Low 0 3 0.06 
 
Romania French Civil Law NA 0 4 0.08 
Singapore English Common Law High 0 67 1.36 
 
Russia French Civil Law NA 0 47 0.95 
South Korea German Civil Law Average-High 0 59 1.19 
 
Spain French Civil Law Low-Average 0 107 2.17 
Thailand English Common Law Low 0 6 0.12 
 
Sweden Scandinavian Civil Law Low-Average 1 101 2.05 
Turkey French Civil Law Low 0 2 0.04 
 
Switzerland German Civil Law Average-High 0 281 5.69 
UAE English Common Law NA 0 12 0.24 
 
U.K. English Common Law High 1 1,097 22.22 
        556 11.26 
 
        3,083 62.43 
South America 
      
North America 
     Argentina French Civil Law Low 0 9 0.18 
 
Canada English Common Law Average-High 0 189 3.83 
Brazil French Civil Law Low 1 2 0.04 
 
Mexico French Civil Law Low 0 29 0.59 
Chile French Civil Law Low-Average 0 16 0.32 
 
U.S. English Common Law Average-High 1 350 7.09 
Colombia French Civil Law Low 0 6 0.12 
 
        568 11.5 
        33 0.67 
       Oceania 
            Australia English Common Law High 1 419 8.49 
       New Zealand English Common Law Low 0 124 2.51 
               543 11 
 
Total       4,938 100 









































Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics 















 Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
 
Mean SD Min Max N 
 
Mean SD Min Max N 
OPPOSE 0.00 1.00 -1.11 6.90 4938 
 
0.10 1.05 -1.11 6.90 3074 
 
-0.16 0.88 -1.11 4.09 1864 
EI_RANK 27.17 8.54 2 41 4778 
 
27.27 8.47 2 41 2978 
 
27.00 8.66 2 41 1800 
BOARD_C 0.60 0.49 0 1 4938 
 
0.62 0.48 0 1 3074 
 
0.57 0.49 0 1 1864 
PRIV 0.80 0.40 0 1 4805 
 
0.79 0.40 0 1 2994 
 
0.80 0.40 0 1 1811 
POSTC 0.53 0.50 0 1 4938 
 
0.54 0.50 0 1 3074 
 
0.52 0.50 0 1 1864 
VOLLG 4.99 0.47 3.61 5.51 4938 
 
5.12 0.43 4.01 5.51 3074 
 
4.76 0.45 3.61 5.51 1864 
CONT 0.18 0.38 0 1 4938 
 
0.18 0.38 0 1 3074 
 
0.18 0.38 0 1 1864 
HIDL 0.24 0.43 0 1 4938 
 
0.24 0.43 0 1 3074 
 
0.25 0.43 0 1 1864 
WORDS 2763 2808 97 34716 4938 
 
3094 3154 97 34716 3074 
 
2217 2000 154 34716 1864 
LENGTH 12.93 19.90 1 230 4938 
 
14.27 21.64 1 230 3074 
 
10.70 16.39 1 212 1864 
MARK 5.87 9.18 0.01 47.74 4925 
 
6.04 9.34 0.01 47.74 3064 
 
5.58 8.92 0.01 47.74 1861 
Panel B: Correlations 
        
 
OPPOSE EI_RANK BOARD_C PRIV MARK POSTC VOLLG CONT HIDL WORDS LENGTH 
OPPOSE 
 
0.0059 0.0797* -0.0209 0.0392* -0.1108* 0.1118* -0.0018 0.0844* 0.1264* 0.2501* 
EI_RANK -0.0153 
 
0.3826* 0.2516* 0.2009* 0.0151 0.0713* 0.0981* -0.0186 0.0205 -0.0372 
BOARD_C 0.0575* 0.4384* 
 
0.0916* 0.3862* -0.1330* 0.0526* 0.0972* 0.1647* 0.1118* 0.0560* 
PRIV -0.0433* 0.3374* 0.0616* 
 
0.1748* -0.0359 0.0091 0.0296 0.029 -0.0288 -0.0607* 
MARK 0.0862* 0.3835* 0.6843* 0.1674* 
 
-0.0204 0.1229* 0.1261* 0.1225* 0.0705* 0.0109 
POSTC -0.1114* 0.0043 -0.1573* -0.0308 -0.0535* 
 
0.2756* -0.0664* -0.0534* -0.1395* -0.0938* 
VOLLG 0.1078* 0.0245 0.004 -0.0064 0.1086* 0.3951* 
 
-0.0336 0.0519* 0.3621* 0.0121 
CONT -0.0027 0.0821* 0.0772* 0.0435* 0.2034* -0.0709* -0.0596* 
 
-0.1872* 0.1558* 0.0765* 
HIDL 0.0951* -0.0174 0.1431* 0.004 0.1601* -0.0542* 0.0434* -0.1977* 
 
0.0269 -0.0055 
WORDS 0.1815* 0.0119 0.1043* -0.0293 0.1427* -0.1027* 0.4939* 0.1229* 0.1050* 
 
0.2939* 
LENGTH 0.4067* -0.0502* 0.0322 -0.0585* 0.0482* -0.0344 0.0557* 0.0642* 0.0470* 0.3028* 
 This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the multivariate analyses. Panel A presents measures of dispersion for the pooled sample and split by type of 
accounting issue. Panel B: Spearman (below the diagonal) and Pearson (above the diagonal) correlation (n=4938), *significance at 0.01 




Panel A of Table 7.3 presents the number of letter question observations and the 
descriptive statistics per type of accounting issue. The composite opposition measure 
is constructed so that it has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. In the split 
sample it is evident that classification and measurement issues tend to be met with 
higher mean levels of opposition (0.1) than are disclosure and other issues (-0.16), and 
this difference is statistically significant.  
The mean of BOARD_C is 0.6 indicating that although there are 47 countries 
represented in the sample, and only 10 which have a representative on the IASB in the 
majority of the years in the sample period, constituents from countries with a board 
member send comment letters more frequently. This is potentially because it 
facilitates more efficient transfer of information, as hypothesised by Hansen (2011), or 
because the IFRS Foundation chooses to appoint board members from countries which 
demonstrate high interest in the standard setting process. It reflects the greatest 
participation of British, German, Australian, French, and American constituents, 54% 
of the sample, which had representatives on the IASB for most of the sample period. 
The distribution of observations across the pre and post financial crisis period is even 
and both types of accounting issues are dealt with in each period. The only other 
major difference between the characteristics of the observations relating to 
classification and measurement issues and those that relate to disclosure and other 
issues is the length of the responses. Both the word count of the comment letters and 
the number of lines devoted to the particular question, are longer for classification and 
measurement issues. This signals the more complicated or controversial nature of the 
changes relating to these issues, and is consistent with the greater volume of responses 
to these questions. It is also consistent with the greater opposition scores for these 




observations, as well as with the findings of Giner and Arce (2012) that disagreement 
tends to be backed up by more arguments than agreement. This is further evident in 
the correlation matrix in Panel B of Table 7.3 which shows significant and positive 
correlations between OPPOSE and VOLLG, WORDS, and LENGTH.  
Moreover, EI_RANK, MARK, and PRIV are highly correlated, which is unsurprising, 
given that bigger capital markets and importance of equity is often associated with 
societies where market economy and private regulation plays a greater role (Büthe and 
Mattli 2011). This is further illustrated in Table 7.4 which presents descriptive 
statistics split by legal origin and show higher mean scores of these variables in 
English common law countries. The number of board members from English common 
law countries is also higher than for countries of other legal origin, which explains, 
and potentially reinforces, the Anglo-American nature of international accounting. 
The EI_RANK follows the hypotheses and results of La Porta et al. (1997), that 
common-law countries protect both shareholders and creditors the best, French civil-
law countries the least, and German and Scandinavian civil-law countries somewhere 
in the middle, which explains the importance of equity in a country. In addition, the 
descriptive statistics also indicate the greater importance of equity in countries of 
Scandinavian legal origin than of German and French legal origin which explains the 
similarities between Anglo and Nordic accounting highlighted by Gray (1988). Mean 
levels of OPPOSE are higher for responses from German and French legal origin, than 
for Scandinavian and English legal origin. This supports the closeness between the 
Anglo and Nordic accounting culture clusters and their closeness to the international 
accounting culture. 




Table 7.4 Legal Origin and Descriptive Statistics 
LEGAL ORIGIN   OPPOSE EI_RANK BOARD_C PRIV MARK 
English Common Law 
     Mean 
 
-0.05 31.34 0.72 1.00 8.34 
Median 
 
-0.13 35 1 1 5.37 
Max 
 
6.90 41 1 1 47.74 
Min 
 
-1.11 4 0 0 0.01 
SD 
 
0.99 6.67 0.45 0.06 11.62 
N 
 
2736 2705 2736 2608 2725 
Scandinavian Civil Law 
     Mean 
 
-0.07 26.77 0.41 0.38 0.67 
Median 
 
-0.13 29 0 0 0.73 
Max 
 
2.59 29 1 1 1.09 
Min 
 
-1.11 24 0 0 0.33 
SD 
 
1.00 2.35 0.49 0.49 0.27 
N 
 
200 200 200 200 200 
German Civil Law 
      Mean 
 
0.10 22.02 0.50 0.88 3.45 
Median 
 
0.02 13.5 0.5 1 2.78 
Max 
 
4.78 32 1 1 10.73 
Min 
 
-1.11 11.5 0 0 0.07 
SD 
 
0.99 8.97 0.50 0.32 2.54 
N 
 
1038 976 1038 1038 1038 
French Civil Law 
      Mean 
 
0.04 20.28 0.42 0.24 2.55 
Median 
 
-0.13 22.5 0 0 2.78 
Max 
 
6.90 28.5 1 1 4.61 
Min 
 
-1.11 2 0 0 0.01 
SD 
 
1.03 6.05 0.49 0.43 1.48 
N 
 
964 897 964 959 962 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the multivariate analyses for observations split by 
legal origin. 
 
7.4.2 Ideological Alignment 
Table 7.5 presents the regression results of opposition on legal origin and the 
importance of equity in the constituent’s home country, as well as an indicator for U.S. 
or E.U. origin. For Equation A in Table 7.4, OPPOSE, is regressed on dummy 
variables for French, German, and Scandinavian civil law, with English common law 
serving as the reference group. Control variables from section 7.3.2 are included but 
not reported. The results show a significant positive relation between opposition and 
German legal origin. This holds for changes related to both types of issues: 




Classification and Measurement and Disclosure and Other, even if at a lower order of 
significance (10%). Equation E includes all of the explanatory variables in Equations 
A-C apart from U.S. and E.U. origin and equation F includes all. The results confirm 
the significant positive relation between opposition and German legal origin, as well 
as showing a significant positive relation between opposition and French legal origin 
for classification and measurement issues as well as all issues. This confirms that the 
IASB is less ideologically aligned with lobbyists from countries of German and 
French legal origin than lobbyists from English common law countries and is 
consistent with Hypothesis 7.1 A, that opposition varies with legal origin. There is no 
significant difference between Scandinavian and English legal origin which could 
suggest that they are equally well aligned with the IASB. However, when changing 
the reference group to Scandinavian legal origin there is no evidence of a significant 
difference between this group and any other group despite its low mean levels of 
opposition. This is likely due to this group representing only 4% of the observations. 
The results from Equation B show that opposition to proposed changes does not tend 
to vary significantly with the importance of equity. Contrary to expectations, and 
hypothesis 7.2 A, there is a significant, positive coefficient for EI_RANK for two out 
of the three equations when the additional explanatory variables are included. 
However, the coefficient is marginal at 0.005, indicating that the changes in 
opposition are negligible. Legal origin may, therefore, better predict clustering in 
variation in opposition than the importance of equity, as it better captures enforcement 
of standards and the operating environment of the financial industry, and thereby the 
resulting impact of the standards. 




There is partial support for hypothesis 7.3 A, as the relationship between OPPOSE 
and the dummy variable for U.S. origin is negative, and significant at 10%, for the 
pooled sample. The relation between OPPOSE and E.U. origin is significant and 
positive for all issues. Equation D includes all additional explanatory variables apart 
from legal origin as all U.S. constituents are categorised as English common-law 
origin. The results of this equation show that the lobbyists from the E.U. tend to 
oppose classification and measurement issues significantly more than other lobbyists 
do, and that U.S. lobbyists tend to oppose disclosure and other issues significantly less 
than other lobbyists do.  
The same analysis is also carried out for the greatest participants in the standard 
setting process by including dummy variables for Australia, France, Germany, U.K., 
and the U.S. reveal that French lobbyists tend to oppose changes to classification and 
measurement issues significantly more which is likely to be driving the high European 
opposition. This is also consistent with the aforementioned opposition by French 
banks to the treatments in IAS 39 prior to the European adoption which led to the E.U. 
carve-out of the abolition for macro-hedging (Armstrong and Jagolinzer 2007). 





Table 7.5 Multivariate Regression Output 
All Issues (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Constant -1.609*** -1.622*** -1.694*** -1.710*** -1.791*** -1.811*** 
FRENCH 0.051 
   
0.174*** 0.147** 
GERMAN 0.111*** 
   
0.202*** 0.181*** 
SCANDINAVIAN 0.032 

















Adjusted R2 9.70% 9.50% 9.70% 9.70% 10.00% 10.10% 
N 4938 4778 4925 4778 4778 4778 
Classification and Measurement 
Constant -1.534*** -1.516*** -1.607*** -1.631*** -1.713*** -1.738*** 
FRENCH 0.083 
   
0.219*** 0.191*** 
GERMAN 0.094* 
   
0.196*** 0.177*** 
SCANDINAVIAN 0.160 

















Adjusted R2 8.20% 7.90% 8.20% 8.20% 8.50% 8.60% 
N 3074 2978 3064 2978 2978 2978 
Disclosure and Other 
Constant -1.111*** -1.137*** -1.210*** -1.220*** -1.271*** -1.303*** 
FRENCH 0.005 
   
0.101 0.067 
GERMAN 0.138** 
   
0.208*** 0.172** 
SCANDINAVIAN -0.148 

















Adjusted R2 10.40% 10.40% 10.50% 11.00% 11.20% 11.50% 
N 1864 1800 1861 1800 1800 1800 
This table displays the results of the individual multivariate regressions. Standard errors are clustered on comment letter. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 




7.4.3 Special Interest Lobbying 
The explanatory variables are included separately in logit model 7.2 to test whether 
any country-specific characteristics affect the relationship between the IASB choosing 
to reject a proposed change and opposition by the lobbyist, in the same way as in 
Chapter 6. The coefficients from the logit regressions for the pooled sample as well as 
by type of accounting issue are presented in Table 7.6. Moreover, the effects of 
opposition are tested at regular intervals from the minimum (-1.113) to the maximum 
(6.9) value of OPPOSE and presented graphically in Figures 7.1-7.3.  
The predictive margins graphs (the upper graphs) in Figures 7.1-7.3 visualise the 
predicted probability of the IASB rejecting a change at various levels of OPPOSE. 
The average marginal effects of a unit increase in OPPOSE are displayed in the 
average marginal effects graphs (the lower graphs) in Figures 7.1-7.3 with 95% 
confidence intervals indicated. The upper graphs correspond to the lower graphs by 
plotting the derivatives of the predicted probabilities plotted in the upper graphs.  
















Variable Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
Legal Origin 
























































      Equity Dependence 
























































   
   U.S., E.U., and Other 
     Constant -0.660* 
 
0.118 








































This table presents the coefficients from the logit regression analysis, equation 7.2, run for all observations as 
well as separately for observations relating to classification and measurement issues, and disclosure and other 
issues. Errors are clustered on comment letters. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Average marginal effect for continuous variables must be tested at specified probabilities and are as such 
reported graphically in Figures 7.1-7.3. 
 








This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the legal origin of the lobbyist’s home country. These graphs are developed based on the average 
marginal effects of lgal origin from model 7.2 for the pooled sample. 




Figure 7.1 (B) Impact of Opposition based on Legal Origin 
Classification and Measurement 
 
 
This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the legal origin of the lobbyist’s home country. These graphs are developed based on the average 
marginal effects of lgal origin from model 7.2 for observations relating to classification and measurement issues. 
 




Figure 7.1 (C) Impact of Opposition based on Legal Origin 
Disclosure and Other Issues 
 
 
This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the legal origin of the lobbyist’s home country. These graphs are developed based on the average 
marginal effects of lgal origin from model 7.2 for observations relting to disclosure and other issues. 





Figure 7.1 presents the predictive margins and average marginal effects for lobbyists 
from various legal origins. The upward sloping curves in the predictive margins graph 
(upper) indicate that the predicted likelihood of rejection increases with opposition for 
all groups in the pooled sample. As the average marginal effects (lower) are all above 
0 and the line indicating the lower confidence interval consistently remains above 0, it 
can be concluded that, overall, lobbyists from all legal origins are influential in the 
process as increased opposition is related to increased likelihood of the IASB rejecting 
the change. Therefore, whilst there was some indication that the tendency to oppose 
changes varies with legal origin, the tendency for the IASB to take account of the 
opposition of constituents does not, on average, vary with legal origin.  
When the model is applied separately to the observation for the different type of 
accounting issues, presented in Figures 7.1 (B and C), it is clear that the overall effects 
for the pooled sample were mainly driven by the observations pertaining to 
classification and measurement issues. For these issues, increased opposition by 
constituents from countries with English, French, or German legal origin tend to 
increase the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its proposals. However, the positive 
average marginal effect of a unit increase in OPPOSE by lobbyists of Scandinavian 
legal origin is insignificant at values of OPPOSE between -0.6 and 2.0. Only 28 
observations fall in this region, whereas most observations (84 out of 118) for the 
Scandinavian group fall below -0.6 at which level a unit increase in OPPOSE 
generates a positive, significant average marginal effect. What is more telling about 
the process, is that lobbyists from Scandinavian civil-law countries, despite making up 
just 4.3% of the sample, together with lobbyists from English common-law countries 
are the ones able to block changes to disclosure and other issues. This is indicated by 




the steep upward sloping predictive margins curves and the significant positive 
marginal effects at all common values of OPPOSE. In contrast, the predictive margins 
curves for OPPOSE given French or German legal origin are nearly flat. Similarly, the 
average marginal effects of increases in opposition for these groups are not significant.  








This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the importance of equity of the lobbyist’s home country. These graphs are developed based on the 
average marginal effects of equity importane from model 7.2 for the pooled sample. 
 
 




Figure 7.2 (B) Impact of Opposition based on Equity Dependence 
Classification and Measurement 
 
 
This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the importance of equity of the lobbyist’s home country. These graphs are developed based on the 
average marginal effects of equity importane from model 7.2 for observations relating to classification and measurement issues.. 




Figure 7.2 (C) Impact of Opposition based on Equity Dependence 
Disclosure and Other 
 
 
This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the importance of equity of the lobbyist’s home country. These graphs are developed based on the 
average marginal effects of equity importane from model 7.2 for observations relating to disclosure and other issues.. 





The predictive margins and the average marginal effects of OPPOSE given varying 
degrees of the importance of equity in the lobbyists’ home countries are presented in 
Figures 7.2 (A-C). Given the results for legal origin, the results are unsurprising. The 
predictive margins show slightly steeper curves for countries with significant equity 
markets which, in the split sample analysis is found to be driven by disclosure and 
other issues. This graph, the lower in Figure 7.2 (C), shows that the steepness of the 
curve for the predictive margins is greater when the importance of equity is greater. 
Further, only the group with the highest equity importance scores, i.e. Hong Kong, 
Australia, the U.K., and Singapore are significantly influential at the 5% level of 
significance.
44
 Moreover, the legal origin of these countries is English common law.  
                                                 
44
 The group with the second highest equity importance scores is significantly influential at a lower 
order of significance (10%). When classifying the importance of equity in two or three groups, 
according to the median, or according to 0-33, 34-66, 67-100 percentiles of the equity importance mean 
rank, the group with the greatest importance of equity remains influential for disclosure and other issues 
at 5% significance. 








Figure 7.2 Impact of Opposition based on Equity Dependence 




This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the lobbyists being from the U.S., an E.U. country, or another country. These graphs are developed based 
on the average marginal effects from model 7.2 for the pooled sample. 
 




Figure 7.3 (B) Impact of Opposition - U.S., E.U., and Other 
Classification and Measurement 
 
 
This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the lobbyists being from the U.S., an E.U. country, or another country. These graphs are developed based 
on the average marginal effects from model 7.2 for observations relating to classification and measurement issues. 
 




Figure 7.3 (C) Impact of Opposition - U.S., E.U., and Other 
Disclosure and Other 
 
 
This figure presents the predictive margins of opposition and the average marginal effect of a unit increase (standard deviation) in 
OPPOSE depending on the lobbyists being from the U.S., an E.U. country, or another country. These graphs are developed based 
on the average marginal effects from model 7.2 for observations relating to disclosure and other  issues. 
 
Figure 7.3 Impact of Opposition U.S., E.U., and Other 
 




The U.S. and the E.U. 
From Figures 7.3 (A-C), which illustrates the predictive margins and average marginal 
effects of opposition from U.S., E.U., and other constituents, there is no indication that 
there is a significant difference in the impact on the IASB’s likelihood to reject a 
proposal between the three groups as all are significantly influential in the pooled 
sample and for classification and measurement issues. In addition an F-test reveals 
that there is no significant difference between the three groups in the average marginal 
effects of OPPOSE on the predicted likelihood of REJECT.  
For disclosure and other issues in Figure 7.3 (C), the predictive margins graph for U.S. 
constituents is not significant at any values of OPPOSE as is indicated by the lower 
graph which shows that the average marginal effects not being different from 0. U.S. 
constituents were shown to express significantly lower levels of opposition to these 
types of accounting issues, i.e. they tended to agree more with the IASB initially in 
comparison to other constituents. However, although it may appear that U.S. 
constituents are not influential, the difference in the average marginal effects between 
the three groups is not significant.   
7.4.4 Subsample of Opposing Responses 
The results presented in section 7.4.3 include observations that do not oppose the 
change and are testing the effect of increasing opposition by one standard deviation. 
This would not necessarily lead to a change from agreement to opposition. Therefore, 
to remove this potential bias from the results, and to allow for a model where the 
explanatory variables can be tested jointly, model 7.3 is tested on a subsample of 
observations which oppose the change. The left column of Table 7.6 presents the 
results of the subsample of observations that contain explicit disagreement. However, 




as hypothesised and confirmed in Chapter 5, this form of opposition does not 
effectively represent the way comment letters express their opposition and are able to 
block changes. Therefore, another subsample, based on the composite opposition 
measure, i.e. which additionally takes account of the negativity in the response is 
derived from the observations which have an opposition score, greater than 1, i.e. one 
standard deviation from the mean.
45
 The results are presented in the right column of 
Table 7.7. 
                                                 
45
 This score was chosen as it represents a similar number of observations to those containing 
disagreement. As there is no absolute limit for the level of opposition that is definitely opposing the 
change, this may seem like an arbitrary allocation. Therefore several values are tested and the results 
are robust for all values within the top quartile of opposition, above 0.497. 













 Panel A: Legal 
Origin 








 FRENCH 0.011 0.002 
 
0.084 0.019 
GERMAN 0.078 0.017 
 
0.101 0.023 
SCANDINAVIAN 0.047 0.011 
 
0.323 0.073 
EI_RANK 0.003 0.001 
 
0.01 0.002 
















      Panel B: U.S. and 
E.U. 








 U.S. 1.643 0.368 
 
2.023** 0.455*** 
E.U. -0.052 -0.012 
 
0.044 0.01 















   7.51% 
  
7.43% 
This table presents the coefficients and average marginal effects from equation 7.3 for subsamples of observations where lobbyists 
explicitly disagrees with the proposed change or expresses high levels of opposition. Errors are clustered on comment letters.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05  
 
Panel A of Table 7.7 presents the coefficients and average marginal effects of legal 
origin, with English common-law serving as the reference group and the importance 
of equity in the lobbyist’s home country. For both samples it can be concluded that 
there is no significant marginal effect in the relation between the probability that IASB 
will reject a change and the legal origin of the opposing lobbyist.  
Panel B of Table 7.7 focuses on the effect of the opposing lobbyist being from the U.S. 
or the E.U. The insignificant average marginal effects in the sample of observations 
that explicitly disagrees confirm the findings in Chapter 5, that explicit disagreement 
is an ineffective means of trying to influence the IASB. However, the average 




marginal effects of U.S. origin are positive, of great magnitude, and highly significant 
for the subsample of observations containing high levels of opposition. The average 
marginal effect indicates that, on average, an opposing U.S. constituent is 45.5% more 
likely to block a change than are their non-U.S. equivalents.  
7.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Perhaps the most anticipated source of conflict within international accounting 
standard setting stems from concerns of implementing an accounting system that has 
been developed according to Anglo-American accounting traditions and may 
contradict the demand for, and purpose of, accounting in different countries (e.g., Ball 
2006). For example, IFRS incorporate features, such as fair value accounting, which 
aim to constrain earnings management, an undesirable feature of reporting in Anglo-
American market systems. The emphasis on constraining earnings management has 
been argued to be a feature of the short term view of myopic capital markets, where 
there is pressure on firms to put capital to its most effective use at all times. However, 
this may not be appropriate in other capitalist systems where more long-term financial 
planning requires firms to build up financial reserves to smooth out future crises 
(Nölke and Perry 2007).  
The empirical literature supports that the demand and incentives for low earnings 
management are dependent on institutional features facilitating outsider systems of 
finance (Ball et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003; Burgstahler et al. 2006). In addition, the 
academic accounting literature largely assesses the quality of IFRS according to their 
impact on information content (e.g., Daske et al. 2008) and value relevance (e.g., 
Barth et al. 2008) in capital markets. This investor focus raises some concerns 




regarding the suitability of IFRS to countries with insider systems of finance and how 
the standard setting process facilitates this development.  
This chapter has addressed the role of country-specific factors on lobbying in the 
development of financial instruments accounting. To do so, the differences in 
propensity to oppose IASB’s proposed changes were tested by OLS regression models 
and the impact of this opposition on the likelihood of the IASB rejecting the proposed 
changes was tested by marginal effects analysis from logit models.  
The results support that the ideology guiding the initial stages of the development is 
mostly aligned with preferences of lobbyists from English common-law countries, 
especially when it comes to classification and measurement issues. Opposition to 
proposed changes is significantly lower in responses from English common-law 
countries, than from French and German civil-law countries, and consistent with 
expectations, as IFRS, in general, are developed with an investor focus as per Anglo-
American accounting traditions (Nobes 2003). This is particularly so in the context of 
financial instruments accounting, as the first discussion papers and exposure drafts 
were the results of a joint project between the IASC, the predecessor to the IASB, and 
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, and primarily based on U.S. 
standards (Camfferman and Zeff 2007).  
Unsurprisingly, U.S. constituents are more ideologically aligned with the IASB when 
it comes to disclosure and other issues. In contrast, European constituents are found to 
oppose the changes that the IASB suggests, especially as regards classification and 
measurement issues. This is mainly driven by French lobbyists who tend to oppose 
changes to classification and measurement issues significantly more than other 
lobbyists. Again, this is unsurprising, given the opposition that French banks 




expressed to IAS 39 prior to the E.U. adoption of IFRS, which ultimately led to the 
European carve-out for the abolition of macro-hedging (Armstrong and Jogolinzer 
2005).  
Overall, legal origin does not have a significant impact on the effect of opposition for 
the pooled sample. However, for observations of responses to disclosure and other 
issues, it was found that increases in opposition by lobbyists from Scandinavian civil-
law countries, despite making up just 4.3% of the sample, and from English common-
law countries, is associated with increases in the likelihood of the IASB rejecting its 
proposed change. There is no such significant relationship for responses from German 
and French civil-law countries.  
Further, only the group with the highest equity market importance, i.e. Hong Kong, 
Australia, the U.K., and Singapore, were found to be significantly influential at the 5% 
level of significance for disclosure and other issues. Influence over these issues seems 
to be granted to lobbyists from countries where the importance of disclosure is a 
particularly important feature of the accounting system. For example, Nobes (1998) 
and La Porta et al. (2006) found that disclosure requirements are positively correlated 
with more developed stock markets, and Ball (2000) found that this was approximated 
by common-law legal origin. However, as indicated in the literature on accounting 
culture, the more fine-tuned division of legal origin is more suitable as it separates the 
Scandinavian civil-law countries, where the accounting culture is more similar to 
Anglo-American accounting, from French and German civil-law countries (e.g., Gray 
1988). These results, therefore, support that, for these issues, where there is less wide-
spread opposition in general, influence is granted to those with the more similar 
ideology to the IASB and who place the greatest importance on these types of issues.  




As increases in opposition do not always represent a change from agreeing to 
opposing a change, the results of the effect of country-specific characteristics may be 
understated in the analysis of special interest lobbying for the full sample. Therefore, 
analysis was carried out on a subsample of opposing lobbyists. The results suggest 
that opposing constituents from the U.S. are more likely to be successful in blocking 
proposed changes than are their non-U.S. counterparts. U.S. influence has been argued 
to be a factor due to the institutional similarities of the U.S. and international standard 
setting process (Buthe and Mattli 2011). The institutional similarities are largely a 
result of American influence over the restructure of the IASC into the IASB (see 
Camfferman and Zeff 2007). The influence of the U.S. standard setter, the FASB, is 
also formalised in a memorandum of understanding and the commitment to achieve 
convergence between U.S. and the IASB. The results show that this influence is also 
reflected in constituent lobbying.  
In conclusion it seems that the IASB is developing standards for financial instruments 
in line with the Anglo-American view of accounting, i.e. for the purpose of enabling 
firms to obtain equity finance. However, as this is not compatible with the purpose of 
accounting in many countries where firms rely less on capital markets for external 
finance, compromises are made to appease opposing parties. Special interest influence 
is afforded to many constituents, but there is some evidence to indicate that the most 
influential constituents in the process are U.S. lobbyists. The bias in international 
accounting towards the Anglo-American view of financial reporting, therefore, 
appears to be a feature throughout the development of financial instruments 
accounting. These results, therefore, reinforce the concerns that international standards 
are being developed that are not suitable to all reporting environments. 






8.1 Motivations and Aims of the thesis 
As highlighted throughout this thesis, the implementation of IFRS has been 
controversial and problematic. The requirements in the IASB’s standards for financial 
instruments have been particularly contentious, and the project to improve these 
standards has remained so ever since it was added to the agenda of the IASB in 2001. 
There have been concerns as to the extent various interested parties are granted 
influence over these standards. In particular, it has been argued that the financial 
industry is well placed to influence the IASB and its operating bodies (e.g., Perry and 
Nölke 2005) and there have been calls for academic research to further our 
understanding of the influence of this group (e.g., Arnold 2009). 
In addition, our understanding of constituent participation in accounting standard 
setting is limited due to the costly and time consuming methodologies that have been 
employed in prior research. The most common approach, manual content analysis of 
comment letters, only facilitates small scale studies or case studies, as opposed to a 
large scale empirical test (Skinner 2008). These studies have researched standard 
setting in the U.S. (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Brown 1981; Mian and Smith 
1990; Brown and Feroz 1992; Saemann 1999), the U.K. (e.g., Hope and Gray 1982; 
Jupe 2000; Weetman 2001), Australia (e.g., Coombes and Stokes 1985), Germany 
(e.g., McLeay et al. 2000), and in an international context (e.g., Kenny and Larson 
1993, 1995; Hodges and Woods 2004; Kwok and Sharp 2005; Hansen 2011; Giner 
and Arce 2012).   




The evidence of constituent influence in prior literature is mixed. This may be due to 
various factors, such as the different accounting issues under examination and the 
standard setting body in question, but also to the shortcomings of manual content 
analysis and the lack of an appropriate theoretical framework. Therefore, the aim of 
this thesis was to develop and employ a suitable methodology to produce robust 
evidence of the opportunity for influence in the IASB’s development of accounting 
standards via an analysis of financial instruments accounting. In doing so, the 
methodology was developed based on the ideology theory of regulation. Further, the 
possibility of using textual analysis was explored in order to come up with a more 
objective and replicable method than manual content analysis for identifying 
constituent opinions in comment letters.  
The ideology theory of regulation sees regulation as the joint outcome of the ideology 
of the standard setter and the special interest lobbying that may affect its decision. 
Therefore, it was necessary to develop a methodology which could isolate the special 
interest component. As such, the methodology focused on instances where the IASB 
had proposed changes that revealed the organisation’s intended course of action. It 
was then analysed whether lobbyists that opposed the proposals were able to block the 
changes from being implemented, thus influencing the IASB to deviate from its 
intended course of action. 
The methodology advanced throughout the thesis and was employed to address 
whether there is room for special interest lobbying to influence the standards in the 
IASB’s financial instruments project. Moreover, it was used to identify sources of 
influence in the project in terms of constituent groups. Finally, it was analysed 
whether country-specific characteristics, or being from a particularly powerful 
economy, affected lobbyists’ level of opposition, or their lobbying success.  




8.2 Summary of Findings 
8.2.1 The IASB Takes Account of External Influence 
Chapter 5 provides robust, objective evidence that the IASB takes account of external 
influence. It shows that the IASB is less likely to implement a proposed change if it 
has been met with higher levels of negativity. Further, logistic regression analysis 
provided robust results that whilst explicit opinion is only significant when a lobbyist 
agrees with the proposal, the measure of negativity is consistently found to affect the 
IASB’s decisions as whether or not to implement a change. This highlights the 
importance of more sophisticated textual analysis than solely identifying explicit 
opinion.  
Moreover, lobbyists are largely adept to the IASB’s tendency to dismiss explicit 
disagreement and the chapter affords insight into how interested parties try to 
persuade the standard setter. For example, it shows that explicit disagreement is rare 
and that high levels of negativity tend to be combined with longer responses. This 
signals that lobbyists spend greater effort when they oppose the proposed change and 
are trying to change the position of the IASB than when they agree with the proposal.  
8.2.2 The Business Community Influences IFRS for Financial Instruments. 
The results in Chapter 6 show that, ideologically, regulators are the group most similar 
to the IASB, followed by accountants. This is indicated by the lack of opposition in 
comment letters, and consistent with the ability of these groups to bring issues to the 
agenda of the IASB. Contrary, lobbyists from the financial industry, followed by the 
rest of the business community, are the most vocal in their opposition to the IASB’s 
proposals. 




All major constituent groups are found to be influential in the process in general. That 
is, increased opposition from accountants, the financial industry, the business 
community, regulators, or national standard setters, tend to increase the likelihood of 
the IASB rejecting its proposed changes. However, for issues relating to disclosure 
and other issues, this type of influence is limited to the business community with no 
other constituent group being found to have a significant effect on the IASB’s decision.  
Whilst ideologically preparers are not the group catered for, it is the group that most 
actively takes advantage of the remaining room for influence by extensive comment 
letter submissions. The IASB’s likelihood to grant them influence confirms results 
from prior literature that indicate, that where standard setters change their position, 
this is in line with the wishes of the preparer group (e.g., Brown and Feroz 1992; 
Saemann 1999; Hope and Gray 1992; Jupe 2000; Kwok and Sharp 2005).  
However, concerns that regulators are captured by the financial industry (e.g., Hardy 
2006), or that the financial industry exerts undue influence over the accounting 
standard development (e.g., Perry and Nölke 2005; 2006), may not be as strong as 
previous researchers have suggested. The analysis shows that the financial industry 
opposes the proposed changes the most, and significantly more than the business 
community and regulators, which suggests that they are the least aligned with the 
IASB’s ideology. Moreover, whilst all major constituent groups are found to be 
influential, interestingly, the financial industry is the only group with significantly less 
influence than the rest of the business community, overall.  




8.2.3 Financial Instruments Accounting is Influenced by Anglo-American 
Preferences. 
Chapter 7 shows that the IASB’s proposals on financial instruments accounting are 
being developed mainly according to preferences of lobbyists from English common-
law countries, especially when it comes to classification and measurement issues. 
Opposition to proposed changes is significantly lower in responses from English 
common-law countries than from French and German civil-law countries. Further, the 
results support that U.S. constituents are more ideologically aligned with the IASB 
when it comes to disclosure and other issues. In contrast, E.U. constituents are found 
to oppose the IASB’s proposals significantly more than other constituents, especially 
as regards classification and measurement issues.  
The analysis of the pooled observations and the observations pertaining to 
classification and measurement issues show no evidence that influence is dependent 
on country-specific characteristics. However, for observations of responses to 
disclosure and other issues, it was found that influence was limited to lobbyists from 
English common-law and Scandinavian civil-law countries, as well as countries with 
high equity importance. Disclosures are particularly important in countries with these 
characteristics (see Nobes 1998; La Porta et al. 2006) which is likely to influence the 
success of the lobbying actors. Moreover, Chapter 7 also analyses a subsample of 
highly opposing observations. The results show that highly opposing constituents from 
the U.S. are 43% more likely to be successful in blocking proposed changes than their 
non-U.S. counterparts.  




8.3 Conclusions and Opportunities for Future Research 
The thesis has developed a robust methodology for analysing accounting standard 
setting. Text analysis facilitates a novel, yet robust way of improving our 
understanding of the effects of third parties on the resulting accounting standards. 
However, existing word lists and methods need to be modified to this context. The 
thesis has developed a way of making these modifications whist maintaining 
objectivity on part of the researcher. This, therefore, generates a range of opportunities 
for investigation of the development of various standards in various settings. 
Sutton (1984) and Georgiou (2010) found that comment letter lobbying is linked to 
other methods of lobbying. This assumption is crucial for research based on comment 
letters to capture the political process in which a standard is developed. However, 
exactly how constituents participate in the process, and how comment letter 
submissions are linked to other forms of lobbying, is still largely unknown. In addition, 
where lobbying failed to alter the macro-hedging requirements in IFRS for example, it 
was instead successful in influencing enforcement via the EC’s decision to adopt the 
standard with a carve-out for these treatments. Therefore, lobbying efforts to affect 
financial reporting are not limited to lobbying the IASB, and future research could 
explore how interested parties exert pressure on various bodies, and its impact on 
financial reporting. 
Whilst the thesis employs the methodology and provides robust evidence that the 
IASB takes account of constituent preferences when expressed within the due process, 
it is limited to observable lobbying and provides no evidence of covert lobbying. 
Therefore, future research could address how political forces beyond comment letters 
affect financial reporting. A potential avenue is to investigate the extent to which 




external influence guides the agenda of the IASB. Agenda setting arguably includes 
the most important decisions that the IASB makes, and our knowledge of the role of 
political forces in this setting is limited. 
Further, the emergence of the ideological conviction of the IASB board members has 
been argued to be linked to the financialization of the economy (Nölke and Perry 2007; 
Arnold 2009). In support of this, Allen and Ramanna (2013) found that FASB 
members with a background in the financial industry tend to propose standards that 
rely on fair value measurement, which has been on the rise in both American and 
international accounting. This is in contrast to the financial industry’s widespread 
opposition to fair value accounting found by Kwok and Sharp (2005). The thesis finds 
that the ideological similarity between the IASB and the financial industry is 
particularly low, and that whilst the financial industry is influential when it comes to 
classification and measurement issues, it is significantly less so than the business 
community. Further investigation into the potential interplay between accounting 
standard setting and the financial industry via other lobbying methods, or other 
organisations, is therefore a potential area for future research. 
The thesis confirms that Anglo-American features of accounting are favoured 
throughout the development of financial instruments accounting. This is consistent 
with expectations, as IFRS, in general, are developed with an investor focus as per 
Anglo-American accounting traditions (Nobes 2003). U.S. constituents appear 
particularly influential despite not having adopted the standards. The IASB and the 
FASB have made efforts to converge their standards on financial instruments which is 
likely to have facilitated U.S. constituents’ superior influence. However, both standard 
setting bodies have announced that this project has failed and decided to diverge on 




several issues. Whilst the thesis provides support that there is conflict in the 
preferences between American and European constituents, academic research could 
address under what circumstances parties are most likely to be influential. For 
example, will U.S. constituents remain influential if the convergence project is not 
resumed? 
Finally, the thesis provides no value judgement as whether constituent influence 
provides a healthy balance or is detrimental to financial reporting. As discussed, 
financial reporting attributes differ across countries but it is unclear which attributes 
are the most desirable features. In order to make these value judgements, future 
research could address what the impacts are of increasing relevance at the expense of 
losing reliability, and whether international financial reporting should generate 
unbiased or conservative accounting income.   
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Appendix 1: Signatories to the IASC Constitution of 1973 
Australia The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia 
 Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
  
Canada Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
  
France Ordre des Experts Comptables et des ComptablesAgréés (Order 
of Accounting Experts and Qualified Accountants) 
  
Germany Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland (Institute of 
Auditors in Germany) 
 Wirtschaftsprüferkammer (Chamber of Auditors) 
  
Japan Nihon Kouninkaikeishi Kyoukai (Japanese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants) 
  
Mexico Instituto Mexicano de Contadores Públicos (Mexican Institute 
of Public Accountants) 
  
Netherlands Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants (Netherlands 
Institute of Registered Auditors) 
  
United Kingdom & 
Ireland 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland 
 Association of Certified Accountants 
 Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants 
  
United States of 
America 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
  
Reproduced from Camfferman and Zeff 2007, p. 49 
  




Appendix 2: Key Points of the Constitution of the IASC. 
 
1973 Inception and 
constitution. 
– IASC members shall formulate and promote compliance with its basic 
standards. The extent of non-compliance should be disclosed. 
– Maximum two board members per country, nominated by the accountancy 
bodies that were signatories to the constitution (see appendix) 
– Each country represented shall have one vote. 
– A two-thirds majority is required to issue proposals through exposure 
drafts addressed to professional accountancy bodies.  
– Standards issued for publication must be approved by three-quarters of the 
total voting rights. 
– Each country shall contribute one ninth of the budget established by the 
committee. 
– The permanent office shall be in London. 






– The standards should no longer be referred to as ‘basic’ in the constitution. 
– The committee may have two non-founder members on a rotation basis but 
founder members were not subject to re-election. 
– The IASC board should determine how much each country should 
contribute. 
– Membership was redefined as all of the professional accountancy bodies 
that were signatories to the Constitution in 1973 or that subsequently 
become members, dropping the term ‘associate member’. 






– Eliminated the distinction between founder members and non-founder 
members. 
– IFAC Council was to nominate and appoint up until thirteen board 
members of whom nine should be from countries with the highest status 
and development of the accountancy profession.  
– The board could appoint four other organisations with an interest in 
financial reporting to be members of the IASC. 
– Board members term was five years and re-appointment was allowed. 
– IFAC member bodies should ensure that published accounts comply with 
the standards and disclose the compliance. Non-compliance was no longer 
required to be disclosed. 
– IFAC would contribute 10% of the IASC’s annual budget. 
    
1992 Change of 
constitution 
– IASC gets the power to raise funds. 
– The administrative office should no longer be required to be London. 
–  Removed the notion that membership should be drawn from IFAC. 




– Each member body will have one vote which can be made by proxy. 




Appendix 3: IAS Plus Timeline 
IAS 32 
September 1991 Exposure Draft E40 Financial Instruments 
January 1994 E40 was modified and re-exposed as Exposure Draft E48 Financial Instruments 
June 1995 The disclosure and presentation portion of E48 was adopted as IAS 32 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation 
1 January 1996 Effective date of IAS 32 (1995) 
December 1998 IAS 32 was revised by IAS 39, effective 1 January 2001 
17 December 2003 Revised version of IAS 32 issued by the IASB 
1 January 2005 Effective date of IAS 32 (2003) 
18 August 2005 Disclosure provisions of IAS 32 are replaced by IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures effective 1 January 2007. Title of IAS 32 changed to Financial 
Instruments: Presentation 
22 June 2006 Exposure Draft of proposed amendments relating to Puttable Instruments and 
Obligations Arising on Liquidation 
14 February 2008 IAS 32 amended for Puttable Instruments and Obligations Arising on Liquidation 
1 January 2009 Effective date of amendments for puttable instruments and obligations arising on 
liquidation 
6 August 2009 Exposure Draft Classification of Rights Issues proposing to amend IAS 32 
8 October 2009 Amendment to IAS 32 about Classification of Rights Issues 
1 February 2010 Effective date of the October 2009 amendment 
16 December 2011 Offsetting Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities (Amendments to IAS 32) issued 
17 May 2012 Amendments resulting from Annual Improvements 2009-2011 Cycle (tax effect of 
equity distributions). Click for More Information 
1 January 2013 Effective date of May 2012 amendments (Annual Improvements 2009-2011 Cycle) 
1 January 2014 Effective date of December 2011 amendments 
 
Source: Deloitte. IAS plus. IAS 39/ [online] available at: http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standards/standard31  [accessed 
9/10/2012] 





October 1984 Exposure Draft E26 Accounting for Investments 
March 1986 IAS 25 Accounting for Investments 
1 January 1987 Effective date of IAS 25 
September 1991 Exposure Draft E40 Financial Instruments 
January 1994 E40 was modified and re-exposed as Exposure Draft E48 Financial Instruments 
June 1995 The disclosure and presentation portion of E48 was adopted as IAS 32 
March 1997 Discussion Paper: Accounting for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities 
June 1998 Exposure Draft E62 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
December 1998 IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
April 2000 Withdrawal of IAS 25 following the approval of IAS 40 Investment Property 
October 2000 Limited revisions to IAS 39 effective 1 January 2001 
1 January 2001 Effective date of IAS 39 (1998) 
21 August 2003 Exposure Draft Fair Value Hedge Accounting for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest 
Rate Risk (Macro Hedging) issued for public comment 
17 December 2003 Revised version of IAS 39 issued by the IASB 
31 March 2004 IAS 39 revised to reflect Macro Hedging 
17 December 2004 Amendment issued to IAS 39 for transition and initial recognition of profit or loss 
1 January 2005 Effective date of IAS 39 (Revised 2004) 
14 April 2005 Amendment issued to IAS 39 for cash flow hedges of forecast intragroup 
transactions 
15 June 2005 Amendment to IAS 39 for fair value option 
18 August 2005 Amendment to IAS 39 for financial guarantee contracts 
1 January 2006 Effective date of the April, June and August 2005 amendments 
6 September 2007 Proposed amendment to IAS 39 for exposures qualifying for hedge accounting 
22 May 2008 IAS 39 amended for Annual Improvements to IFRSs 2007 
1 January 2009 Effective date of the May 2008 amendments to IAS 39 
30 July 2008 Amendment to IAS 39 for eligible hedged items 




13 October 2008 Amendment to IAS 39 for reclassifications of financial assets 
1 July 2008 Effective date of the October 2008 reclassifications amendment 
22 December 2008 Proposed amendment to IAS 39 for Embedded Derivatives Assessment 
12 March 2009 Amendment to IAS 39 for embedded derivatives on reclassifications of financial 
assets 
16 April 2009 IAS 39 amended for Annual Improvements to IFRSs 2009 
1 July 2009 Effective date of the July 2008 and March 2009 amendments 
1 January 2010 Effective date of the April 2009 revisions to IAS 39 




Classification and measurement provisions of IAS 39 replaced by IFRS 9 effective 
1 January 2013, with earlier application permitted 
 
Source: Deloitte. IAS plus. IAS 39/ [online] available at: http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standards/standard38 [accessed 
9/10/2012] 
  





22 July 2004 Exposure Draft ED 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures  
18 August 2005 IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures issued Click for IASB Press Release 
1 January 2007 Effective date of IFRS 7 
10 January 2008 IFRS 3 (2008) is issued as a consequence deleting paragraph 3(c) – scope 
exemption for acquirer for contracts for contingent consideration 
14 February 2008 IAS 32 is amended for puttable instruments and obligations arising on 
liquidation, adding to IFRS 7 paragraph 3(f) scope exemption for such 
instruments classified as equity 
22 May 2008 Consequential amendment to IFRS 7.3(a) following from Improvements 
amendment to IAS 27, IAS 28 and IAS 31. The requirement to present 
additional disclosures of IAS 27, IAS 28, and IAS 31 in the individual financial 
statements accounting for interests in subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures in 
accordance with IAS 39 has been deleted. 
13 October 2008 Amendment to IFRS 7 for disclosures relating to reclassifications of financial 
assets.  
1 July 2008 Effective date of the October 2008 reclassifications amendment 
23 December 2008 Exposure Draft of proposed amendments to IFRS 7 issued (project 
abandoned January 2009) 
5 March 2009 Amendment to IFRS 7 on enhancing disclosures about fair value and liquidity 
risk.  
1 January 2009 Effective date of the:  
 March 2009 enhanced fair value disclosure amendments  
 scope exemption for puttable instruments classified as equity  
 exemption from presenting additional IAS 27, IAS 28 and IAS31 
disclosures amendment  
1 July 2009 Effective date of the January 2008 IFRS 3 consequential amendment 
6 May 2010 IFRS 7 amended for Annual Improvements to IFRSs 2010 
7 October 2010 Amendment to IFRS 7 on enhancing disclosures about transfers of financial 
assets.  
1 January 2011 Effective date of May 2010 amendment to IFRS 7 
1 July 2011 Effective date of October 2010 amendment to IFRS 7 related to transfers of 
financial assets 
16 December 2011 Mandatory Effective Date and Transition Disclosures (Amendments to IFRS 9 
and IFRS 7) issued 
16 December 2011 Disclosures — Offsetting Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities 




(Amendments to IFRS 7) issued 
1 January 2013 Effective date of December 2011 amendment to IFRS 7 related to offsetting of 
financial assets and financial liabilities 
1 January 2015 Effective date of December 2011 amendment to IFRS 7 related to transition to 
IFRS 9 (or otherwise when IFRS 9 is first applied) 
Source: Deloitte. IAS plus. IAS 39/ [online] available at: http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard47  [accessed 9/10/2012] 
 
  





14 July 2009 IASB issues exposure draft Financial Instruments: Classification and 
Measurement 
12 November 2009 IASB issues IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, covering classification and 
measurement of financial assets, as the first part of its project to replace IAS 39. 
Concurrent with issuing IFRS 9, the IASB published a Project Summary and 
Feedback Statement and a separate Summary of Responses to European Concerns. 
28 October 2010 IASB reissues IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, incorporating new requirements on 
accounting for financial liabilities and carrying over from IAS 39 the requirements 
for derecognition of financial assets and financial liabilities. Concurrent with 
reissuing IFRS 9, the IASB published a IASB feedback statement. 
4 August 2011 IASB publishes an exposure draft proposing to push back the mandatory 
effective date of IFRS 9 Financial Instruments from 1 January 2013 to 1 
January 2015. 
16 December 2011 IASB publishes Mandatory Effective Date and Transition Disclosures 
(Amendments to IFRS 9 and IFRS 7), which amends the effective date of IFRS 9 to 
annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2015, and modifies the relief from 
restating comparative periods and the associated disclosures in IFRS 7 
1 January 2013 Original effective date of IFRS 9, with early adoption permitted starting in 2009 
1 January 2015 Revised effective date of IFRS 9, with early adoption permitted. 
 
Source: Deloitte. IAS plus. IAS 39/ [online] available at: http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard49  [accessed 9/10/2012] 
  




Appendix 4: Archive IASB Projects - Comment Letters 
 Draft Memorandum of Understanding on the role of Accounting Standard-Setters and their 
relationships with the IASB, 10th Aug 2005  
 
 ED 3 Business Combinations, 14th Jul 2005  
 
 Exposure draft of proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement and IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts, November 2004  
 
 ED7 – IAS 39 Financial Instruments – Disclosures, October 2004 
 
 IAS 39 Financial Instruments – Cash Flow Hedge A/c of Forecast Intra Group 
Transactions, October 2004 
 
 IAS 39 Financial Instruments - Transition and Initial Recognition of Financial Assets 
and Financial Liabilities, October 2004  
 
 ED Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement: The Fair Value Option (2004) 
 
 Proposed Amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits-Actuarial Gains and Losses, Group 
Plans and Disclosures (issued for comment 29 April 2004) 
 
 Discussion Paper Preliminary Views on Accounting Standards for Small and Medium-sized 
Entities, 6th Oct 2004 
 
 Exposure Draft ED 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (issued for 
comment 15 January 2004 
 
 ED on Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement – Fair Value Hedge for a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate Risk, 14 Nov 
2003 
 
 ED 5 Insurance Contracts, 10th Dec 2003 
 
 ED2 Share-based Payment Comment Letters March 2003 
 
 Amendments to IAS 32, Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, and IAS 39, 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, 14 October 2002 
 
  
 Exposure Draft E65 - Agriculture 1999  
 
Source: IFRS Foundation 2012b. Archive IASB Project – Comment Letters. [online] available at: 
http://www.ifrs.org/Archive/Pages/Archive-IASB-Project-Comment-Letters.aspx [accessed: 10/10/12] 




Appendix 5: All Projects since 2006 in Alphabetical Order 
Project name 
[click on the name to 
access the project page] 






Ongoing August 2011 - Agenda consultation document na 
Amendments to IFRS 1 Completed 
December 2010  
The IASB issued two narrow amendments to IFRS 1 
- Severe Hyperinflation and Removal of Fixed Dates 
for First-time Adopters 




The IASB issued amendments that relieve first-time 
adopters of IFRSs from providing the additional 
disclosures introduced in March 2009 by Improving 
Disclosures about Financial Instruments 
(Amendments to IFRS 7 




The IASB amended the retrospective application of 
IFRSs for first-time adopters 
 
 Completed May 
2008 
The IASB issued Cost of an investment in a 
subsidiary (Amendments to IFRS 1 and IAS 27) 
1 January 2009 





The IASB issued Improving Disclosures about 
Financial Instruments (Amendments to IFRS 7 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures) 
1 January 2009 
Annual improvements na Project cycle 2009-2011 
 
Project cycle 2008-2010 
1 January 2013 
Borrowing costs Completed 
March 2007 
The IASB issued a revised IAS 23 January 2009 







The IASB issued IFRS 3 Business Combinations and 
an amended version of IAS 27 Consolidated and 
Separate Financial Statements 
1 July 2009 
Business combinations 
under common control  
Paused As of an agenda decision from September 2007 na 
Conceptual framework   Ongoing   




The IASB and the FASB, the U.S. national standard-
setter, complete the first stage of conceptual 
framework 
na 
Phase B - Measurement 
objectives 
 November 2005 - Discussion paper  na 




Phase D – Reporting 
entity 
 March 2010 - Exposure draft   





The IASB issued IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial 
Statements; IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interest in Other 
Entities 
1 January 2013 
Consolidation: 
Investment entities 
Ongoing August 2011 -  Exposure draft Investment Entities na 






October 2009 - The IASB integrates the project 






The IASB issued Amendments to IFRS 7 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures  
TBC 
Earnings per share Paused August 2008 - Exposure draft Simplifying Earnings 
per Share (Proposed amendments to IAS 33) 
na 
Effective dates Paused October 2010 - The IASB together with the U.S.-
based FASB published a Request for Views to 
gather views with a comment period that ended on 31 
January 2011  
na 
Embedded derivative Completed 
March 2009 
The IASB issued Embedded Derivatives 
(Amendments to IFRIC 9 and IAS 39) 
Annual periods 
ending on or 




Paused Agenda decision outstanding  na 
Extractive activities Paused July 2010 - Discussion paper Extractive activities na 
Fair value measurement Completed May 
2011 
The IASB issued IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement 1 January 2013 
Financial Instruments projects [FI] 




The IASB issued Eligible Hedged Items 
(Amendment to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement) 






or after 1 July 
2009 
FI with characteristics 
of equity 
Paused February 2008 - Discussion paper Financial 
Instruments with Characteristics of Equity 
na 
FI - puttable Completed The IASB issued Amendments to IAS 32 
Financial Instruments: Presentation and IAS 1 
1 January 2009 




instruments  February 2008 Presentation of Financial Statements — Puttable 
Financial Instruments and Obligations Arising on 
Liquidation  
Replacement of IAS 39 
 
  







The IASB issued IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. 
The standard covers the classification and 
measurement of financial assets. 
 
The IASB adds the requirements for classifying 
and measuring financial liabilities to IFRS 9 
See project 
Effective dates 
Phase II – Amortised 
cost and impairment of 
financial assets 
Ongoing January 2011 - Supplementary document na 
Phase III – Hedge 
accounting: 











FI - Asset and liability 
offsetting 
Completed 
December 2011 - the IASB and FASB issued 
common disclosure requirements on offsetting. 
The IASB issued Disclosures - Offsetting 
Financial Assets and Financial 
Liabilities (Amendments to IFRS 7)   









Phase A Completed 
March 2006 
The IASB issued a revised IAS 1 Presentation of 
Financial Statements 
 
Phase B - Replacement 
of IAS 1 and IAS 7 
Paused July 2010 - Staff draft na 
Phase B – Presentation of 
items of OCI 
Completed June 
2011 
The IASB issued Amendments to IAS 1 Presentation 
of Financial Statements 
1 July 2012 
FSP – Discontinued 
operations 
Paused July 2010  - Staff draft of proposed standard  na 






The IASB issued Group Cash-settled Share-based 
Payment Transactions (Amendments to IFRS 2) 
TBC 
IFRS for SMEs Completed July 
2009 
The IASB published the IFRS for SMEs na 





financial assets - 
Amendments to IAS 39 
and IFRS 7 
Completed 
October 2009 
The IASB permitted the reclassification of 
financial instruments 
1 July 2008 
Income taxes Completed 
December  2010 
The IASB issued Amendments to IAS 12  
Insurance contracts Ongoing July 2010 - Exposure draft Insurance contracts na 
Intangible assets Deferred   
Investment in debt 
instruments 
na December 2008 - Exposure draft Investments in 
Debt Instruments (Proposed amendments to IFRS 
7)  
 
Joint ventures Completed May 
2011 
The IASB issued IFRS 11 Joint arrangements January 2013 
Leases Ongoing August 2010 - Exposure draft Leases na 
Liabilities Paused April 2010 -  IASB staff paper Recognising liabilities 














The IASB issued Amendments to IAS 19 Employee 
Benefits 
1 January 2013 




The IASB issued IAS 19 Employee Benefits, which is 
effective from 1 January 2013.  
  




The IASB included amendments in Amendments to 
IAS 19 Employee Benefits 
 





The IASB issued Amendments to IFRIC 14 1 January 2013 
PEB - Discount rate for 
Employee Benefits 
Stopped October 2009 - Board decides not to proceed na 
Rate-regulated activities Paused July 2009 - Exposure draft Rate regulated activities na 
Related party disclosures Completed 
November 2009 
The IASB issued a revised IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosures 
1 January 2011 
Revenue recognition Ongoing June 2010 - Exposure draft Revenue recognition na 
Share-based payment - 
vesting conditions and 
cancellations (IFRS 2) 
Completed 
December 2007 
The IASB issued Amendments to IFRS 2 Vesting 
Conditions and Cancellations 
1 January 2009 




Segment reporting Completed 
November 2006 
The IASB issued IFRS 8 Segment reporting  
Transition Guidance—
amendments to IFRS 10 
 Completed 
December 2001 
IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial Statements arising 
from the exposure draft published in December 2011. 
  
 
Source: IFRS Foundation 2012a. All projects since 2006 in alphabetical order. [online] available at: http://www.ifrs.org/Current-
Projects/IASB-Projects/Pages/All_projects.aspx [accessed 10/10/2012] 
  




Appendix 6: Additions to the Master Dictionary 













































































































   
verifiability 307 
This table reports the words that did not match words in Loughran and McDonald's master 
dictionary but that were added to the new master dictionary and the number of occurrences 
 
 
 
